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Abstract 
This thesis offers a systematic study of accountability in the voluntary sector. Existing studies 
of accountability tend to veer towards normative and prescriptive analyses, which fail 
effectively to model accountability mechanisms. They do not test the relationships between 
the diverse variables that can explain practices of accountability in voluntary organisations. 
Equally, they typically promote what I term ‘thin’ conceptualisations of accountability, either 
privileging the dimension of transparency or that of stakeholder engagement. Adding to such 
studies, this thesis develops a ‘thick’ account of accountability practices which brings 
together these two privileged dimensions, transparency and stakeholder engagement, in a 
hybrid model that breakdowns stages, levels, and mechanisms of stakeholder engagement. In 
so doing, it not only tests the validity of this innovative model of accountability across the 
voluntary sector, but also enables lessons to be drawn as to the significance of different 
practices of transparency and stakeholder engagement, how these dimensions interact, and 
the impact of variables such as organisational size, affiliation, levels and sources of income 
and policies and practice guidelines on accountability.  
Through the quantitative analysis of an original survey of voluntary organisations in England 
and Wales prior to austerity, the thesis draws attention to the inconsistent practices of 
transparency and stakeholder engagement across the sector. In so doing, it throws doubt on 
the narrative of organisational fixes, suggesting that there is no identifiable nor significant 
trend in the relationship between organisational affiliation, age, and size and practices of 
accountability.  More importantly, the study foregrounds the complex interactions of policy 
and practice, shedding doubt on whether policies or the existence of a formal policy actually 
matters in terms of explaining practices of accountability. It reveals the complexity 
surrounding policy and practice when considering participation or transparency. On the one 
hand, the existence of a formal policy did not lead to any significant improvement in levels of 
stakeholder engagement and participation. But the existence of guidelines on how to action 
the policy did impact significantly on participation and engagement practices. On the other 
hand, as for transparency policies, the existence of procedures and guidelines of transparency 
policy impacted positively upon levels of transparency. But having simply a policy in place 
appeared to impact negatively on levels of transparency. And finally, policies and procedures 
in stakeholder participation and engagement appeared to be more effective at improving 
transparency than transparency policies and practices. 
Finally, the study raises the importance of ‘accounting for accountability’ through recourse to 
‘thick’ interactive models of accountability, which combine levels of transparency and 
participation in one hybrid model. Combining transparency and engagement, the study 
demonstrates, is statistically proven to explain a higher level of accountability in the 
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ACCOUNTABILITY AND VOLUNTARY ORGANISATIONS 
 
In the last thirty years, from attempts to bring about the mixed economy of welfare 
onwards, successive governments have taken a serious look at the role that voluntary 
organisations or the third sector can play in the provision of public services. Contractual 
relations between the state and the voluntary sector have grown in significance, as large 
voluntary organisations have taken shape on the back of their predominant positions in 
service delivery markets. Voluntary organisations have become in many fields one of the 
prominent providers of public services acting as replacements or supplements for 
government providers. In the aftermath of the financial crash in 2008, voluntary 
organisations were in many ways seen as a source of greater efficiency, with government 
seeking to build the capacity of the sector in order to deliver services whilst simplifying 
the outsourcing of services from the public sector.  
 
The Conservative and Liberal Democratic Coalition government‘s short-lived vision of a 
'Big Society' in 2010 called for public service providers to be replaced with a variety of 
private and voluntary organisations (Purkis,  (2011). Conservative thinking viewed the 
voluntary sector as underused, undervalued but importantly already over-regulated or 
controlled like a mini-public sector caught within a net of bureaucratic controls 
(Macmillan, 2010 p.8). Yet, at the same time, its call for the development of a Big Society 
was part and parcel of a move towards austerity that, while advancing the role of voluntary 
organisations, imposed severe cuts to public funding, particularly local government, and 
threatened the very existence of voluntary groups which had in some cases become overly 
dependent on state funding and grants. As such, austerity appeared to confirm concerns 
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across the voluntary sector that increasing involvement in delivering public services might 
undermine its independence, increase bureaucracy and regulations, and lead to part of the 
sector becoming a shadow state services imposing cutback management on local 
communities (Macmillan, 2010).  
 
The increasing involvement of voluntary and community organisations in the delivery of 
state-funded services has created tensions, growing concerns over accountability and 
regulation within the sector. On the one hand, voluntary organisations have always faced 
the challenge of convincing stakeholders, particularly donors, that their cause is worthy 
and trusted, and that their promises and claims are well taken care of and supported. 
Stakeholder engagement is for this reason often fundamental as a key mechanism for trust 
in decision-making process across the sector (NCVO, 2004; Jepson 2005; McCambridge, 
2004). But, on the other hand, as Bolton (2005, p.2) has claimed, as the state has drifted 
away from direct service provision ‘to ensuring that these [services] are provided, so the 
focus of regulation has shifted from relatively simple questions of probity to more complex 
questions of performance.' As such, accountability practices within voluntary organisations 
have had increasingly to accommodate competing challenges, associated with both 
engagement and transparency, posing new questions over to whom they are accountable, 
and for what.  
 
Questions of accountability have at times become embroiled with concerns over trust and 
confidence about whether the sector is able to provide a high level of accountability and 
transparency in their operations (Kendall and Knapp, 1996; Cairns et al., 2005; Wenar, 
2006; Raynard, 2000; Slim, 2000; Leat, 1996). Significantly, Gibelman and Gelman 
(2001, 2004), in their study of scandals in the voluntary organisations in the UK and USA, 
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argued that the wrongdoers were board members and chief executives, drawing attention to 
the relative capacity of the strategic apex within voluntary organisations to ensure 
adequate practices of oversight. However, understanding accountability practices in the 
voluntary sector poses a number of difficulties. The sector is incredibly diverse, bringing 
about a range of economic and social contributions.  It also draws upon a whole set of 
different streams of funding, each with its particular rules, engagements and expectations, 
as well as multiple sets of stakeholders. In 2007 to 2008, before the onset of austerity 
measures across British society, the voluntary sector amounted to a workforce of 668,000 
and controlled assets worth £97 billion. It had an income of £36 billion, with 37 per cent of 
total income derived from direct donations from the public (individuals), and 36 per cent 
from government sources (UK Civil Society Almanac, 2010).  Government contributions 
were split relatively evenly between contracts and grants, 49 per cent compared to 51 per 
cent respectively. Over the next decade the trend in the proportional structure of the 
government’s contribution to the sector changed dramatically (see Figure 1.1), with 
contracts replacing grants as the dominant funding mechansism.  By 2013/14 
government’s grants had declined to just 19 per cent of total funding, and approximately 
half of this grant funding came from the European Union (EU). As for government 
contracts, they had grown in significance to account for 81 per cent of the total 
government contribution to the sector (UK Civil Society Almanac, 2016). In terms of the 
overall proportion of funding to the voluntary sector, the contribution of government has 
remained relatively stable, standing at 34 per cent in 2013/14. However, the mechanism of 
that funding has been transformed, with a clear push towards contracts over grants.  
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Figure 1.1:  Income from government contracts and grants, 2000/01 to 2013/14 (£bn, 
2013/14 prices) 
 
Source: the UK Civil Society Almanac 2016 
 
In addition to changes to funding regimes, accountability within voluntary organisations 
differs from other accountability types in other organisational contexts across both the 
private and the public sectors. Unlike business organisations, voluntary organisations have 
no shareholders nor do they distribute profits. Members of their board of governance are 
more aptly considered to be stakeholders and they are unpaid. Unlike many public sector 
organisations, voluntary organisations have boards that are not democratically elected or 
appointed, or even responsible to the community as a whole (Leat, 1996; Kendall and 
Knapp, 1996; Jepson, 2005). They are unique because the basis of their practices of 
accountability lies in the way they manage their relationships with stakeholders. This type 
of accountability states that the power is shared between the organisation and its 
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stakeholders (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006b; Kendall and Knapp, 1996; Jordan, 2005; 
Leat, 1988).  
 
Such sharing of power in principle creates tensions between downward accountability and 
upward accountability. Downward accountability means accountability to beneficiaries, 
whilst upward accountability refers to accountability to donors. They encapsulate different 
models of accountability. Upward accountability tends to be understood through the 
principal-agent perspective which employs managerial/technical approaches to serve the 
needs of donors in relation to beneficiaries (Leat, 1988; Wallace and Chapman, 2003; 
Ebrahim, 2003; Townsend and Townsend, 2004). These managerial and technical 
approaches do not account for broader perspectives of ‘giving account’ in which 
beneficiaries, and other stakeholders, have the right to hold voluntary organisations 
accountable for their actions. However, this broad perspective of accountability is, 
arguably, much more relevant to the way voluntary organisations are governed (Unerman 
and O’Dwyer, 2006b; Wallace and Chapman, 2003; Neligan, 2003; Blagescu et al. 2005). 
 
Against this background of complexities and tensions, this thesis offers a systematic study 
of accountability in the voluntary sector. Existing studies of accountability tend to veer 
towards normative and prescriptive analyses, which fail effectively to model accountability 
mechanisms. They do not test the relationships between the diverse variables that can 
explain practices of accountability in voluntary organisations. Equally, they typically 
promote what I term ‘thin’ conceptualisations of accountability, either privileging the 
dimension of transparency or that of stakeholder engagement. Adding to such studies, this 
thesis develops a ‘thick’ account of accountability practices which brings together these 
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two privileged dimensions, transparency and stakeholder engagement, in a hybrid model 
that breakdowns stages, levels, and mechanisms of stakeholder engagement. In so doing, it 
not only tests the validity of this innovative model of accountability across the voluntary 
sector, but also enables lessons to be drawn as to the significance of different practices of 
transparency and stakeholder engagement, how these dimensions interact, and the impact 
of variables such as organisational size, affiliation, levels and sources of income and 
policies and practice guidelines on accountability.  
 
At the heart of the thesis sits the quantitative analysis of an original survey of voluntary 
organisations in England and Wales and their practices of transparency and stakeholder 
engagement. In keeping with a post-positivist perspective, it adopts a cross-sectional 
methodology that measures multiple variables so as to critically examine the relationships 
between these different variables. The survey design aims to identify the primary 
organisational and governance factors that determine accountability practices and to 
subsequently evaluate their explanatory power in relation to the innovative model of 
accountability advanced in the thesis. These latter objectives are important to note. The 
thesis seeks ultimately to test a model of accountability rather than report on existing 
practices of accountability in the voluntary sector. Its sample of survey returns predates the 
waves of austerity and public spending cuts since 2010. Thus, whilst the sample returns 
and the analysis can be used, as it is here, to validate new models of accountability, it acts 
as an important evidence-base of accountability practices before austerity. It thus provides 
a valuable dataset upon which to base future studies into the impact of austerity on the 
voluntary sector and accountability, as well as setting out key lines of inquiry and potential 
hypotheses for such studies.  
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Against this background, I set out below the research questions that informed the study, 
then briefly establish its main findings and contributions before turning to an outline of the 
organisational structure of the thesis. 
 
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
Reflecting the objective of the thesis to systematically test a novel model of accountability 
across voluntary organisations, the overarching research questions of the study are:  
1. How can accountability in voluntary organisations be best understood? 
2. What is an appropriate model of accountability for voluntary organisations? 
3. What variables have the highest explanatory power in relation to accountability 
practices within voluntary organisations?  
The aim of the study in adopting a postpositivist perspective was to measure multiple 
variables and test a ‘thick’ model of accountability that brings together the two dimensions 
of transparency and stakeholder engagement. In line with this aspiration, and more 
specifically, from the three research questions established above, a set of research 
propositions were developed. They are summarised here: 
A. Examining the relationship between the two dimensional framework of 
accountability and multiple formal variables: 
There is a relationship between the accountability framework and the 
i. Existence of policy on participation. 
ii. Existence of participation policy guidelines. 
iii. Existence of policy on transparency. 
iv. Existence of transparency policy guidelines. 
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v. Existence of code of board practice. 
 
B. Examining the relationship between the two dimensional framework of 
accountability and board functions: 
There is a relationship between the accountability framework and  
i. Managerial oriented board. 
ii. Strategic oriented board.  
C. Examining the relationship between the two dimensional framework of 
accountability and variables within board structure. 
There is a relationship between the accountability framework and 
i. Board size. 
ii. Number of board committees. 
D. Examining the relationship between the two dimensional framework of 
accountability and organizational characteristic variables: 
There is a relationship between the accountability framework and 
i. The size of voluntary organisations in terms of annual income. 
ii. Source of income. 
iii. The age of voluntary organisations. 
iv. Affiliation within a regulatory body or network. 
 
1.2 UNDERSTANDING ACCOUNTABILITY: FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
In testing these research propositions, the thesis tests an innovative ‘thick’ model of 
accountability, as well as generating an evidence-base of accountability practices across 
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the voluntary sector before the full onset of the austerity measures put in place by the 
Conservative government from 2010. Broadly speaking, it makes five contributions to 
existing knowledge, challenging many of the conventional understandings of the 
effectiveness of voluntary sector organisations in terms of practices of transparency and 
stakeholder engagement. Firstly, it reasserts and confirms that before austerity the 
practices of transparency across the voluntary sector were at best patchy and inconsistent. 
Importantly, the study suggests that even if an organisation replicated one practice of 
transparency, this did not necessarily lead it to replicate other practices of transparency, 
leading to the availability of uneven information for stakeholders. 53% of respondents did 
not have a transparency policy in place.  
 
Secondly, the thesis draws attention to the equally inconsistent practices of stakeholder 
engagement. Most notably, voluntary organisations’ own staff and employees appeared to 
be more engaged than other stakeholder groups and beneficiaries, suggesting an inward-
looking bias across the sector. At the same time, involvement of beneficiaries was often on 
the lower levels of the participatory ladder of engagement (Arnstein, 1969). There was an 
inconsistant set of practices across the three elements of the participation processes 
studied: stages of engagement; influence on decisions; and mechanisms. These three 
elements were often operating at different and incompatible levels, such that the 
engagement of stakeholders in for example decision-making did not match the level of 
influence over decisions nor the mechanisms used for that engagement.   
 
Thirdly, the thesis throws doubt on the narrative of organisational fixes that suggest that 
different sectors are characterised by different logics or qualities. These narratives propose 
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that the transfer of service delivery from one sector to another will improve outcomes due 
to some inherent characteristics of each sector, be it the private sector being more 
competitive or the voluntary sector being more accountable and responsible to users. This 
study makes no such comparative analyses. But, this narrative of organisational fixes has 
also been applied to the size of organisations (the larger the better), their affiliation (best to 
operate as part of a group) and levels and sources of income (more income and more 
government income increases resources for, and expectations of, accountability 
procedures). Here the thesis suggests in relation to transparency and stakeholder 
engagement and participation, there is no identifiable nor significant trend in the 
relationship between organisational affiliation, age, and size and practices of 
accountability. This is no ‘organisational fix’ that comes from transferring services to the 
voluntary sector, at least in terms of accountability.   
 
The study does suggest that organisation respondents with higher reliance on government 
grants and funding had a higher level of transparency, although more reliance on trading 
activities appeared to have a negative impact on how organisations engaged with practices 
of transparency. Equally, affiliation, organisational age and level of income had 
differential impacts on practices, depending on whether it was level of engagement, stage 
of engagement or mechanism of engagement. However, in contrast to practices of 
transparency, and broadly speaking, sources of income, whether governmental, private or 
trading, did not appear to have any consistent impact on the three dimensions of 
participation. Rather than an organisational fix, the study identifies the complexity of 
accountability practices across organisations, surfacing a mixture of organisational ‘goods’ 
and ‘bads’ in terms of how organisational variables impact on accountability. 
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Fourthly, the study foregrounds the complex interactions of policy and practice, shedding 
doubt on whether policies or the existence of a formal policy matters in terms of 
explaining practices of accountability. The study confirmed that having a policy did not 
mean that it was implemented in practice. The complexity surrounding policy and practice 
differed according to whether participation or transparency was being considered. On the 
one hand, the existence of a formal policy did not lead to any significant improvement in 
levels of stakeholder engagement and participation. But the existence of guidelines on how 
to action the policy did impact significantly on participation and engagement practices. On 
the other hand, the existence of procedures and guidelines of transparency policy impacted 
positively upon levels of transparency. But having simply a policy in place appeared to 
impact negatively on levels of transparency. And finally, policies and procedures in 
stakeholder participation and engagement appeared to be more effective at improving 
transparency than transparency policies and practices. 
 
Finally, the study raises the importance of ‘accounting for accountability’ through recourse 
to ‘thick’ interactive models of accountability, which combine levels of transparency and 
participation in one hybrid model. Combining transparency and engagement, the study 
demonstrates, is statistically proven to explain a higher level of accountability in the 
voluntary sector. The ‘thick’ hybrid model of accountability thus opens up new avenues 
for exploring accountability. However, the implications of these main messages for 
practice will be considered in the conclusion, and I will discuss further how the findings of 
the thesis challenge many widely-held conventions of the practices of accountability across 
the voluntary sector. With this initial framing of the contribution of the study in mind, let 
us now turn to the structure of the thesis and how its contribution unfolds. 
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1.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS  
The thesis is divided into two main sections. The first section engages with the theoretical 
and methodological foundations of the study. The second section analyses the survey 
returns and the data generated by the study, drawing out the lessons for research and 
understandings of the practices of accountability. Chapters Two and Three bring together 
the hybrid model of ‘thick’ accountability, which seeks to better understand accountability 
practices of transparency and engagement across voluntary organisations. Chapters Four, 
Five and Six present the data generated (Chapter Four) and the result of the quantitative 
analysis of the sample returns, both the cross-tabulation of organisational variables 
(Chapter Five) and the regression analysis (Chapter Six) undertaken as a result.  
 
More specifically, Chapter Two examines existing approaches to accountability, drawing 
out the complexities of evaluating accountability and the limits to ‘thin’ accounts that 
privilege one dimension of accountability practices over another. In response, it sets out 
the hybrid or ‘thick’ model which is tested in the empirical chapters of the thesis. Chapter 
Three subsequently explores the research strategy underpinning the thesis, discussing the 
methodological and epistemological commitments of post-positivism before turning to the 
design and implementation of the survey that informs the study. Chapter Four reports on 
the sample returns, setting out the responses of organisations to the core areas of 
organisational capabilities, governance issues, transparency and stakeholder engagement 
practices. Chapter Five then subjects the findings of the survey to a series of cross-
tabulations, exploring the impact of organisational capabilities or characteristics on the 
practices of transparency and stakeholder engagement. Chapter Six offers a focused 
analysis of the impact of policies on such practices, using regression analysis to explore 
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how the likes of policies and codes of governance shape transparency and stakeholder 
engagement. In so doing, it also examines the explanatory capacity of the ‘thick’ model of 
accountability presented in Chapter Two to understand practices of accountability.  
 
Finally, Chapter Seven concludes the thesis, providing the reader with an overview of the 
findings of the study. It establishes the main lessons that can be drawn for the policies and 
practices of accountability in voluntary and community organisations, while suggesting 
future lines of research and investigation. I now turn to Chapter Two and the construction 
of the ‘thick’ model of accountability, which provides the foundation of the empirical 





CHAPTER TWO  
ACCOUNTING FOR ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR 
 
 
Accountability like so many issues in the social sciences remains a contested and problematic 
concept, used to describe an increasingly wide range of relationships (Ebrahim 2003a, 2003b, 
2005; Blagescu et al., 2005). Much depends on the theoretical perspective through which it is 
analysed, as well as the sector under consideration, be it the public, private or third sector 
(Jepson, 2005; Kovach et al., 2003; Leat, 1988, 1996, 1994; Jordan 2005; Mulgan, 2001; 
NCVO, 2004). For many, empirical research into the field of accountability is hampered by 
this absence of any general consensus in the literature on the meaning of accountability 
(Brandsma, 2013). The vast literature on accountability tends nonetheless to focus on four 
main questions: what does accountability mean?; accountability to whom?; accountability for 
what?; and how do organisations practice accountability? However, empirical studies, both 
qualitative and quantitative, of the practice of accountability, particularly within voluntary 
organisations, remain relatively under-developed (Ebrahim, 2010; Boven, 2010; Willems and 
Van Dooren, 2012). At the same time, the relationship between transparency and 
accountability has not been subjected to extensive empirical research (Brandsma and 
Schillemans, 2012). They supported the idea that the literature on accountability has been 
mainly prescriptive or descriptive and there is not much known about how accountability 
works in practice. Much of the literature still focuses on finding appropriate definition and 
understanding to the concept of accountability (Brandsma and Schillemans, 2012). Most 
studies tend to be limited to offering prescriptive and descriptive accounts rather than 
empirical analysis of accountability in operation, focussing on determining appropriate 
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definitions and conceptual clarifications (Brandsma and Schillemans, 2012). There are few 
studies that test the relationships between different variables in order to model effectively the 
mechanisms of accountability.  
 
This chapter addresses this lacuna in existing studies, advancing a model for measuring and 
capturing voluntary organisations accountability in practice. Section 2.1 I critically assesses 
understandings of accountability, drawing out debates over accountability and responsibility. 
Section 2.2 reviews mechanisms for delivering accountability. Section 2.3 subsequently 
argues that narrow models of accountability fail to account for the multiple stakeholders that 
might be affected by the actions of organisations. In contrast, in section 2.4 I suggest that 
rival broad perspectives of accountability acknowledge the multiplicity of stakeholders, but 
fail to model fully how transparency affects levels of accountability in organisations. Against 
this background, section 2.4 turns to the construction of a hybrid model of the practices of 
accountability, which brings together the insights of both narrow and broad perspectives of 
accountability by aggregating together the dimensions of transparency and participation. In so 
doing, I rethink understandings of transparency and participation so as to anticipate the 
hybrid model of accountability advocated in this thesis.  
 
 
2.1 ACCOUNTABILITY AS A CONTESTED CONCEPT: BETWEEN 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY  
 
Organisational accountability has continued to become more and more important issue since 
the mid-1990s. Issues such as globalisation and the introduction of mixed economy concepts 
have led governments to contract out much of public services to the private and third sectors. 
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Incidents of financial scandals and misappropriation of public money by organisations from 
both sectors, and the increase in public awareness regarding issues such as environmental 
protection and social sustainability, have all transformed the way organisations in general 
think about and react to the issue of accountability.  Hence the accountability environment in 
which voluntary organisations operate has become very complex. Voluntary organisations in 
recent years find themselves accountable to many stakeholders for many issues. As Gregory 
(2007, p. 348) states: 
One size does not fit all, and there can be no last word written on these complex 
issues. The last decades of the twentieth century saw a widespread shift to the 
contractual ‘out-sourcing’ of public goods and services; the adoption of market and 
quasi-market approaches to service delivery; […] the general emergence of what 
has been referred to as the ‘shadow state’ or the ‘hollow state’ […] The growth of 
discretionary authority has demanded increasingly higher levels of responsible 
action in the exercise of public power. But reliance on formal accountability 
procedures, essential as they are, is unlikely to guarantee these levels. Reliance on 
them alone will diminish rather than enhance them. New, more positive 
arrangements and expectations need to be established. 
 
The classic common understanding of organisational accountability is that it reflects a 
relationship between two parties, where one party has the responsibility to explain or justify 
actions to the other party (Edwards and Hulme, 1996a, 1996b; Najam, 1996b; Unerman and 
O’Dwyer, 2006a, 2006b; Leat, 1988, 1996; Ebrahim, 2003a, 2003b, 2005; NCVOs, 2004). 
However, as Bovens (2010) points out, this is but one dimension of accountability, which 
privileges accountability as a functional mechanism governing relations between institutions 
or individuals. He also draws attention to an alternative dimension, that of accountability as 
virtue, which treats accountability as a property of individuals or institutions and associates it 
with such concepts as responsiveness or transparency. This recognition of the multiple 
dimensions of accountability points to the complexity of accountability in practice. Leat 
(1988) for example argues that voluntary organisations are accountable to multiple 
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stakeholders rather than to a single authority which makes accountability in the voluntary 
sector somewhat specific and different to the classical idea of accountability. Furthermore, 
multiple stakeholders have different accountability needs and demands, which may hinder 
setting general accountability standards such as measurable performance indicators (Mulgan, 
2001).    
 
This recognition of the complexity introduced into practices of accountability by multiple 
stakeholders has provoked varied responses. For example Thomas (2014) argues that 
widening the concept of accountability to include all stakeholders who are affected by an 
organisation’s actions makes accountability a very elastic concept. It loses analytical 
purchase as it is applied more and more loosely to a wide variety of situations. Proponents of 
Thomas’s view prefer to keep the classical definition of accountability in order to avoid it 
being confused with what they argue is a different but related concept of responsibility 
(Salminen and Lehto, 2012 and Gregory, 2009). They argue that accountability should be 
used to describe formal and structured relationships based on external scrutiny of actions 
where (i) expectations are identified formally so that an organisation has to provide a 
satisfactory level of transparency in relation to those expectations, (ii) the principal must be 
specified, and (iii) the principal has the right and the capacity to impose sanctions and 
rewards on the agent. The sanctions involved should be relatively tangible and immediate 
(Leat, 1988). In this view widening the concept of accountability is problematic, since not all 
those who might be affected by an organisation’s actions have strong sanctioning power 
under requirement (iii) (Salminen and Lehto, 2012). 
 
Those who argue for a clearly drawn distinction between accountability and responsibility 
typically argue that responsibility refers to relationships based on morals and ethics (Gregory, 
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2007). Gregory claims that the two words, accountability and responsibility, are frequently 
used as if they were synonymous. He states that accountability “is a matter of political and 
organisational housekeeping, whereas responsibility is about moral conflicts and issues of life 
and death” (Gregory 2007 p.340). According to Gregory, responsibility involves an internal 
moral choice whereas accountability implies external standards and monitoring and does not 
apply in situations where the agent acts solely on the basis of their personal judgement. 
Similarly Mulgan (2000) concludes that when someone acts on their own values and out of 
free choice this should be called responsibility. While Mulgan acknowledges that the two 
concepts are linked, and holding someone to account usually implies that they are responsible 
for their actions, he argues that the linguistic roots of responsibility are entwined with the 
notion of a response or need to respond, and someone who chooses to respond can be praised 
or blamed for their actions but are not necessarily required to give an account of them 
(Mulgan, 2000).  
 
Against this background, Gregory (2007) argues that accountability in political and 
bureaucratic domains revolves around the notion of answerability to constituents. This helps 
to secure control and provide assurance to voters, and is a necessary component of 
responsibility. He argues that responsibility is about the moral obligation to answer, and 
answer honestly. This view conforms to Mulgan’s argument that responsibility is to be 
understood as the internal aspect of accountability which deals with ethics and moral 
obligations of the accountor towards the accountees (Mulgan, 2000). Supporters of the 
classical view of accountability thus acknowledge the difficulty of maintaining the definition 
of accountability, as distinct from responsibility (Gregory, 2007 and Thomas, 2014). Such 
concerns are tied to their acceptance that the environment in which accountability takes place 
is inter-dependent, devolved, and deregulated. In this context they recognise that developing 
26 
 
appropriate accountability mechanisms may lead to alternative ways of thinking about 
accountability (Gregory, 2007 and Thomas, 2014). 
 
With this in mind, Mosher (1968) makes a useful differentiation between what he called 
objective responsibility and subjective responsibility. Objective responsibility addresses the 
formal institutional framework within which those who exercise public authority work. It can 
be envisaged as a formal map, or organisation chart, which depicts the constitutional and 
organisational lines of answerability. In the agency theory perspective it is the chain of 
principal-agent relationships that constitutes the formal structure of constitutional and 
organisational authority. In contrast, subjective responsibility focuses attention on moral 
values of the agent’s actions. It focuses on duties and obligations that are felt subjectively by 
organisations, public administrators, managers, groups and individuals. Under this dimension 
answerability depends on the moral character of those who are required to be accountable so 
that accountability obligations are fulfilled responsibly. Importantly, the concept of 
accountability as answerability according to the objective responsibility perspective restricts 
accountability to being always delivered through formal processes where agents answer for 
their actions. However subjective responsibility is about issues of truth, trust and moral 
choices. 
 
This dichotomy corresponds with widely acknowledged sources of accountability. For 
example, Steward (1984) and Leat (1988) argue that accountability is derived from 
hierarchical structures, a specific act of delegation, or/and community. A hierarchical 
structure of accountability is generated by the structure of an organisation: workers are 
accountable to managers and managers are accountable to owners or funders. Accountability 
can also be generated by a particular or specific act of delegation. This might happen through 
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a contract with an external party such as a local authority or central government. For 
example, government might contract out to a voluntary organisation to deliver a public 
service on their behalf. Alternatively, accountability can also be communal, stemming from 
public expectations of an organisation or individual. Communal accountability might also 
stem from allegiances and commitment of those who accept that they are accountable to their 
communities and to the public.  
 
Such classifications of accountability very much recognise the different aspects of formal and 
moral values that constitute accountability. Indeed formal and moral values have a major role 
to play when it comes to defining the bases of accountability. In part, this depends on the 
scope of the stakeholders to which organisations find themselves accountable. Hierarchical 
structural accountability and delegated accountability implies there are a limited number of 
stakeholders who might have the right to demand accountability from an organisation or an 
individual, whereas communal accountability may imply a much larger number of 
stakeholders.  
 
This brief review has demonstrated the contested nature of accountability and its multiple 
practices. However, two primary dimensions emerge as a means of classifying the different 
perspectives. First, accountability can be categorised into narrow and broad forms according 
to how far they draw upon internal and external sources of accountability, for example the 
extent to which an organisation’s actions are scrutinised externally according to a set of 
formal standards, or alternatively, set voluntarily derived from a sense of moral and ethical 
values. Second, different perspectives can be drawn on according to whether they involve 
engagement with few or multiple stakeholders. For example, organisations can chose to 
provide only legal and contractual requirement for accountability or on the other hand 
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organisations can hold themselves accountable to all those who might be affected by their 
activities. Broad accountability differs from narrow accountability by the existence of an 
internal dimension. Agents in a broad accountability relationship have internal drivers. 
However, up until now, I have said little about the mechanisms of accountability and it is to 
an examination of these mechanisms that I now turn.  
 
 
2.2 MECHANISMS FOR DELIVERING ACCOUNTABILITY  
 
Existing literature, predominantly focuses on listing different categories or mechansims, 
whilst recognising their limited effectiveness, their interactions, and to a certain extent 
foregrounding the value-added of participatory and dialogical tools or processes. Ebrahim 
(2003a and 2010) outlines six accountability mechanisms used by voluntary organisations. 
These include: disclosure statements and reports; evaluation and performance assessments; 
participation; industry self-regulation. Social audits as a mechanism was originally 
acknowledged, but subsequently dropped and replaced by adaptive learning. Ebrahim (2003a) 
claims that most of the mechanisms are deficient in offering broad-based accountability 
addressing impacts on various stakeholders in society: ‘most mechanisms … undervalue 
long-term and qualitative assessments that are essential for understanding the real impacts of 
… NGO activity (p. 826).’ Yet, at the same time, he argues that one of these mechanisms, 
participation (or engagement with stakeholders), integrates many of the characteristics of the 
other four accountability mechanisms into a process which can both improve on and enhance 
voluntary organisations’ accountability to various stakeholders in society. All the other 
mechanisms are underpinned by forms of stakeholder dialogue which Edwards and Hulme 
(1996) argue are needed to address the problem of accounting for broader societal impacts 
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and performance. This argument was supported by Edwards and Fowler (2003) who stated 
that voluntary organisations accountability ‘… must [involve] a process of negotiation 
between stakeholders rather than the imposition of one definition or interpretation of 
‘effectiveness’ [or impact] over another’ (sited in O’Dwyer, 2007 p.291).  
 
In other words, through its explicit encouragement of engagement with stakeholders the 
participation mechanism facilitates downward accountability to beneficiaries and upward 
accountability to donors (where relevant). It also encourages the development of social 
information systems and transparency (Kilby, 2006; Gray et al., 1997) and can operate as a 
valuable means of organisational learning if stakeholder perspectives are fed back into, and 
allowed to influence, organisational decision-making processes. Fowler (1996) thus 
recommended the adoption of a continuous process of multiple stakeholder involvement to 
both project evaluation (at an operational level) and performance assessment of a voluntary 
organisation in order to expose and embrace competing stakeholder demands.  
 
However, as I shall discuss below, such an continuous process of dialogue is not without its 
difficulties. Keystone (2006)1 carried out a survey for the purpose of investigating donor and 
voluntary organisations’ perspectives regarding extending voluntary organisations’ 
accountability to other stakeholders such as beneficiaries. The study uses stakeholder 
engagement as a proxy for accountability practices among voluntary organisations. The 
results show that voluntary organisations and donors sometimes have the same agenda when 
it comes to the importance with which they regard accountability to a broad range of 
stakeholders, in particular downward accountability to those who are powerless such as 
                                                 
1 Keystone is a supporting and development UK based non for profit organisation (NGO) focusing on 
developing accountability and effectiveness in the sector. 
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beneficiaries. However, the survey results reveal that there is a practical knowledge gap 
among the respondents as voluntary organisations and donors do not seem to know how to 
operationalise the process. Successful engagement process of voluntary organisations with 
their stakeholders must influence decision-making processes and actively enable learning and 
improvement. Merely providing information and reporting will not capture the quality of 
accountability in relationships between voluntary organisations and their stakeholders. 
However, the study did not provide a clear framework for the participation process with 
stakeholders and so there was no clear answer on how to operationalise the participation 
process. 
 
In addition, engagement with stakeholders according to Edwards and Hulme (1996) requires 
a statement of goals (adherence to certain rules, policies and procedures), transparency, and 
relationships with stakeholders if there is to be effective practices of accountability. A key 
example of a project attempting to apply these types of mechanisms was the Global 
Accountability Project (GAP) of the UK charity One World Trust (Blagescu et al., 2005). 
The GAP framework unpacked voluntary organisations’ accountability into four dimensions: 
transparency, participation, evaluation, and complaint and response mechanisms; all of which 
were seen to be central to (stakeholder-focused) broad accountability processes. To 
demonstrate accountability in relation to its key stakeholders, GAP argues that voluntary 
organisations need to integrate all four of the above dimensions into its policies, procedures 
and practice at all stages of decision-making and implementation. While the framework does 
not indicate the need for formal reports, it does suggest various means of information 








The provision of accessible and timely information to stakeholders 
and the opening up of organisational procedures, structures and 
processes to assessment by stakeholders. 
Participation 
(responsiveness) 
The process through which an organisation enables key 
stakeholders to play an active role in the decision-making processes 
and activities which affect them. 
Evaluation 
(Internal drivers) 
The process through which an organisation monitors and reviews 
its progress and results against goals and objectives; feeds learning 
from this back into the organisation on an ongoing basis; and reports 




Mechanisms through which an organisation enables stakeholders 
to address complaints against its decisions and actions, and 
ensures that these are properly reviewed and acted upon. 
*Source: Adapted from Blagescu et al. (2005 p.25) 
 
The GAP framework to a great extent is based on attempts to capture the dimensions of 
transparency and participation. These two dimensions are underpinning the whole 
framework. As such, the GAP framework begins to straddle the different forms or types of 
narrow and broad accountability so far under discussion. It also begins to combine different 
explicit mechanisms of accountability. By seeking to engage with the dimensions of 
participation and transparency, the GAP model begins to open up new possibilities. It is to 
these possibilities that I now turn, first discussing narrow and broad models of accountability 





2.3 THE NARROW MODEL OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND AGENCY THEORY 
 
Agency theory has been particularly influential in thinking about accountability and public 
service contracting with voluntary organisations, with key authors in the field of voluntary 
organisations adopting this narrow concept of accountability (Crawford et al. 2009, Connolly 
and Hyndman 2000 and 2004, Brody, 2002, Mulgan, 2001, Leat, 1988 and 1996, Kearns 
1994, and Robinson, 1971).  Accountability research in the voluntary sector has also focused 
on issues related with fraud prevention and financial control (Gibelman and Gelman, 2000, 
2001). Agency theory, with its inherent distrust of agents, provides a useful framework for 
studying organisations in this context. At the same time, accountability measures and 
instruments such as competitive bidding, performance contracting, mandated quality controls, 
outcome measurement, programme evaluation and independent financial audits address 
accountability from this narrow perspective in which agents are required to account for 
expenditures and activities to ensure that they are compliant with legal, regulatory and 
contractual agreements (Kearns, 1994).  
 
Narrow accountability, with its adoption of agency theory, is centred on power delegation 
and expressed mainly through structured and hierarchical relationships (Leat, 1988, Ebrahim, 
2003b and Mulgan, 2001). Hence, accountability according to this model reflects an act of 
delegation of power between two parties. The party delegating tasks is conceptualised as 
principal and the party undertaking and accepting the tasks as agent, or in other words, one 
party is accountable and the other is accountable to. As such, its defining characteristics can 
be summarised through two fundamental elements. These are first, the right to investigate and 





In building upon such fundamental assumptions, this narrow model of accountability frames 
practices of accountability in a particular fashion. First, the narrow model of accountability 
reflects independence. One party carries out activities and responsibilities on behalf of 
another party without their immediate supervision. The principal transfers resources to the 
agent with expectations of how these resources are to be used. This reflects an element of 
trust. Once there is an act of delegation and independence it is necessary for trust to be 
involved. Subsequent to the delegation the principal will have the right to call and hold the 
agent to account.  
 
Yet, although the concept of accountability itself reflects an element of trust, the fundamental 
assumption of the agency theory is that agents cannot be trusted. Narrow accountability 
assumes that agents act opportunistically and take advantage for their personal utilities and 
benefits, especially if there is no threat of punishment (Ebrahim, 2003b, Laughlin, 1990, Gray 
et al., 1997, Mulgan, 2001, Leat, 1988, and Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006b). Agents cannot 
be trusted to complete their work and complete it to the required standard. They also cannot 
be trusted to give an accurate report about their actions. Therefore, making them accountable 
for how they have used the principal’s resources becomes strategic and as such accountability 
is primarily retrospective in nature. It often involves a responsibility for giving an account of 
an activity that has already been carried out. However, the agent can also be required to 
explain what they are going to do in the future, although the agent will not be accountable for 
the action until it is carried out.  
 
Secondly, narrow accountability also reflects an element of inequality in the relationship 
between two parties. This inequality is intrinsic to the acceptance that one party delegates 
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power to another party, and has the right to call and to hold the other party to account, whilst 
the other party is responsible to explain and give an account for the actions that been carried 
out on behalf of the delegator. At the same time, narrow accountability encompasses the right 
to impose sanctions if the action accounted for is below expectation. Sanctions are often 
tangible such as losing job or losing funding. From the principal-agent perspective, narrow 
accountability can be defined as in a relatively one-sided manner as ‘the principal’s right to 
require an account from the agent’ Ebrahim (2003b p.196) and ‘the right to impose sanction 
if the account or the actions accounted for are inadequate’ (Leat, 1988 p.20). 
 
Once again, this assumption requires clarification. Agents such as voluntary organisations are 
responsible for the utilisation of their resources and also for the provision of relevant 
information to their principals whether they are funders or government institutions or other 
stakeholders. This suggests that the element of inequality reflected in the principal-agent 
relationship offers more advantage in power and domination to the agent than to the 
principal. Agency theory suggests that one solution for principals seeking better assurance is 
to tighten control over their agents by increasing the level of specification in contracts. 
However, Laughlin (1990) finds in his study of religious types of voluntary organisations that 
as contracts become more specified and agents lose autonomy, the level of conflict increases. 
The study suggests that agents’ motivation towards working to their own agenda and 
misreporting their activities will not decrease but rather will always increase. 
 
In fact, Brandsma and Schillemans (2012) reveal the temporal dimension of accountability 
practices, drawing attention to how relationships between principal and agent evolve over 
time through three stages: providing information; discussion;  and consequences / sanctions. 
From the development of what they termed the accountability cube, they distinguished the 
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different intensity of existing studies on specific stages or accountability processes (see Table 
2.2)  Importantly, they called for studies of the  accountability relationship to examine all the 
three processes of accountability with similar levels of intensity(Brandsma and Schillemans, 
2012: 7). But, they also surfaced disparity in the levels of attention devoted to each set of 
processes in practice. They noticed that in the case of agents not meeting their targets, 
sanctions always do not take place. They thus concluded that the answerability dimension is 
often not applied in practice; rather it is replaced by a soft dialogue and discussion. Brandsma 
and Schillemans, 2012 
 
Table: 2.2 Quantitative analysis of accountability* 
*Source: Brandsma and Schillemans, 2012 p. 7 
 
While widely adopted as a way of thinking about accountability, narrow accountability with 
the principal-agent relationship at its focus, is therefore not without complications or for that 
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matter, limitations. Reporting occurs only after the agents have completed their work. The 
possibility of sanctions may discourage the agents from misconduct, however the 
retrospective nature of the accountability process provides only a weak form of control 
(Ebrahim, 2003b and Mulgan, 2001). There is little incentive for agents to give principals the 
best information in their reports (Ebrahim, 2003b). It is not in the agent’s interest to let the 
principal know that they have performed poorly. Principals do not always have the capacity 
to sanction delegated agents and a narrow definition of accountability cannot cater for 
relationships where the principal is not the higher authority. For example, in the voluntary 
sector voluntary organisations are accountable to a wide range of stakeholders but not all of 
them, for example the beneficiaries, have the ability to impose sanctions (Kearns, 1996 and 
Miller, 2002).  In fact, Schillemans and Busuioc (2015) argued that the principal agent theory 
does not fully fit for public accountability as principals  choose not to hold drifting agents to 
account, but employ methods of  dialogue and discussion before any consequences been 
applied (see also the work of Brandsma and Schillemans, 2012).  
 
In addition, in the voluntary sector sometimes it is very difficult to measure and quantify 
performance (Ebrahim, 2003b). These difficulties are amplified by the microeconomic frame 
within which agency theory operates. This frame focuses upon individual gain and survival 
and not the wider societal impacts of any behaviour (Ebrahim, 2003b). It suggests that 
voluntary organisations are operating in a constant battle for survival, which makes them only 
more dependent on and susceptible to powerful stakeholders such as major donors. However, 
the narrow definition of accountability does not recognise any stakeholders other than those 




Against this background, conceptualising accountability as a relationship between principals 
and agents enforces hierarchical thinking. Principals are assumed to have the right to control 
the behaviour of agents. Any departure from the principal’s wishes is worthy of sanction 
(Laughlin, 1990). But, principals may require agents to do things that may be considered 
inappropriate by the agents. For example, the managers of voluntary organisations (agents) 
may be expected to prioritise the needs of their funders (the principal) at the expense of 
focusing on their organisational mission (Tandon, 1995 and Kearns, 1996). In practice 
however principals often play multiple roles in relation to their agents, and agents may have 
relationships with many principals. Nonetheless, issues of morality, tradition, culture and 
ethics are arguably ignored when accountability is narrowly defined in hierarchical terms 
(Ebrahim, 2003b).  
 
Overall, many of these limitations emerge from the inability of the model of narrow 
accountability and the principal-agent perspective to cater for relationships based on trust. 
Agents are assumed untrustworthy. Formal agreements and reporting are needed as proxies 
for trust. In practice, this makes for costly and ineffective methods of accountability for many 
voluntary organisations (Ebrahim, 2003b). Many relationships across the sector are based on 
trust and their accountability mechanisms need to be designed accordingly (Ebrahim, 2003b). 
Swift (2001 p.20) stated that ‘in situations where trust is present the trusted tend to disclose 
more accurate, relevant and complete information, whereas the trusting feel less need to 
impose social controls in order to gain access to or influence over information.’ In such 
circumstances, accountability is not confined to just formal processes and reporting to a 
higher authority, but it refers more generally to a wide range of stakeholder expectations 
related to organisational performance, responsiveness, and actions. Voluntary organisations 
may feel a sense of duty that they must account to not only higher authorities in the 
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organisational structure but also to a wide range of stakeholders including the general public, 
beneficiaries, donors, staff, peer organisations and networks, and so on (Kearns, 1996). The 
trust that underpins such reporting is normally based on shared values and purposes that bring 
people together. It is fundamental to activities in the voluntary sector.  
Against this background Willems and Van Dooren (2012) argued that accountability has been 
departing from the conventional classical form to more democratic one. This view resonates 
with Friedrich-Finer debate in 1940s. Finer believed that accountability could only be 
guaranteed by maintaining hard external constraints and sanctions, whereas Friedrich argued 
that self-control is feasible based on broader array of soft internal norms and values. Picking 
up on such debates, Schillemans, Van Twist and Vanhommerig (2013) claim that 
accountability has evolved from the conventional relationship of delegation to a more 
relational one, where accountability is no longer called for by a principal but rather by 
multiple stakeholders. Thus Schillemans, Van Twist and Vanhommerig (2013) argue that 
governments open up the accountability process to engagements and interactions with 
internal and external stakeholders, which facilitates organisational learning processes in the 
public sector. Innovation in the public sector has then transformed accountability from the 
classical retrospective to a dynamic process. However, Willems and Van Dooren (2012) and 
Schillemans, Van Twist and Vanhommerig (2013) have reiterated the fact that there has been 
little empirical research on the evolving model of accountability, and with that in mind, I turn 




2.4 THE BROAD MODEL OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND STAKEHOLDER 
THEORY 
 
The inability of the narrow accountability model to explain relationships outside the 
principal-agent perspective has led to an alternative broader conceptualisation, epitomised by 
stakeholder theory. The essence of stakeholder theory is an attempt to answer the 
fundamental questions to whom organisations are accountable or which groups of 
stakeholders deserve or require an organisation’s attention (Mitchell et al., 1997 and 
Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004). It was primarily developed by researchers investigating the 
practices of private business (Freeman and McVea, 2001 and Freeman et al., 2004), and there 
may be concerns as to whether it can be applied to the voluntary organisations under 
consideration in this study. However, following the work of Barrett (2001), I argue that it 
offers a novel insight into the application of accountability in voluntary organisations. Indeed, 
Barrett suggests that because voluntary organisations are perceived to have a high level of 
responsiveness to community needs, stakeholder theory can be meaningfully applied to 
voluntary organisations. Voluntary organisations have a sense of obligation to various 
stakeholder groups identified as sharing their objectives.  
 
Broad perspectives on accountability thus in keeping with stakeholder theory relax the 
primary underpinnings of agency theory by widening the scope of accountability to all those 
affected by the delivery of services or by the work of organisations, as well as including in its 
analysis particular relationships where the agent has voluntarily chosen to undertake work so 
that no formal delegation occurs. Stakeholder theory defines an organisation’s stakeholders, 
according to Freeman and McVea (2001:4), as ‘any group or individual who is affected by or 
can affect the achievement of an organisation’s objectives.’ This definition leaves the field of 
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possible stakeholder open to include virtually anyone. However, the basis of the relationship 
is stakeholder power over the organisation derived from their stake in the organisation’s 
successful achievement of its goals and objectives (Freeman and McVea, 2001). In particular, 
managers will not be able to give an account to all stakeholders, if only because of time and 
resource limits (Mulgan, 2001). Mitchell et al. (1997) suggest that organisations classify 
stakeholders as primary and secondary, where the difference depends on the power of 
stakeholders to influence organisations’ decision-making process. They develop the idea that 
stakeholders become salient to managers to the extent that those managers perceive 
stakeholders as possessing three attributes: power, legitimacy and urgency. Power is defined 
as the extent to which managers perceive that stakeholders can impose their will on the 
organisation. Legitimate stakeholders are those that are perceived to have an acceptable claim 
on the organisation and the power to enforce their claim. Urgent claims are those that are 
time sensitive and a manager will need to respond to the claim quickly (Mitchell et al., 1997). 
Managers are more likely to provide accounts to stakeholders who they regard as having high 
values in all their attributes. 
 
Alternatively, Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) categorise the relationship between an 
organisation and stakeholders into voluntarily and involuntarily, where the organisation either 
choses to give an account (voluntarily) to the stakeholders or has no choice but to give an 
account (involuntary).  Both categorisations offer limited guidance on which stakeholders 
managers should give most attention to as both suggest that it is for the organisation to gauge 
and decide which stakeholder groups should be given an account. However, Rowley and 
Moldoveanu (2003), in contrast to the categorisation offered by Mitchell et al. (1997), allows 
for all stakeholders who might be affected by the organisation’s actions regardless of their 
power to be included in the accountability process. 
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In fact, underpinning this latter conception of accountability is the view that organisations 
have a duty towards their communities. It stresses that voluntary organisations have a moral 
duty to be responsive to their communities and to the needs of many stakeholders within 
those communities. This perspective is also described as communal accountability where the 
community is considered to be the main source of accountability (Leat, 1988). Under this 
perspective, the relationship between principals and agents is informal, morally defined, and 
based on high levels of trust. Agents have more discretion to carry out the wishes of the 
principal. Accountability occurs in social settings where roles are unclear or uncertain, less 
structured, and there is a reliance on informal communication between parties (Stewart, 1984; 
Leat, 1988; Ebrahim, 2003b; Laughline, 1990; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006b). With this in 
mind, Stewart (1984) talks of the presence of links of accountability where parties are linked 
together but there is not a clear bond of accountability such as a formal contract. Instead one 
party is responsive to the needs of the other informally. On this theme, Leat (1988) also 
identifies responsive accountability where those accountable take into account as an act of 
free will the demands of those to whom they are informally accountable. But, she views this 
as a weak form of accountability, as there are no formal sanctions. 
 
Under the broad perspective of accountability, any analysis has to allow for the fact not only 
that performance measures may be formally codified in laws and regulations but that 
measures of accountability are also defined by the subjective standards and expectations of 
those engaged in the accountability relationship. Anticipating emerging standards and taking 
proactive steps to meet them is an important aspect of an accountability relationship (Kearns, 
1996). The accepted levels of performance under the broad perspective depend on the nature 
of the relationship between the parties, and the cultural and historical contexts of the 
relationship (Ebrahim, 2003b). As such, broad forms of accountability may appear more 
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situated, more concerned with the constructions of the meaning in particular organisations, 
than with the presence of the standardised procedural regularities.  
 
 
Whilst I have drawn out the contrasting views of narrow and broad forms of accountability, 
there are what might appear at first glance to be similarities. Like narrow accountability, 
answerability is a component of the broad perspective. Organisations answer to themselves 
on performance and give accounts to the stakeholders they view as important or have agreed 
to report to, for instance to maintain their trust and reputation or, like narrow accountability, 
to report on their actions. But broad accountability’s distinct characteristic is that 
organisations allegedly believe themselves to be responsible for their actions and respond 
voluntarily to a need or demand of their stakeholders. Organisations’ responsiveness as an act 
of free will add, a moral dimension to their relationships with stakeholders. For instance 
Brown, Moore and Honan (2004) argue that an actor is accountable when they recognise that 
they have made a promise to do something and accepted a moral or legal responsibility to 
fulfil that promise. It could be a promise between two actors. Alternatively, an actor could 
believe and act as though she was accountable to an abstract purpose. Although a voluntary 
organisation may be judged on formal measures of accountability (narrow), voluntary 
organisations actions are normally based on their beliefs, values, and acceptance of 
responsibility, and as such they are guided by their commitment to broad accountability 
relationships (Najam, 1996b; Gray et al., 1997; Slim, 2002; Ebrahim, 2003b, 2005 and 2007). 
 
Overall, voluntary organisations’ commitment to broad accountability relationships should 
empower stakeholders by giving them the possibility to be part of the decision-making 
process on issues that impact upon them (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006b). This right of 
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participation in the decision-making process on a particular matter will be more justified 
when the potential impact on the lives of participant stakeholders is greater (Gray et al., 1997; 
Blagescu et al., 2005; Neligan, 2003; Najam, 1996b; Kovach et al., 2003).  
However there are two challenges with applying stakeholder theory to accountability. Firstly 
there remain questions as to why some accountability relationships are prioritised and others 
are not, in part because stakeholder theory fails to navigate between over-extending or over-
narrowing the definition of stakeholders. Secondly, stakeholder theory is concerned only in 
managing relationships and engagement with stakeholders. It stands silent on transparency. 
Organisations might use information disclosure superficially and only when it is in the 
organisation’s traditional interests (for example as part of legitimacy process and / or profit 
seeking, (Gray et al., 1997)). The stakeholder approach risks assuming that stakeholders’ 
needs can be integrated morally with those of the organisation. If this can be assumed then 
accountability to multiple stakeholders can be in the organisation’s best interests. But, as this 
study will demonstrate, this remains a risky assumption; processes engagement can be a sham 
and meaningless.  Accountability requires that participation processes are complemented with 
a fair and reasonable degree of transparency if stakeholders are to have the information 
required to act. The lack of attention given to transparency thus weakens the utility of broad 
perspectives drawing on stakeholder theory.  
 
With this acknowledgement I now turn to how a hybrid model, building on the GAP 
perspective pointed to above, can bring together a thicker analysis to accountability practices. 
Let me briefly recap on the argument so far. I have identified in the literature two models of 
accountability, narrow and broad perspectives. In my assessment of these models, each model 
over-privileges one dimension of accountability. Narrow models drawing on agency theory 
foreground practices of transparency and the adherence to formal standards, procedures and 
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expectations. However, they fail to account for how multiple stakeholders impact upon 
accountability practices. In contrast, broad perspectives draw on stakeholder theory and open 
up models of accountability to more informal and constructed measures. But, as I have just 
argued, there broad perspectives fail to grasp the demands of transparency. In short, neither 
model nor perspective provides an adequate basis upon which to test and evaluate practices of 
accountability in voluntary organisations. With that in mind, I now turn towards the 
construction of an alternative hybrid model which enables a thicker analysis of the practices 
of accountability, and draws upon the promise of the GAP analysis to straddle the distinct 
dimensions of accountability but which remains still in its infancy (Gusinsky, et.al, 2015)  
 
2.5 TOWARDS A HYBRID THICK MODEL OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Writers such as Gusinsky, et.al, (2015) and Hood (2010) have made the argument for the 
relevance of attaching the term transparency to accountability. However, again, there has 
been a lack of empirical effort by researchers to test this combined conceptualisation of 
accountability (Brandsma, 2013; Brandsma and Schillemans, 2012; Boven, 2010; Fox, 
2007; Hood, 2010; Gusinsky, et.al, 2015).   In this section, I build on the limits of existing 
mechanisms of accountability to frame accountability around the two dimensions of 
organisational transparency and stakeholder participation in the decision-making process. 
It follows that I test the assumption that combining the two mechanisms can yield a better 
predictability power to accountability practices within voluntary organisations (see Figure 
2.1).  
I address these two dimensions in turn. Each discussion establishes how these dimensions 



















The term transparency is normally associated with vision and visibility. According to the 
Cambridge dictionary it means: ‘the characteristic of being easy to see through’ and ‘the 
quality of being done in an open way without secrets.’ This definition contains three key 
characteristics: ‘see through’ which implies seeing things with clear visibility through a 
medium; operating in an ‘open way’; and ‘without secrets.’ I will try in this section to discuss 
the concept of transparency through the lens of these three characteristics.  
 
In line with this definition, the concept of transparency is more comprehensive than being 
just about the visibility of information through an organisation’s website or through any other 
medium. Providing useful information to stakeholders is equally a primary condition that 
underpins the effectiveness of the transparency process. Michener and Bersch (2013) describe 
useful information as inferential: it can easily be used to draw verifiable inferences. 

















Figure 2.1: Framing the research model 
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operations and activities (Hood, 2010). This enables stakeholders to monitor and evaluate the 
voluntary organisation’s performance and action against its objectives, and targets.     
 
Other researchers contrast transparency with secrecy. For example Florini (1998) states that: 
‘secrecy means deliberately hiding your actions; transparency means deliberately revealing 
them’ (p.1). The emphasis here is on the will and the purpose of an organisation to act 
deliberately in a certain way. This implies a broad definition of transparency which enables 
organisations to assess their transparency by looking at the purpose of taking certain actions, 
policies or practices. This broad definition can, following Balkin (1998), be based upon three 
interconnected factors. These are not only (i) traditional access to information, but also (ii) 
participation in making decisions, and (iii) accountability for actions. Rawlins (2009) argues 
that transparency requires all three elements to be present in order for the organisation to be 
transparent and for it ultimately to be able to build (and restore if necessary) trust with 
stakeholders. Rawlins (2009) believes that transparency consists of ‘information that is 
truthful, substantial, and useful; participation of stakeholders in identifying the information 
they need; and objective, balanced reporting of an organization’s activities and policies that 
holds the organization accountable’ (p.74). Thus, Rawlins adds value and quality to Balkin’s 
(1998) elements of transparency (see also the works of Heise, 1985; Gower, 2006; Blagescu 
et al., 2005; Strathern, 2000; Martinson, 1996; Klaidman and Beauchmap, 1987; Cotterrell, 
2000). 
 
Indeed, existing studies establish a set of conditions as to what it means to be transparent. 
Heise (1985) argues that transparency requires that ‘all legally releasable information 
whether positive or negative in nature’ should be made available ‘in a manner which is 
accurate, timely and balanced’ (p. 209). Gower (2006) argues that a transparent organisation 
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should make information available to its stakeholders about its activities, policies and 
decisions in order for those interested in the organisation’s activities to have the opportunity 
to ascertain, understand, and assess these activities. She states that ‘stakeholders must 
perceive or believe that the organisation is transparent and that they are being told everything 
they need to know’ (p. 96).  
 
However, mere information disclosure may not mean anything and does not necessarily lead 
to public trust nor represent transparency. Disclosure alone can undermine the purpose of 
transparency which can lead to confusion rather than enlighten reality (Balkin, 1998 and 
Gower, 2006). For example, confusion may occur when relevant information is hidden in a 
large body of irrelevant information so that stakeholders cannot access easily the information 
required. Balkin (1998 p.1) refers to this type of transparency as ‘a form of transparency that 
is not transparent at all.’  
 
Taking such criticism into account, transparency is about openness and not about the 
magnitude and the amount of information disclosed. Strathern (2000) agrees with this. He 
states that transparency is only useful when it enhances understanding and is not just about 
the amount and the flow of information. Equally, Martinson (1996) argues that the goal of 
transparency is to ‘truthfully communicate the reality of a particular subject-incident-event-
etc.’ (p. 43). He argues that truthful communication and disclosure of information should 
meet the standards of ‘substantial completeness’ (Klaidman and Beauchmap, 1987 p. 35 cited 
in Martinson, 1996 p. 43). Klaidman and Beauchmap (1987) define substantial completeness 
as ‘the point at which reasonable [...] (people’s) requirements for information are satisfied’ 
(p.35). Hence, the key to achieving substantial completeness is for organisations to know 
their stakeholders’ demands and needs.   
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In fact, Cotterrell (2000) argues that transparency as ‘a process involves not just availability 
of information but active participation in acquiring, distributing and creating knowledge’ 
(p.419). Similarly, Rawlins (2009) argues that the element of stakeholder participation 
promotes disclosure to transparency and that stakeholders must be invited to participate or be 
consulted in order to identify the information needed by the stakeholders for the right 
decisions to be made. Rawlins (2009 p. 75) says that ‘transparent organizations are 
accountable for their actions, words, and decisions, because these are available for others to 
see and evaluate.’ A transparent organisation provides information to its stakeholders beyond 
annual reports and statutory information required by law or other regulatory body. 
Transparency is a process that occurs continuously and not just in the annual report once a 
year. Voluntary organisations should be open about their structures, activities and decisions, 
listen to stakeholders and encourage their input in order to develop and improve their 
transparency. If organisations fail to disclose information that they are required to disclose by 
law then sanctions will be imposed against them. However, transparency is more than 
providing statutory information. It should be a continuous process of making stakeholders 
aware and informed about the organisational operations, programmes, activities, staff and 
governance. Based on the above discussion Figure 2.2 depicts a transparency system for 
voluntary organisations. The model shows that transparency is generated by providing 
stakeholders with information that is not required by law to be revealed. In addition, it 
suggests that an organisation should engage with its stakeholders in order to meet their needs 
and requirement. The items under the ‘Transparency’ heading in figure 2.2 will be used to 
develop a scale to measure the extent of organisations’ involvement in providing information 








Past research has focused heavily on examining the disclosure of information in annual 
reports (Dhanani and Connolly, 2012p; Connolly, Hyndman and McConville, 2013; 
Hyndman and McConville, 2016). For example, Dhanani and Connolly (2015) adopted a dual 
strategy method in carrying-out the research through content analysis of the annual report and 
semi-structured interviews. Their research found that voluntary organisations focused their 
efforts mostly on meeting statutory part of the annual report (financial statement) and the 
expectations of powerful donors. They also stated that ‘some organizations engaged in 
misleading practices (sometimes unwittingly) thus potentially manipulating stakeholder 
perceptions and influencing their actions and decisions (p. 631-32).’   Hyndman and 
McConville (2016) studied the transparency of large UK voluntary organisations reporting on 
efficiency. Their findings showed that organisations were ‘driven [in their reporting] more by 
a desire to appear legitimate rather than by an aspiration to provide ethically driven and 
transparency accounts of their efficiency’ (p.3). At the same time, voluntary organisations 
shied away from reporting information about efficiency measures and conversion ratios (e.g. 
Figure 2.2: Transparency model 
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cost per unit of service provided) as they might be negatively perceived or misunderstood by 
stakeholders. Hence, a voluntary organisation might consider that such information is not 
important to stakeholders, reasoning that they appear more legitimate by not reporting than 
by reporting and consequently, not exposing stakeholders to uncertainties on charity costs.  
However, this can be interpreted as merely a justification for an organisation not providing 
accountability to its stakeholders because they will misunderstand it. 
 
 In a different study Mussari and Monfardini (2010) argue that transparency in reporting by 
voluntary organisations is influenced mainly by changes to the economic environment.  They 
argue that a government imposing public spending cuts and reforms to the funding criteria to 
the voluntary sector might encourage some voluntary organisations to disclose more 
information to their stakeholders in order to signal a higher level of transparency, efficiency 
and socially responsible behaviour , so that in turn stakeholders might be encouraged to make 
donations to the voluntary organisations. They draw attention to the fact that while laws are 
considered as a powerful tool of compliance, informal pressure comes from stakeholders on 
voluntary organisations to improve transparency. In fact, returning to the relationship 
between reporting and legitimacy, Monfardini, Barretta and Ruggiero (2013), in contrast to 
Hyndman and McConville (2016), argue that transparency in reporting can provide 
legitimacy if managed correctly in order to avoid cynicism from stakeholders. And they 
added that if organisations used social reporting for the purpose of increasing their legitimacy 
instead of being transparent about the performance achieved then in this case social reporting 
might produce adverse outcomes on their legitimacy. In short, past research has shown that 
transparency is not a straightforward concept and how complex it can get. To this end I shall 




   
Stakeholder engagement (participation) in the voluntary organisation’s decision-
making process 
 
Understanding accountability through the logic of participation offers critical insights into the 
practices of accountability, foregrounding the inalienable link between engagement and the 
capacity of citizens and stakeholders to hold organisations to account. In fact, Dereli (2011) 
emphasises that accountability can be achieved through empowering participation in 
decision-making, going beyond mere democratic representation. But, such participation is of 
course not without its complexities. On the one hand, it may take different forms. For 
example, stakeholders are able to participate through their involvement in implementation 
through consultation over outcomes or through being involved in project design and strategy 
planning, or even through contributions in cash or labour to the work of organisations. 
However, such participatory forms can be limited by power imbalances. Downward 
accountability, the power of beneficiaries and communities to impose sanctions can often not 
match upward accountability to government and funders and their capacity to impose 
sanctions on organisations if their expectations have not been met. As Ebrahim (2010) argues 
beneficiaries tend to gain very little decision-making authority, with actual project objectives 
being determined by institutions and funders long before any participation occurs, so that the 
benefits of such participation for the purposes of downward and broad accountability are 
more imagined than real. Ebrahim’s (2010) argument resonates with Najam’s (1996: 346) 
view of participation practices which claims that participation has become “merely a sham 
ritual” process functioning as “no more than a feel-good exercise for both the local 
community and the voluntary organisation.” In linking this problem to accountability, Najam 
argues that “the sham of participation translates into the sham of accountability” because 
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“unlike donors, communities cannot withdraw their funding; unlike governments, they cannot 
impose conditionalities” (Najam, 1996: 346-7). In the same vein Ebrahim (2010) added that 
there is a disjuncture between an imagined logic of participation (in theory), which is 
empowering and enables downward accountability, and the structural constraints of a real 
logic of participation that is sham and ritual. Indeed, without a mechanism for addressing 
unequal power relations, participation appears unlikely to lead to downward accountability. 
 
In order to map these complex processes, this section critically assesses the works of Arnstein 
(1969), Ebrahim (2003) and Neligan (2003). It develops a novel model to articulate levels of 
meaningful participation where, participation mechanisms, level of influence on decisions 
and stage of participation all come together to form a hybrid heuristic model for assessing 
levels of participation. Thus, underlying these claims is the assumption that these elements 
are interconnected. The model uses the level of influence on decisions as an indicator for 
power. However, claiming that stakeholders have a certain level of influence on decisions 
would be meaningful only if it corresponds with the right mechanism as well as an 
appropriate stage in which participation occurs. In other words, a high level of participation 
suggests a high level of influence on decisions (the extent of power). And low level of 
participation suggests low engagement mechanism and minor level of stages. 
 
Mapping Participation      
In this section I specify these different elements of participation processes, so as to enable the 
systematic testing of how these different elements of participation come together to impact 
upon levels of accountability. High levels of participation might suggest high levels of 





Notably, Arnstein (1969) analysed stakeholders’ involvement in decision-making through the 
lens of a ladder of stakeholder participation. She argued that participation in the decision-
making process is a frustrating process for the participating stakeholders if it is without power 
being distributed fairly. She suggested a hierarchical model of engagement. Its lowest level is 
‘non-participation’. The highest level of the participation ladder is when stakeholders have 
full control over decision-making.  
 
 
Figure 2.3 Arnstein's ladder of participation* 
 
*Source: Arnstein, 1969 p.2 
 
The ladder has eight rungs and is divided into three level-groups of participation. The lowest 
two rungs of the ladder represent the level of ‘non-participation’. The next stage, named 
‘tokenism’ consists of three rungs: informing, consultation and placation. Under informing 
and consultation stakeholders can be heard but have no influence in the decision-making 
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process. Informing implies one-way communication where stakeholders are essentially ‘told’ 
about decisions, projects or plans by means of bulletins, pamphlets, posters and responses to 
inquiries. However, an organisation might adopt consultation as a means of engagement 
where stakeholders are invited to express their opinions and feedback concerning issues that 
matters to them via mechanisms such as surveys and public hearings. Arnstein (1969) argues 
that consultation can be described as “window-dressing” (p.6), if stakeholders’ feedback does 
not affect the organisation’s decision-making process.  Finally, in relation to tokenism, 
placation, grants stakeholders an advisory position and gives stakeholders the opportunity to 
be heard before decisions can be made. However, the board has the right not to consider their 
advice when decisions are being taken.  
 
The next group of engagement strategies come together under ‘citizen power’ which consists 
of three rungs: partnership, delegated power, and citizen control. At this level of 
participation, stakeholders have a significantly greater degree of influence over the decision-
making process. At the partnership level of participation, power is distributed through 
negotiation between stakeholders and power-holders in order to reach a joint decision. 
Delegated power represents an advanced form of partnership where stakeholders are enabled 
to undertake a dominant position in the decision-making process. Finally, the top rung of the 
ladder is citizen control in which stakeholders lead decision-making processes. This is the 
case in some types of organisations such as self-benefitting voluntary organisations where the 
board of governance are the beneficiaries (Ebrahim, 2010 and O’Dwyer, 2014). 
 
Alternatively, Ebrahim (2003), Najam (1996), Kilby (2005), Neligan (2003), and Blagescu et 
al. (2005) have adopted the notion of power-redistribution for assessing stakeholders 
engagement in the decision-making process in voluntary organisations. Ebrahim (2003) 
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suggests four levels of participation. The first level is comprised of two of Arnstein’s three 
components of tokenism: informing and consultation. The second level refers to limited 
participation on an operational level whereby stakeholders are involved in a project 
implementation through, for example, labouring. Hence, the stakeholders’ power in the 
decision-making process appears to be very low at both these levels of participation. Finally, 
the third and the fourth levels are based on Anrstein’s three components of ‘citizen power’ 
where stakeholders can negotiate decisions before they are taken. This implies that power 
over decisions is more equally distributed between a voluntary organisation and its 
stakeholders. Stakeholders might have a dominant role in accepting or rejecting decisions, 
whereas at the fourth level stakeholders have full control in the decision-making process. 
 
Shifting the focus away from levels of engagement, Neligan (2003) argues that for a 
participation process to be effective and genuine and not mere ritual, power should be 
distributed between stakeholders and the voluntary organisation’s board to ensure that 
stakeholders are involved in and have influence on the decision-making process. She suggests 
a framework which assesses stakeholders’ participation in the decision-making process with 
three interlinked measures. These measures are: (i) the stage of the decision-making cycle in 
which engagement with stakeholders is sought, (ii) the level of influence of stakeholders on 
decisions, and (iii) the mechanism of engagement in the participation process. Figure 2.4 
depicts the three measures. This framework provides for different types of interaction 
between a voluntary organisation and its stakeholders.  It examines the interrelationship 
between the levels of influence stakeholders may have in the decision making process, the 
engagement mechanism being used in the participation process, and the stage of decision-





Figure 2.4: Three processes of participation model 
 





More specifically, there are different types of interactions with stakeholders which have 
different levels of influence in the decision-making process. At the lowest level of influence, 
a voluntary organisation might choose information sharing or consultation, which are 
equivalent to Arnstein’s informing and consultation. This will lead stakeholders to have no 
influence on the decision-making process, particularly if the engagement mechanism and the 
stage at which engagement occurs are also low. Equally, a voluntary organisation might limit 
stakeholder engagement to the operational level where stakeholders are involved only in the 
implementation process, or perhaps through monitoring the project’s implementation. In this 
stage of engagement, stakeholders’ participation is normally expressed by physical 
participation in project delivery. This type of engagement is equivalent to, or at least maps 
upon, the second level of Ebrahim’s model of participation.  
The next level of influence allows stakeholders to provide suggestions about the design of 
projects and policies. At this level, participation occurs before decisions are taken, allowing 
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stakeholders to suggest what they believe are necessary changes to a design of a project or 
policy. This can be achieved through appropriate mechanisms such as advisory groups and 
task forces. At this stage of participation, power is distributed enabling stakeholders to 
influence decisions. However, at the highest level of influence, decisions are reached through 
a joint decision-making process where stakeholders are considered as co-decision makers. 
This level of influence can be implemented by employing mechanisms such as a partnership 
between a voluntary organisation and its stakeholders, and through the use of joint 
committees where some key stakeholders might set. At this level of participation, 
stakeholders are empowered to be involved in forming and agreeing to decisions, thereby 
enabling stakeholders to be seen as part of the voluntary organisation’s governance system. 
Broadly speaking, Ebrahim (2003) and Neligan (2003) built their engagement paradigms on 
Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation in the decision-making process. The range of 
influence expressed by this ladder gives an observer the flexibility to distinguish between 
various participation models. Ebrahim and Neligan’s models combine Arnstein’s eight levels 
of influence into four levels for stakeholders’ engagement in the decision-making process. 
However, although Arnstein discussed the relationship between the different levels of 
influence that stakeholders might have on decisions and the mechanisms being used for 
engagement process, Arnstein’s ladder of engagement does not address the different types of 
engagement mechanisms which can be used at different levels of influence. These are 
important, because recognising the engagement mechanisms used in the participation process 
can help to assess the level of influence stakeholders might have on a voluntary 
organisation’s decision-making process. 
 
In addition, Arnstein’s ladder fails to recognise the stage of engagement, for example, the 
stage in the decision-making cycle at which engagement occurs. The stage at which 
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engagement occurs should be looked at when the participation process is being assessed as it 
is interrelated with both the level of influence and the engagement mechanisms. For example, 
when the level of stakeholder influence in the decision-making process is at the highest level, 
this depicts the point where engagement occurs and should be also at the top of the decision-
making cycle. If the stage of engagement is low and the level of influence being used by a 
voluntary organisation is high, this might indicate a different level of influence stakeholders 
may have on decisions. It could undermine the stakeholders’ power over decisions. Adopting 
Neligan’s three dimensional model guards against the risks of such limited assessments and 
offer a more comprehensive analysis of the complexities of stakeholder participation.  
 
Overall, therefore, three primary assumptions emerge to guide this study. Firstly, a 
participation process in a voluntary organisation where the stakeholders are unable to 
influence decisions can be described as a window-dressing. Secondly, the participation 
process is multi-dimensional. The levels of influence stakeholders have on decisions, the 
mechanisms of engagement used to convey the stakeholders’ level of influence in the 
decision making process, and the stage in the decision-making cycle where participation 
occurs, are inter-related to build a complete picture of participations. Thirdly, as Blagescu et 
al. (2005) argue, stakeholders must make sure they have and are provided with, relevant 
information about the voluntary organisation and the participation process in order for a 
voluntary organisation to engage appropriately and effectively with its stakeholders. Both 
participation and transparency should thus be interlinked in order to provide an effective and 







Accountability, as the opening to this chapter acknowledged, is a complex and contested 
concept. This chapter has unpacked some of the key elements of this contestation, drawing 
attention to the embedded debates over responsibility and accountability and how these 
concepts might apply to the practices of voluntary organisations. In so doing, it has 
characterised two schools of thought, be it narrow or broad perspectives of accountability. 
Each of these schools tends to over-privilege one primary dimension of accountability, either 
transparency or participation. In seeking to overcome this binary opposition, the chapter thus 
sought to put in place a ‘thick’ hybrid model of accountability that enabled the measurement 
of the interaction between transparency and participation. To this end, it investigated how we 
might begin to test or measure the elements of each of these dimensions, particularly the 
availability and type of information (transparency) and mechanism, levels of influence and 
stages of engagement (engagement and participation). There are various factors, for instance 
formality, board structure, board function, and organisational characteristics, that may 
influence the level of stakeholder participation in a voluntary organisation’s decision-making 
process, as well as the transparency displayed by a voluntary organisation. Neligan (2003) 
and Blagescu et al. (2005) suggest other contextual factors within the governance system of a 
voluntary organisation, such as the existence of policies and governance standards which 
might have a knock-on-effect on the level of the voluntary organisation’s transparency and 
engagement with stakeholders.  However, such debates take us further into the realm of 
methodology and survey design and the capacity to capture data on such variables. It is thus 






This chapter presents the methodological design of this thesis, the procedures and tools used for 
the purpose of data collection and analysis. Initially, it discusses the philosophical positions in 
social science research before identifying the philosophical approach of the methodology adopted 
in this study and outlining its overarching research questions and propositions. It then turns to the 
definition of the sampling unit for the study and questions of the survey design and construction 
of the questionnaire used in the study. This discussion subsequently considers the sampling 
strategy, identifies the population, selection of sample, and piloting and pre-testing of the survey. 
With these methodological building blocks in place, the chapter sets out the data collection process 
and discusses the validity of the sample. The final sections of the chapter explore research ethics 
and discuss the limitations of the methodology used to generate data and investigate the key 
propositions of the thesis. 
 
3.1  Philosophical approach of the methodology 
This section provides a brief overview of the main philosophical approaches underpinning the 
methodological design of this study. It is commonly asserted that there are two main philosophical 
positions from which social science research can be conducted: positivism and social 
constructionism (Easterby-Smith., 2008; Thietart et al., 2001). These philosophies perceive the 
world in opposing ways and offer different methodologies for understanding reality and extracting 
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knowledge from reality (see Table 3.1). Indeed, each philosophy is based on two key assumptions. 
Firstly, an ontological assumption which concerns the way reality is understood, and secondly an 
epistemological assumption which concerns the way knowledge is perceived and extracted from 
the understood reality. Given that the two philosophical underpinnings offer different 
methodologies for understanding reality (i.e. ontology) and how to extract knowledge 
(epistemology) from reality; there is always going to be a link between the choice of philosophy, 
the methodology being used, and the epistemological and ontological positions. Certain 
methodological elements are employed by certain epistemological positions associated with 
certain ontologies (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998; Johnson and Duberley, 2000; Easterby-Smith, 
Thorpe, and Jackson, 2008; Thietart et al., 2001). 
 
More specifically, positivism, or ‘the scientific approach of enquiry’, regards the existence of 
reality in the social world as independent from an observer’s feelings, sensation and reflection, so 
that reality exists externally to the observer. Knowledge can be understood only from observed 
facts and should be extracted from reality using objective methods. Positivist studies thus normally 
start with hypotheses, which are tested through experiment using techniques to measure outcomes 
and to determine their causation (Bryman and Bell, 2003; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Jackson, 
2008). Typically for example external realism focuses on the notion that the world exists externally 
and people experience the world directly so that they can see it exactly as it is: there is no room 
for doubt. According to this position, people sense the existence of the truth in an absolute sense 
so that truth has to be objective and, therefore, knowledge. This position has been criticised 
because it does not allow subjectivity at all. By saying that people sense objective truth directly it 
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does not allow for two people seeing the same thing to see it differently (Johnson and Duberley, 
2000; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Jackson, 2008; Thietart et al., 2001). 
 
In contrast, the social constructionist view argues that reality is established by sharing views and 
experiences between people via the medium of language. Reality does not exist independently of 
the observer, but it is brought into being or constituted through ideas, language and beliefs or 
different discourses. According to this approach, the primary way for an observer to extract 
knowledge in the world of social science is thus to critically examine how people bring the world 
into being by identifying and engaging with the stories and narratives that compose their ‘multiple 
realities’ (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Jackson, 2008). Nominalism is about the names and labels 
people attach to experiences and events (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Jackson, 2008). Its view of 
reality, as stated in Johnson and Duberley, (2000 p. 78) is that it is “a product of our minds,” so 
that it does not allow for the existence of objective truth. Nominalism is totally subjective. It does 
not accept the existence of the real world. People only experience what is in their minds. This can 
vary from one person to another: people might sense the same object differently. Thietart et al., 




Table 3.1 A comparison of positivism and social constructionism  
 Positivism Social Constructionism 
The observer Must be independent Is part of what is being 
observed 
Human interests Should be irrelevant Are the main drivers of science 
Explanations Must demonstrate causality Aim to increase general 
understanding of the situation 
Research progresses through Hypotheses and deductions Gathering rich data from which 
ideas are induced 
Concepts Need to be defined so that they 
can be measured 
Should incorporate stakeholder 
perspectives 
Units of analysis Should be reduced to simplest 
terms 
May include the complexity of 
‘whole’ situations 
Generalization through Statistical probability  Theoretical abstraction 
Sampling requires Large numbers selected 
randomly  
Small numbers of cases chosen 
for specific reasons 
Source: Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Jackson, 2008 (p. 59) 
 
This thesis seeks to tread a path between these two alleged extremes (see Table 3.2). It adopts a 
heterodox approach, which recognises the ontological assumptions of representative realism. As 
for a heterodox approach, representative realism, although it still believes that reality is 
independent and external to individuals, it suggests that individuals do not see the objective world 
directly, but see an appearance of the real world. For example, when a person sees an object, 
representative realism explains this by suggesting that the person views this object through a prism 
of generalised perceptions which causes the image of the object to be formed in the person’s mind 
and after that knowledge is exposed through collective ways of acting or thinking (Johnson and 
Duberley, 2000; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Jackson, 2008; Thietart et al., 2001).  Therefore, the 
challenge is to access / expose the multiple realities and critically evaluate their collective ways of 
acting. As such, this heterodox approach uses a cross-sectional methodology that enables several 
variables to be measured at the same time in order to examine potential relationships between 
them. This type of enquiry requires a relatively large sample to enable the researcher to make an 
approximation of reality. This epistemology underpins surveys as the most suitable technique for 
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data collection (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Jackson, 2008). The most important question 
representationalism asks is whether the research results are an accurate reflection of reality. To be 
able to answer this question the researcher needs to look at the sample size to determine whether 
it will be sufficient to generalise the research findings for the entire population (Easterby-Smith, 
Thorpe, and Jackson, 2008).  
 








   
Aims Discovery Exposure Invention 
Starting points  Hypotheses Propositions Meanings 
Designs Experiment Cross-sectional Reflexivity 





Outcomes Causality Correlation Understanding 
Adapted from Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Jackson, 2008 (p. 63) 
 
Having established the ontological and methodological assumptions underpinning this study, I 
now turn to questions of research design. 
 
3.2  Research Questions 
As I set out earlier, this study seeks to provide a systematic study of the empirical practices of 
accountability in the voluntary sector across England and Wales. In so doing, it seeks to ‘test’ a 
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thick interactive model of accountability, as well as teasing out the complex relations between 
such variables as organisational characteristics, policies, and practices of transparency and 
dimensions of participation. The research design is thus informed by a number of decisions and 
assumptions from the outset. First, empirically, I decided to focus the study on Engalnd and 
Wales because all voluntary organisations within this geographical area are registered with the 
same regulatory body, the Charity Commission in England and Wales. For the purpose of this 
study, all voluntary organisations that are registered with the Charity Commission conform to 
the same classifications and regulatory boundaries. As for voluntary organisations which are 
located in Scotland and Northern Ireland, they are registered with different regulatory bodies. 
Therefore, this study focuses only on England and Wales.  
 
 Secondly, the research assumes that various organisational and governance factors across 
voluntary organisations may have an explanatory link to its practices of accountability. Hence 
one of the main purposes of this study is to establish which the key organisational and 
governance factor(s) impact on accountability and then to assess their explanatory power in 
relation to practices of accountability and the proposed accountability framework. With this in 
mind the research questions are:  
1. How can accountability in the voluntary organisation be best understood? 
2. What is an appropriate model of accountability for voluntary organisations? 
3. What variables have the highest explanatory power in relation to accountability 
practices within voluntary organisations?  
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More specifically, from the research questions, a set of research propositions were 
developed. They are summarised systematically here: 
A. Examining the relationship between the two dimensional framework of accountability 
and multiple formal variables: 
There is a relationship between the accountability framework and the 
i. Existence of policy on participation. 
ii. Existence of participation policy guidelines. 
iii. Existence of policy on transparency. 
iv. Existence of transparency policy guidelines. 
v. Existence of code of board practice. 
 
B. Examining the relationship between the two dimensional framework of accountability 
and board functions: 
There is a relationship between the accountability framework and  
iii. Managerial oriented board. 
iv. Strategic oriented board.  
C. Examining the relationship between the two dimensional framework of accountability 
and variables within board structure. 
There is a relationship between the accountability framework and 
iii. Board size. 
iv. Number of board committees. 
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E. Examining the relationship between the two dimensional framework of accountability 
and organizational characteristic variables: 
There is a relationship between the accountability framework and 
v. The size of voluntary organisations in terms of annual income. 
vi. Source of income. 
vii. The age of voluntary organisations. 
viii. Affiliation within a regulatory body or network. 
 
3.3 Towards a Definition of Voluntary Organisations (VOs) 
Voluntary organisations or the third sector have traditionally been subsumed or grouped under 
the banner of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), with studies tending to focus on the 
characteristics of such organisations in terms of their structure, functions, and geographical 
location (Salamon, 1992; Kendall and Knapp, 1993, 1996). One starting point is thus to consider 
the broad questions of sampling in relation to the third sector or NGOs. However, the NGO 
sector it itself extremely diverse, heterogeneous and populated by organisations with hugely 
varied goals, structure and motivations. Voluntary organisations can be NGOs, but NGOs are 
broadly described as interest groups, pressure groups, and non-profit organisations, as well as 
voluntary, charitable and third sector organisations. Thus, Yaziji and Doh (2009), in an effort to 
make sense of this complexity, classify organisations according to two dimensions: first, the 
intended beneficiaries whom an organisation serves, whether self-benefiting organisation or 
other-benefiting organisations; and second, the type of activities, be it advocacy organisations, 




In short, it is not an easy task to find a common definition of the term 'non-governmental 
organisation' which facilitates the identification of a 'neat' survey sample, although there are 
shared common organisational characteristics, be it the absence of profit-sharing, voluntary 
participation, institutional formality, and an orientation towards public action. Salamon (1992) 
suggests that each attempt at an all-encompassing definition highlights one part of the wider not-
for-profit sector, be it voluntary organisations or charities and creates labels that can sometimes 
be used interchangeably. Najam (1996a) argues that absence of a generally accepted 
classification causes confusion, and that adopting terms in isolation can be problematic. 
Illustrating such complexity, Uphoff (1996) argues that NGOs are located within the private 
sector but in its not-for-profit service subsector rather than in the third sector which he thinks 
belongs to membership organisations and cooperatives. He argues that 'describing NGOs as a 
third sector is misleading, the real third sector, located somewhere between the public and the 
private sectors in institutional space, belongs not to NGOs but rather to people’s associations and 
membership organisations' (p. 23). 
 
Recognising these difficulties, and the heterogeneity of the voluntary sector, this study first 
investigated the definition of voluntary organisations as set out at the time of the survey by the 
National Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO) and the UK Voluntary Sector Almanac 
(2007) and the UK Civil Society Almanac (2008). It thus considered the following six criteria in 
terms of discussing voluntary organisations. First, organisations had to have a  structured 
organisational form which excludes large numbers of informal community based or temporary 
associations. Second, organisations were required to be constitutionally and institutionally 
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independent from the statutory and private sectors which exclude registered charities that were 
also quasi non-governmental organisations (quangos) or non-departmental public bodies 
(NDPBs). Third, organisations had to be non-profit seeking in that they did not distribute profit 
to shareholders, owners or members and all surpluses were to be directed to the organisation’s 
charitable activities and non-distributed for personal benefit, thereby excluding cooperatives 
from the definition of voluntary organisations. Fourth, organisations were to be considered 
independent, to the detriment for example of charities that operated under the umbrella of the 
National Health Service (NHS) as these were seen  are ultimately under the control of  a 
statutory body. Fifth, organisations had to demonstrate a substantial degree of voluntarism either 
in terms of money or time donated. Finally, in terms of private benefit and public benefit, 
organisations that existed solely for the benefit of their own members friendly societies, 
benevolent societies, trade associations and professional bodies, housing associations, 
independent schools or faith groups were all excluded, although some might argue that religious 
groups’ constitutions and activities do have wider public benefits. With these criteria in mind, 
Table 3.3 below at the time of the survey in 2008 the number of registered charities with the 
Charity Commission in England and Wales, distinguishing the number of organisations 
registered with the Charity Commission that did not meet the criteria for inclusion and those that 




Table 3.3:  Number of registered charity with the Charity Commission 














94,690 49,003 19,345 4,715 652 168,405 
The voluntary 
sector 
79,312 43,201 16,803 3,112 332 142,760 
Excluded 
Organisations 
15,378   5,802   2,542 1,603 320   25,645 
Adapted from The UK Civil Society Almanac 2008 p.144 
 
 
However, by definition, these criteria did exclude a proportion of potentially significant 
respondents. The charity sector has two main criteria which were stipulated in the Charity Act 
2006. First, the organisation’s purpose had to fall under a list of functions. These functions were 
relatively broad from the prevention or relief of poverty to the advancement of health or the saving 
of lives, and on to the advancement of animal welfare. Second, the purpose must be for the public 
benefit, be of actual benefit and benefit the public as a whole or a significant section of it. It is for 
this reason that not all not-for-profit organisations could be considered charities since this clause 
automatically excludes any organisation that acts solely for the benefit of its membership. 
However, this does enable charities to take a variety of legal forms, including for example: 
companies limited by guarantee (Charitable Corporation) or Trusts and Foundations. 
 
In fact, at the time of the survey, the House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, 
in its July 2008 report, “Public Services and the Third Sector: Rhetoric and Reality,” referred to 
the non-governmental organisations as organisations which are 'value driven and which principally 
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invest their surpluses to further social, environmental and cultural objectives. This includes a wide 
range of organisations, which take different forms and are regulated in quite different ways' (p.5). 
It estimated that there existed around 160,000 charities, which were voluntary (trustee) led 
organisations, delivering public benefits established in law and overseen by the Charity 
Commission. Other grassroots voluntary and community organisations, were, it concluded, 'often 
on too small a scale to register as charities, and too numerous to count' (p.5). It also identified some 
55,000 social enterprises, as well as approximately 8,000 cooperatives and mutuals. 
 
At this stage, it is worth noting that the definition of public benefit is not without difficulty.  As 
suggested, it is a characteristic which cannot be applied to all sectors or which can sometimes be 
applied but in various degrees. For example, the application of the public benefit test in the 
voluntary sector has a stringent approach which made it impossible for a large number of 
organisations to be included in the definition of the voluntary sector. However, term charity and 
the NGO sector definitions have employed more flexible understanding to the term public benefit 
which made it easier for organisations to be included within these two sectors rather than the 
voluntary sector. The definition of the third sector gives an even looser understanding of the term 
public benefit, where organisations are not essentially required to comply with the public benefit 
approach in order to be classified as a part of the third sector.  A characteristic which cannot be 
applied to all sectors is formality, where informal community based associations and associations 
which are established on ad-hoc bases are excluded from the voluntary, the charity and the NGO 
sector while they are included in the definition of the third sector. These conditions were thus taken 





So far and based on the identified organisations’ characteristics in all of the sectors defined 
above, it is clear that the voluntary sector groups organisations within a narrower set of 
boundaries, esepecially when compared to the third sector as it includes all organisations 
classified as charities and NGOs, and in addition a very large category of unregistered/ informal 
community based associations. However, limiting our discussion to the boundaries of the 
voluntary sector as defined above risks drawing false boundaries between charitable 
organisations sharing many organisational characteristics. Therefore, and for the purpose of 
identifying the unit of analysis for this current research, I shall define voluntary organisations in 
England and Wales (the scope of this research) as belonging to the set of registered charities with 
the Charity Commission for England and Wales. 
 
 
3.4  Survey Design 
 
Just to recap, the aim of the methodological elements of the research design of this thesis is to 
expose reality rather than discover reality. According to the post-positivism approach which is 
the epistemological position of this thesis getting full access to reality in social research is 
extremely difficult or maybe impossible. Hence, this thesis aims to identify the factors that can 
explain reality as much as possible in order to establish an approximate picture of reality. This 
can be reached by establishing and testing propositions regarding the relationships between 
different factors in order to identify the factors that contribute the most in exposing the reality 
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(the issue under investigation in this research is strengthening accountability in the voluntary 
sector). The research is cross-sectional conducted via questionnaire survey.   
This study is best categorised under the heterodox approach. The distinctive trait of the 
heterodox approach is that it allows researcher to capture a large amount of data translated into 
results which can be generalised over the whole population. The main aim of the heterodox 
approach is to provide an approximate picture of reality based on probabilities. The higher the 
probability the closest the picture is from reality. The best way to operationalize this approach is 
through a cross sectional survey design. It uses descriptive and statistical analysis in order to 
make sense of the data.   
The questionnaire survey was comprised from 22 questions mostly a ‘tick box’ type of questions. 
The length of the survey was decided based on two things firstly, not making the questionnaire 
too long so that respondents will get tired answering it. Secondly, questions should be easy to 
understand. The questionnaire was pre-tested by asking colleagues within the faculty of business 
and law to go through and answer all questions. It took them around 15 minutes on average to 
answer the questionnaire. In terms of clarity, there were no reported difficulties in understanding 
questions. 
The survey was administered online. I chose online survey because partly it is cost effective and 
also when I collected the data in 2008 the online surveys have shown increasingly the popularity 
of the internet. 
 
 
3.4.1  Construction of the questionnaire 
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The purpose of the survey centred on gaining an overarching picture of voluntary organisations 
capacities and practices with regard to accountability.  There are four main areas the researcher 
has identified in an organisation’s environment and these are: organisational capabilities, issues 
of governance, issues of transparency and lastly issues of stakeholder participation in decision-
making process. Another purpose of the survey is to test relationships between variables within 
these four areas in order to find out the best possible solution for accountability. The research 
administered a structured questionnaire survey which was presented mainly in closed-ended 
format with categorical, ordinal and continuous type of questions. Some categorical questions 
gave respondents an opportunity to add other categories according to their practices.   
         
Organisational capabilities: In this section respondents were asked a series of questions 
concerning seven organisational capabilities: the charitable legal status of the organisation as 
registered with the Charity Commission, its affiliation (or not) to an umbrella group, its primary 
purpose, as well as its age and size (annual income, number of staff and volunteers). The first 
question in this section was an open ended question asking respondents to write down their 
primary nature or purpose. Four out of seven questions in this section are continuous type of 
questions demand respondent to write a number in a designated space to reflect their answer. 
Two questions were categorical with one of them with an open ended close.   
 
Issues of governance: Respondent organisations were asked a series of questions concerning 
codes of governance, motivations and consequences of adhering to code of governance, and 
board membership, as well as questions on board functions and responsibilities, levels of 
satisfaction about the engagement of board members, and the number and type of board sub-
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committees that exist. This section consists of six questions; four of them were categorical and 
two were ordinal type of questions. A five-point Likert scale was used in this section to measure 
board involvement and satisfactory level in governance. 
 
Policy and Guidelines: Policy is a contested concept, which in practice is often confused with 
guidelines. Here, however, I distinguish for analytical purposes between policy and guidelines. 
Following the work of Hogwood and Gunn in Cairney (2012) I define a policy as an expression 
of intent whereas guidelines relate to the specific practices, rules and procedures put in place to 
ensure the practical realisation of the policy. In other words, policy is a vision whereas 
guidelines is how you get there, hence policy and guidelines as variables arguable impact 
differently upon outcomes, be it transparency or participation (Knill and Tosun 2012).  
It may be assumed that if policies are in place then guidelines are in place. Equally, it could be 
assumed that policies and guidelines are locked into a positive relationship – one supports the 
others. Indeed, arguable, it is not ill judged to expect policy/guidelines in one sphere such as 
participation to enforce those in others (such as transparency). However, such assumptions are 
not proven. 
Therefore, it is important for this study to test the existence of policy and guidelines in separate 
propositions in order to measure their impact on the level of transparency and participation in the 
voluntary sector and their inter-relationships. This distinction between policy and guidelines is 
essential to identifying their impact on accountability. 
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To this end, the next two sections outline the proxies used in the questionnaire for testing the 
level of transparency and participation plus the existence of policy and guidelines for 
transparency and for participation as well.  
 
Transparency: Issues of transparency were divided into policies regarding transparency and 
level of transparency. There were three questions included in the questionnaire examine these 
issues. One of the three questions was put on a five-point Likert scale to assess the level of 
transparency. The other two questions one of them investigates the narrow understanding of 
policy as a principle which only asks about the nominal existence of a transparency policy. The 
other question had a thicker understanding of policy which focuses on the principle plus 
guidelines that is the content of the policy. Both questions were categorical with an open ended 
tail to allow respondents to add more categories as appropriate.  
The level of transparency was assessed by examining the public availability (or not) of six items 
of information. These are: details and descriptions about each activity and programme of the 
organisation; a list of key staff, specifying their contact details and the scope of their 
responsibilities; details about the organisations impact on society; any codes, partnerships or 
coalitions to which the organisation is a signatory; information on the governing board members 
and the executive; and finally openness on how stakeholders can input into the different levels of 
decision-making. These six items were taken from the One World Trust Global Accountability 
Project (GAP) (Blagescu et al., 2005 p 40-41). The six items were put on a Likert scale ranging 
from 1 which indicates that respondent never made information available and up to 5 which 
indicate that information was made frequently available.  
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As for policies regarding transparency, the survey sought to analyse whether organisations had 
formal commitments or policy behind transparency practices or whether much depended on the 
ad hoc work of officers.  It sought to identify the existence within organisations of policies on 
transparency and the guidelines and procedures associated with those policies. 
The narrow understanding of transparency policy was considered in the questionnaire by asking 
respondents whether they have in place a formal or informal transparency policy (in nominal term) 
and if not why not. The thicker, more expandable understanding of policy, which covers the 
principle plus guidelines (policy content) was presented by a question consisted of seven 
categories. Policy content and guidelines are vital for a policy to be effective that is without clear 
guidelines for implementing a policy then the existence of the policy itself as a nominal would be 
useless. 
Drawing again upon the study of Blagescu et al. (2005), I thus pinpointed seven items to test for 
the policy’s contents (rules, guidelines, procedures). Respondents were asked whether their 
transparency policy highlights how to make an information request; the timeframes for dealing 
with the request and details of how response will be made; details of the rules governing 
decisions; costs of obtaining information; what information it regards as confidential and why; 
and other areas the policy might highlight. 
 
Participation: Issues of participation constitute six closed ended questions, three of them 
correspond to the model of participation informing this study which consists of three interlinked 
processes: stage of engagement (the stage of decision-making cycle in which participation 
occurs); the level of influence stakeholders have on decisions; and the engagement mechanism 
used in the participation process. These three processes (dimensions) were adapted from 
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(Nilegan, 2003). Respondents were thus asked a series of categorical questions concerning these 
three processes, as well as how these processes affected or impact upon five different stakeholder 
groups: beneficiaries; donors; government; staff; and others. Each process was characterised by 
different practices which were comprised of five items ranging from high to low (in relation to 
the categories of Arnstein’s ladder of engagement (see Chapter Two). The design of these three 
questions enabled the researcher to analyse them as both categorical and ordinal type of 
questions. As for the other three questions investigating the issues of participation two of them 
investigated the issue of participation policy. With regard to this the questionnaire survey has 
differentiated between narrow and the thick understanding of policy regarding participation just 
in the same way as mentioned in the above section of transparency. The other question looked at 
the level of different stakeholders’ importance to respondent organisations which used a five-
point Likert scale ranging from not-important to extremely important.   
  
3.5 Sampling strategy 
The validity of this study and its findings rests on its sampling strategy and its generation of a 
legitimate and appropriate sample of respondents. Knowledge generation comes from the ability 
of the research to generalise findings from a sample to the entire population so that an 
approximate picture of the accountability practices of the voluntary sector will be reflected 
reliably in the research findings. With this in mind, the sampling strategy was based on three 
core principles. Firstly, the sample should be selected randomly in order to minimise bias so that 
each subject in the population should have the same chance to be selected in the sample. 
Secondly, the size of the sample should be relatively large so that will enable the research 
findings to be generalised on the entire population. Thirdly, the instrument used to collect data 
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should be pre-tested for the validity and reliability of the questions included in the instrument 
before the administration to the identified research subjects being carried out.  
 
 
3.5.1  The population  
There are around 161,000 voluntary organisations (VOs) in England and Wales registered with the 
Charity Commission. The GuideStarUK2 database provides information about all organisations 
registered with the Charity Commission in England and Wales. The GuideStar database divides 
voluntary organisations (VOs) into nine strata according to the size of their annual income. Table 
3.4 shows the number of VOs in each stratum.  
 
 






1 Less than £1000 26,391 
62% micros 2 £1000 to £9,999 42,526 
3 £10,000 to £24,999 32,158 
4 £25,000 to £99,999 30,128 
27% small VOs 
5 £100,000 to £249,999 13,615 
6 £250,000 to 999,999 10,337 
10% 
medium and 
large VOs 7 £1,000,000 to £9,999,999 5,362 






25,000,000 and over 311 
Total 161,426 100%  
Source: adapted from GuideStar UK www.GuideStar.org.uk 
 
                                                 
2  www.guidestar.org.uk  Is a source of information about all NGOs registered with the charity commission in 
England and Wales. GuideStar UK was developed in 2003 in partnership with the Charity Commission; it was 
funded mainly by the Treasury and by grant giving Trusts in the UK and US.  
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Voluntary organisations vary in size and complexity. In order to be able to draw a representative, 
sizable sample that mirrors the target population, and also in order to be able to apply or generalise 
the findings for the target population (Fink, 2003), the thesis restricts the sample’s population to 
strata 6 and 7. Hence the scope of the study includes voluntary organisations with annual incomes 
ranging between £250,000 and £10million. These consist of 15,699 organisations.  
 
3.5.2  Selection of sample 
Having identified the target population, the next step was to collect information about each subject 
included in the sample. The GuideStar UK database is designed to provide information about up 
to 500 NGO subjects in each search and these are selected randomly by the system, so that it was 
not possible to acquire a complete list containing information about the 15,699 subjects.  To 
overcome this problem a request was submitted to the Charity Commission who owns the register. 
According to the Commission’s policy on information provision as published on their website3, 
the Commission will be able to provide a copy of the register for academic use upon request. After 
the request had been sent out I had some delays in receiving feedback from the Charity 
Commission, expected in 20 working days. Despite constant reminders, I did not get any useful 
support from the commission after four months of the initial request. I later had to generate the 
sample myself manually which took me an additional three months.  The only option left to me in 
order to generate a reasonably unbiased sample from the target population, was to use the 
GuideStar database which holds information about the whole target population 15,699 NGOs. The 
                                                 
3 http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/registeredcharities/copyrightreg.asp  Charity Commission Policy on 
Provision of Electronic Copies of Publicly Available Information 
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database can randomly retrieve up to 500 NGO records randomly in each time the search is run 
after the range of the total annual income of NGOs been selected. NGO records were searched by 
using four keywords: Trust, Limited, Foundation were used, leaves last keyword empty. This 
method of searching the database provided 2,000 records for each stratum of NGO total annual 
income; therefore I managed to retrieve 4,000 records for the two ranges of annual income. 
  
The 4,000 records were printed out on lists; the types of the information provided on the lists 
include the name of the NGO, the webpage address and description of the organisation’s mission. 
In order to acquire more useful information about an NGO such as the email address, postal address 
and telephone number, I had to access the all webpage addresses mentioned on the lists one by one 
online. The acquired information was then put into distribution lists and were stored on the outlook 
email account. The records were sometimes duplicated or some time the webpage did not provide 
an email address of the NGO therefore, the net number of the NGO records went down to 3,100 
records.  
 
3.5.3  Piloting and pretesting of the instrument  
After the initial design of the questionnaire was reached, the questionnaire went through several 
reviews before being piloted on a number of NGOs. The questionnaire was sent to be reviewed by 
several academic members in the faculty of business and law, most involved in research activities, 
however some were in other areas than accountability and governance. Most have had 
longstanding involvement in a charity type of organisation, some as board members, so that they 
are most likely to have the experience and understanding of the governance and accountability 
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practices in the charity type of organisations. The assumption was that they should be able to 
provide an evaluation of the questions included in the survey in terms of the extent of the reliability 
and whether the questions are relevant and valid to be asked in the light of the research context 
and aims.  
 
Accordingly, after pilot-testing the questionnaire, suggestions and comments collated were very 
useful in improving the questionnaire design. After the final version of the design was reached the 
questionnaire was ready to be piloted on a number of NGOs. The questionnaire was then sent to 
30 NGOs electronically via the Internet. NGOs were asked to printout the attached questionnaire 
survey, fillout and return by post.  I received one response from an NGO where all the survey 
questions were attempted. 
 
The result of the piloting was considered to be satisfactory for two reasons. Firstly, all the questions 
were attempted by the respondent organisations which means questions were not difficult to 
understand and answer. Secondly, of the several reviews that the questionnaire had to go through 
before being piloted, there were very minimal changes spelling and using clearer word in few 
places in the questionnaire.  
 
3.6  Data Collection  
On the 21 may 2008 I sent out e-mails to 3,100 NGOs in England and Wales asking them to fill in 
my research questionnaire survey, the e-mails were directed to the chief executive/ manager. An 
overview of what the research is about and the areas that the questionnaire is focusing on were 
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included in the emails. A link to the questionnaire survey was also enclosed in the e-mails so that 
organisations could complete the survey on line.   
 
After the email was sent out to a 3,100 NGOs I started to receive many undelivered e-mails for 
different reasons. A total of 513 undelivered e-mails were returned, of which 205 e-mails were 
returned for the reason of not reaching the recipient’s e-mail system so that I did send my original 
e-mail to the 205 e-mail addresses again and as a result of this I received a total of 78 e-mails 
returned back undelivered. The net number of addresses that the survey failed to reached was 386 
[(513-205) +78] so that the final sample size after deducting the undelivered e-mails after the 
survey being sent out was (3100 – 386) 2714 NGOs. 
 
After the questionnaire survey was sent out on the 21st May 08, I waited two weeks before the first 
reminder being sent. Reminders were sent four times during one month period after the first two 
weeks have past. The tool that I used for the survey being published online allows administrator 
to monitor the flow of the survey submission so that enables me to see how many surveys being 
submitted in each day and on which days the flow is high and on which days the flow is low so 
that I was able to organise sending the reminders and also this allowed me to decide which day of 
the week would be the best to send the reminders on.  
 
The population interaction with the research survey was high as I received many emails from 
NGOs regarding the survey. 250 NGOs completed the questionnaire survey equal to an 
approximate response rate of 9% of the sample. Almost 73% of the respondent organisations 




3.6.1 Validity of the Sample 
The sample was selected randomly from the population of voluntary organisations that fell 
within stratum 6 and stratum 7 of the annual income classified by the GuideStar UK database. 




Table 3.5 Size and activities of the sample compared with other studies 
Type of activities The thesis 
Dhanani& Connolly 
(2012 p1151) 
 N % N % 
The relief of those in need  45 18 15 20 
Citizenship or community development 42 17 10 13 
Education 34 14 8 11 
The advancement of health 32 13 9 12 
Art culture heritage or science 28 11 7 9 
Other charitable purposes 27 11 9 12 
Religion and the prevention or relief of poverty 22 9 9 12 
Environmental protection or improvement 19 7 8 11 
Total of the sample of respondents 249 100 75 100 
 
The Organisation size   
Cornforth& 
Simpson (2002 p456) 
 N % N % 
Respondents with income little below 250,000 12 a 5   
£250,000 – 1 million 130 54 155 53 
£1 million – 10 million 97 41 136 47 
Total of respondents in the sample  239  291  
Decided to keep them in the samplea 
 
The figures to some extent were comparable hence the researcher is relatively satisfied with the 
validity of the sample. 
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 3.7 FACTOR ANALYSIS 
 
Factor analysis aims in general to summarise a matrix of correlations by regrouping and placing 
variables into meaningful categories based on shared variance so that relationships and patterns 
can be discovered first and then be easily interpreted and understood (Kline, 1994).  With these 
aims in mind, there were four steps I followed in conducting the factor analysis for the four 
original scales included in the questionnaire survey. The first step was to assess the suitability of 
the data for factor analysis. This assessment was followed by the second step of factor extraction 
before turning to the third step of factor rotation and interpretation of the results. The final step 
was to test the reliability of the solutions for each scale. 
 
Step One: Assessment of the suitability of the data for factor analysis 
There are two main issues to consider in determining whether a particular data set is suitable for 
factor analysis: sample size, and the strength of the relationship (inter-correlations) among the 
variables. While there is little agreement among authors concerning how large a sample should 
be, the recommendation generally is: the larger, the better. In small samples, the correlation 
coefficients among the variables are less reliable. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) suggest that it 
would be comforting to have 300 cases or more for factor analysis. However, they argue that a 
sample size of 150 cases should be sufficient especially if solutions have several high loading 
variables i.e. the relationship of each variable to the underlying solution (factor). Some suggest 
that it is the ratio of the number of cases to the number of items within a scale that is of concern 
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rather the overall sample size. For example, Nunnally (1978) in Pallant (2007) recommends a 10 
to 1 ratio, that is, ten cases for each item within a scale  
Drawing on the above views, the largest scale used in this study was made up from 12 items and 
the overall size of the sample was 250 cases. The sample size was therefore assumed to be 
suitable and sufficient for conducting the factor analysis.  
With these initial tests undertaken, I then subjected the data to an inspection to the strength of the 
inter-correlation among the items, the test of sphericity and the KMO index to evaluate the 
factorability of the data. According to Bartlett (1954) in Pallant (2007) Bartlett’s test of 
Sphericity should be significant (P < or = 0.050) or less for the factor analysis to be considered 
appropriate. The KMO index ranges from 0 to 1, with 0.6 suggested as the minimum value for a 
good factor analysis (Kaiser, 1970, 1974 in Pallant, 2007). As for the strength of the inter-
correlation among the items, Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) recommend an inspection of the 
correlation matrix for evidence of coefficients greater than 0.3. 
Drawing on the above conditions, I inspected the correlation matrix for the four scales used in 
this study and found sufficient evidence of correlation coefficients between the items above the 
0.3 level. Hence the initial inspection of the correlation between the items over the all four scales 
was satisfactory. As for the KMO and Bartlett tests, the results for the four scales as shown in 
Table 3.6 below reveal sufficient evidence to suggest the suitability of the sample for conducting 
the factor analysis tests; all the coefficients are significant and none of the KMO readings are 




Table 3.6 KMO and Bartless tests results 





Level of participation (SE scale) P= 0.000 0.689 
Participation procedure guidelines (PPG scale) P= 0.000 0.850 
Level of transparency (TR scale) P= 0.000 0.841 
Board functions (BF scale) P= 0.000 0.806 
     
 
Step Two: Factor extraction 
 
Factor extraction involves determining the smallest number of factors that can be used to best 
represent the interrelations among a set of variables. As mentioned in Pallant (2007), there are a 
variety of approaches that can be used to identify (extract) the number of underlying factors. The 
most commonly used approach is principal components analysis PCA (Kline, 1994; Tabachnick 
and Fidell, 2007; Pallant, 2007). The main advantage of the PCA is that it explains all the 
variance in a correlation matrix whereas the other types of factor analysis make estimates from 
the data (Kline, 1994). However, the main limitation of the PCA is that naming the identified 
underlying factors may prove to be difficult because names may not accurately reflect the 
variables within the identified factor (Kline, 1994 and Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007).  
So as far the factor analysis is concerned, this thesis adopts the principal component analysis 
(CPA) as a method for factor extraction.  There are two issues that should be considered when it 
comes to extracting factors: the need to find a simple solution with as few factors as possible; 
and the need to explain as much of the variance in the original data set as possible (Kline, 1994). 
There are a number of techniques that can be used to assist in the decision concerning the 
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number of factors to retain: Kaiser’s criterion, Scree plot inspection and parallel analysis. The 
Kaiser’s criterion argues that only factors with eigenvalues above 1 are retained; the Scree plot 
focuses on the point at which the shape of the curve in the plot changes drastically and become 
more horizontal; finally, the parallel analysis involves comparing the size of the eigenvalues with 
those obtained from a randomly generated data set of the same size. Eigenvalues that exceed the 
corresponding values from the random data set are retained. A programme called Monte Carlo 
principal component analysis (PCA) for Parallel Analysis developed by Marley Watkins (2000) 
was used in this study to generate the eigenvalues from a randomly generated data set of the 
same size.   
After taking all these methods of extraction into consideration, I now turn to report on the 
extraction outcomes for the four original scales used in this study. All the factor analysis outputs 
(tables and scree plots) are provided in the appendices at the end of the thesis under the title 
‘factor analysis.’ The first scale is level of participation (SE scale) which was composed of three 
items: level of influence; mechanism of participation; and stage of participation. After inspecting 
the Kaiser’s criterion, scree plot and the parallel analysis, all suggested a one factor solution 
which has the only eigenvalue that is above 1. The one factor solution was able to explain around 
67.5% of the overall variance in the SE scale.  
The second scale is the participation procedure guidelines (PPG scale), which contains six items 





Table 3.7: The Items of the Participation procedure guidelines Scale (PPG scale) 
1. Information regarding engagement processes are circulated to key stakeholders in 
appropriate forms and through appropriate media. 
2. Information regarding engagement processes are made available to all stakeholders in 
appropriate forms and through appropriate media. 
3. Contact details for a relevant person in the organisation are provided 
4. Key stakeholders are not prevented from participation processes due to lack of physical 
access, communication barriers (language or expert terms) or financial constraints. 
5. The confidentiality of stakeholders during an engagement process is guaranteed by the 
organisation where appropriate. 




The results show that all the three methods of extraction have suggested a one factorial solution 
to the PPG original scale. The suggested extraction solution was the only factor to have 
eigenvalue that is above 1. The one factor solution was able to explain around 71% of the overall 
variance in the original scale. 
The third scale is Level of transparency (TR scale): This scale was constituted from six items as 
detailed below in table 3.8. 
 
Table 3.8: The Items of the Level of Transparency Scale 
1. Details and descriptions about each activity and programme 
2. Information on the governing board members and the executive 
3. A list of key staff, specifying their contact details and the scope of their responsibilities 
4. Details about the organisations impact on society 
5. Any codes, partnerships or coalitions to which the organisation is a signatory 




All the three methods of extraction have suggested a one solution to the original TR scale and is 
the only solution to have eigenvalue that is above 1. It was able to explain around 50% of the 
overall variance in the original scale. 
Finally, the fourth scale was board functions (BF scale): This scale as shown in table 3.9 was 
made up from twelve items.  
 
Table 3.9: The Items in the Board Functions Scale  
1. Setting organisational missions / goals  
2. Setting executive’s compensation  
3. Establishing / reviewing budgets and financial objectives 
4. Setting organisational objectives  
5. Reviewing auditing and accounting policies and practices 
6. Approving significant financial transactions  
7. Fundraising efforts  
8. Advocacy activities 
9. Setting programme objectives 
10. Setting basic management policies 
11. Setting programme performance measures 
12. Setting staff compensation 
 
 
The first two methods of extraction the Kaiser’s criterion and scree plot both suggested a four 
factor solutions to the scale of board functions. Kaiser’s criterion test resulted in four factor 
solutions having an eigenvalue above 1 and the four of them managed altogether to explain 
around 68% of the overall variance in the original scale. However, the parallel analysis test 
reveals that only the first two actual eigenvalues from the (PCA) have exceeded the 
corresponding values from the random data set which were generated by the parallel analysis 
test. The two component solutions were able to explain around 50% of the overall variance in the 
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original scale of board functions.  Hence, I decided to retain two factor solutions to represent the 
scale of the board functions.  
 
Step Three: Factor rotation and interpretation of the results 
 
To determine the items in each solution, factor rotation comes here to help in identifying these 
items. It does not change the underlying solution rather it presents the pattern of loadings in a 
manner that is easier to interpret. The results from the extraction process show that the items for 
each of the first three scales SE, PPG, and TR have expressed only one dimension so no 
extractions came out of the three scales. As for the fourth scale BF the extraction process 
identifies two solutions.  
As shown in table 3.8 the rotation process identified two dimensions to the fourth scale of Board 
Functions (BF scale). The first dimension was interpreted as managerial dimension because it 
constitutes five managerially oriented items. The second dimension was interpreted as strategic 




Table 3.10: The Scale of Board functions two factors extraction 
Strategic responsibilities  
1. Approving significant financial transactions 
2. Establishing and reviewing budgets and financial objectives 
3. Setting organisational mission and goal 
4. Reviewing auditing and accounting policies and practices 
5. Setting organisational objectives 
6. Setting executive’s compensation 
7. Setting staff compensation 
Managerial responsibilities 
1. Setting basic management policies 
2. Setting programme objectives 
3. Setting programme performance measures 
4. Fundraising efforts 
5. Advocacy activities 
 
 
The identified dimensions and their items were identical to those identified by other 
researchers such as Salamon and Geller (2005) in the study of governance and accountability 
practices of non for profit organisations in the USA.  Hence, the validity of the BF scale and 
its two dimensions is confirmed by previous literature (Salamon, 2005).  
 
Step Four: Testing the reliability of the solutions for each scale 
 
Having done the factor analysis and identified the final scales that will be used in the analysis 
chapters the next step was to test the internal consistency of these scales. This refers to the 
degree to which the items that make up the scale hang together and are all measuring the 
same underlying construct. One of the most commonly used indicators of internal consistency 
is Cronbach’s alpha coefficient. Ideally, the Cronbach alpha coefficient of a scale should be 
above 0.7 (DeVellis, 2003 in Pallant, 2007). Cronbach alpha values are quite sensitive to the 
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number of items in the scale. Low Cronbach values are not uncommon with short scales. 
However, the results of the reliability tests for the scales were above the threshold of 0.7 so 
that all the scales were reliable (see Table 3.9). The lowest alpha was to SE scale with alpha = 
0.75 and highest alpha wat to PPG with alpha = 0.92.   
 
Table 3.11 Summary of the factor analysis and reliability tests 
Name of the scale 
Assessment of the suitability of 
the data for factor analysis  
Factor 
extraction Reliability 
Alpha Bartlett’s test (KMO) No solutions 
Level of participation (SE scale) P= 0.000 0.689 1 0.750 
Participation procedure guidelines (PPG 
scale) 
P= 0.000 0.850 1 0.917 
Level of transparency (TR scale) P= 0.000 0.841 1 0.794 
Board functions (BF scale) P= 0.000 0.806 2 - 
Strategic: 7 items - - - 0.783 
Managerial: 5 items - - - 0.774 
 
 
Table 3.9 summarises the results of the factor analysis and the reliability tests for the scales. 
It confirms the suitability of the scales for factor analysis. As set out above, there were two 
solutions identified to the BF scale, one interpreted as managerial and the other as strategic. 
The reliability tests for these new dimensions are also confirmed. Having completed the 
factor analysis and the reliability tests, the scales are now ready for the analysis, which will 
be undertaken in the next three chapters. However, in order to finalise the methodological 
steps set out in this chapter, I shall now move to discuss in the next section the ethical 
considerations of this study.  
3.8 RESEARCH ETHICS  
 
Research ethics were taken into consideration for the purpose of data protection, collection 
and throughout the study as well. The whole project was governed by the university’s ethical 
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guidelines and standards. Four main ethical aspects were taken into account and these are: 
First, the integrity and honesty of the researcher in making respondents aware of the purpose 
and objectives of the project. The researcher should be truthful and open about how the 
obtained data will be used and how the findings of the study will be disclosed (Blaxter, 
Hughes and Tight, 2010). Respondents were sent the questionnaire survey accompanied with 
a covering letter explains the purpose of the research and the structure of the questionnaire. 
Information about the researcher, address and contact details were provided in the letter. The 
second ethical factor was that participants should not be harmed by any mean as a 
consequence of their participation in the survey. Respondents were informed in the covering 
letter that the collected data (their answers to the questions) and the findings of the survey 
were going to be used specifically for academic purposes and not for any other use. All 
responses were obtained completely voluntary so that there was no compulsion to any 
respondent to respond to the survey what so ever. The third ethical factor was that 
respondents’ privacy should be respected and protected. Respondents were given the choice 
to provide their name if they wished or keep their identity hidden. The online survey was 
published through a password protected site hosted by DMU. While a respondent is 
answering the survey he or she can change their answers to questions if they wish to but 
when questions are completed then at the end of the survey respondents will be asked to 
submit the survey. Once the questionnaire survey was submitted it cannot be tempered with 
or accessed again. The researcher was the website only administrator so that no one else had 
access the data beside him. The final ethical factor was about respecting the confidentiality of 
the actual data and not talk about it or discuss it with others and the reporting of the research 
findings will ensure that organisations and individuals cannot be recognised (Berg & Lune, 
2004).  In the covering letter the researcher assured full confidentiality for participants and 
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their answers to the survey were going to be used anonymously and only for academic 
purposes. 
There was only very few cases where organisations did not have access to the internet so 
those respondents were provided with a hard copy of the survey accompanied with a an extra 




3.9 CONCLUSION  
 
In this chapter I began with discussing research philosophy giving particular emphasis to 
post-positivism. The research instrument developed for the data collection, sampling 
approach, data collection, and validity of the sample and the consideration of research ethics 
are outlined. 
There is no research study is free of bias, limitations and restrictions. This is because the two 
philosophical approaches of positivist and constructivist perceive reality in a totally opposite 
ways. It is impossible to find a philosophical approach views reality as an absolute objective 
and as an absolute subjective at the same time. Therefore, no matter what the philosophical 
paradigm that a research is identified with, there will always be limitations in the 
methodology. In this sense what makes a research study sound is the extent of its closeness to 




The quantitative survey of this study fits the methodological procedures of a heterodox 
paradigm. It is a cross-sectional survey design offers a combination of questions with a 
randomly selected valid sample comparable to sample figures in other studies and documents. 
The large size of the sample used in the analysis (250 VOs) plus the confirmation of its 
validity and that it was randomly selected, provide a good level of confidence to generalise 
the conclusion of the findings on the entire population. Having said that however, much of 
this based on how the results are interpreted, however these limitations are engaged in critical 
reflection discussion throughout the thesis. With this in mind, now the focus moves in chapter 
four to presenting the survey returns, then in chapter five and six I will be analysing the 












This chapter undertakes a first reading of the results emerging from the survey returns.  It 
reports on the five areas of the survey: organisational characteristics; governance; policies 
and extent of formality procedures for participation and transparency; transparency; and 
stakeholder participation in the decision-making process. The collective performance of 
organisations on transparency and stakeholder engagement at the time of the survey was at 
best inconsistent and at worse poor. Such inconsistencies in the application of the 
fundamental elements of what might constitute effective practices of transparency and 
engagement undermines what are often seen as self-reinforcing and continuous practices of 
accountability in the sector. 
 
The chapter begins with an examination of the organisational characteristics of the NGOs 
who responded to the survey.  It then turns to the analysis of the issues concerning the 
governance structures of respondents before considering practices of transparency and 







4.1 ORGANISATIONAL CAPACITIES 
 
The analysis of survey returns starts with an examination of the organisational capacities 
across the sample.  Respondents were asked a series of questions concerning seven 
organisational capabilities. These included the charitable legal status of the organisation as 
registered with the Charity Commission, its affiliation (or not) to an umbrella group, its 
primary purpose, as well as its age and size (annual income, number of staff and volunteers). 
 
 
4.1.1 Legal status 
 
Almost three quarters of organisations (71 per cent) were registered with  the Charity 
Commission as limited companies by guarantee, with approximately a quarter (26 per cent) 
registered as trusts, whilst a relatively small percentage (3 per cent) of respondents indicated 
that they took other legal forms. 40 per cent of respondents were affiliated to an umbrella 
body.  
 
4.1.2 Range of activities 
Respondent organisations were engaged in a wide range of activities. There was no 
discernable concentration of respondent organisations working within a specific charitable 
field of work. Organisations were relatively equally spread across the eight categories of 
activities devised to map their core activities. Working for those in need and undertaking 
community development captured just over a third of all respondents; religion and 




Table 4.1: Voluntary organisations primary nature or purpose of existencea 
The primary nature or purpose of existence  %  
The relief of those in need   18 
Citizenship or community development  17 
Education  14 
The advancement of health  13 
Art culture heritage or science  11 
Other charitable purposes  11 
Religion and the prevention or relief of poverty  9 
Environmental protection or improvement  7 
Total  100 
aNumber of respondents: 249, missing data: 1 
 
 
4.1.3 Organisational age 
 
In terms of the age of organisations in the sample (table 4.2), only a minority of organisations 
(8 per cent) declared themselves to be ‘very young’, or having been in existence for seven years 
or less. Only a fifth of respondents identified their organisation as ‘young’, or having existed 
for less than 14 years. On the contrary, most respondents, some 57 per cent, classified their 
organisation as being established or mature. Over a sixth, 16 per cent, declared themselves to 
be ‘very mature’, having existed for 50 years or more. 
 
Table 4.2: Age of Voluntary Organisationsa 
Age of NGO   % 
Very young (7 years or less)  8 
Young (8 - 14 years)  19 
Established (15 - 24 years)  28 
Mature (25 - 49 years)  29 
Very mature (50 years or more)  16 
Total                                                                                      100 
aN = 249, missing data = 1 




The majority of respondents, 54 per cent employ between 1 and 10 full-time staff, 58 per cent 
had between 1 and 10 part-time staff and around 32 per cent of the respondents recruit between 
1 and 10 volunteers (see Table 4.3). Approximately a third of organisations had up to 100 full-
time, part-time staff or volunteers. Only a small proportion of respondents employed over 100 
paid staff, be it full-time or part-time employees, and about 10 per cent had over 100 volunteers. 
Indeed, it is worth noting that almost a fifth of organisations did not have any volunteers.  
 
Table 4.3: Number of paid staff and volunteersa 
number of staff and volunteers 
Full-time staff Part-time staff Volunteers 
% % % 
None 6 10 21 
2 or fewer 11 16 8 
3 - 10 43 42 24 
11 - 100 34 30 38 
101 and more 6 2 9 
Total  100 100 100 
aNumber of respondents: 249, missing data: 1 
 
 
4.1.5 Annual income 
 
Respondent organisations were divided into five income categories (see Table 4), which were 
adapted from the classifications put forward from the Charity Commission (Charity 
Commission, 2010). The annual income of respondents fell somewhat evenly across the 
income brackets from £250, 000 up to £5 million. These income brackets accounted for 90 per 
cent of all respondents. Relatively few organisations had an annual income of less than 
£250,000. Similarly, few had an annual income over  £5 million. Twice as many respondent 






Table 4.4: Voluntary organisations’ size measured by annual incomea 
NGO size  % 
Less than £250,000  5 
£250,000 - £499,999  30 
£500,000 - £999,999  24 
£1m - £4,999,999  31 
£5m  and over  10 
 Total  100 
aNumber of respondents: 239, missing data: 11 
 
 
4.1.6 Sources of income 
 
At the time of the survey, it was estimated that about 34 per cent of the total annual income of 
the voluntary sector came from government sources (NCVO, 2008). This reliance on 
government funding was reflected in the survey returns, with 32 per cent of respondents having 
more than 50 per cent of their income awarded by government (see Table 4.5). However, 
reliance on government funding should not be overstated. 35 per cent of respondents did not 
receive any government funding at all, whilst a quarter of organisations relied on government 
for up to a quarter of their funding. 40 per cent of organisations relied on donations for up to a 
quarter of their income, whilst 34 per cent generated up to a quarter of their income from 
trading. 49 per cent drew on other sources such as income from rent. Approximately three 
quarters of all respondents attracted some funding from the private sector and individual 
donations. Almost two thirds indicated that they fund at least part of their activities by engaging 
in trade. 
 
Table 4.5: Sources of income for voluntary organisationsa 
As a % of the NGO’s 












%  %  %  %  
0 % 35 24 36 33 
From 1% to 25% 20 40 34 49 
From  26% to 50% 13 11 11 08 
From 51% to 75% 12 10 08 05 
From 76% to 100% 20 15 11 05 
Total 100 100 100 100 
aNumber of respondents: 240, missing data: 10 
 
 
4.2 Issues of Governance 
 
Respondent organisations were asked a series of questions concerning codes of governance, 
motivations and consequences of adhering to code of governance, and board membership, as 
well as questions on board functions and responsibilities, levels of satisfaction about the 
engagement of board members, and the number and type of board sub-committees that exist.  
 
 
4.2.1 Code of best practice  
 
Almost all respondents, some 94 per cent, confirmed that their organisations adhered to at least 
one code of best practice in terms of its governance (see Table 4.6). Two-thirds adhered to a 
sector-wide code, whilst over half had an internally developed code of practice, and over a 
third adhered to government associated standards and a fifth to industry wide standards.  
Adherence to a code of practice was overwhelmingly associated with a motivation to improve 
management outcomes and processes. The motivation ‘to fulfil a desire to achieve excellence’ 
was thus endorsed by 84 per cent of respondents (see Table 4.7) and in many ways this was 
supported by the motivation to achieve transparency (80 per cent). Importantly for our analysis, 
adopting a code of practice was not tied to what we might term external demands, be it from 
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government, other funders or beneficiaries.  Indeed, internal motivations were reflected in the 
assumed consequences of adopting a code of practice, which were defined predominantly as 
improvements to governance, accountability and transparency (see Table 4.8). Only half 
associated the adoption and following of a code of practice with an improved capacity to meet 
the goals of the organisation.  
 
 
Table 4.6: Board code of governancea 
Board adherence to code of best practice  
Yes No 
% % 
Board adheres to code of standards 94 6 
Adhere to sector wide standards 61 39 
Adhere to internally developed standard 53 47 
Adhere to government-associated standards 36 64 
Adhere to industry wide standards 21 79 
Adhere to other type of standards 16 84 




Table 4.7: Reasons for adherence to a code of governancea  
Reasons for adherence  % 
Desire to achieve excellence  84 
Desire to ensure transparency  80 
Reputation and public image  70 
Board monitoring  50 
Government funder demands  42 
Required to operate in field  38 
Other funder demand  25 
Beneficiary demands  21 
Other influences  10 
Media attention  8 




Table 4.8: Consequences after adherencea 
Consequences of adherence  % 
Improved governance  84 
Improved accountability   80 
Improved transparency  76 
Improved board knowledge  72 
Improved reputation  62 
Improved staff knowledge  58 
Improved staff/board ethics  54 
Improved ability to meet goals  50 
Improved staff attention to mission  41 
Improved board recruitment  37 
Improved fundraising  37 
Improved staff morals  34 
Other consequences  10 
aNumber of respondents: 250, missing data: 0 
 
 
4.2.2 Board membership 
 
There was relative uniformity in terms of board membership. Over half of respondent 
organisations had between 5 and 9 board members (see Table 9). Just over a third had between 
10 and 19 members. Only five per cent of respondents had less than five members on their 
board, and no more than four per cent had more than 20 members on their board. In terms of 
board structures, 1 in 7 respondents had no board committees in place (see Table 10).  This 
said, almost three quarters had between one and three committees, whilst 9 per cent have four 
and only 4 per cent had five or more. 
 
 
Table 4.9: Size of Voluntary Organisation Boardsa 
Board Size  % 
Less than 5 members  5 
5 – 9 members  55 
10 – 19 members  36 
20 and over  4 
Total  100 




Table 4.10: Number of board committees a 
Number of committees VOs have  % 
None  14 
One committee  22 
Two committees  26 
Three committees  25 
Four committees  9 
Five committees  3 
Six committees  1 
Total   100 
aNumber of respondents: 249, missing data: 1 
 
 
There were a range of different board committees in place (Table 4.11), from fund raising 
committees to personnel committees. Two categories of board committees dominated, with 54 
per cent of boards having an executive committee in place and 51 per cent having established 
a finance committee. In contrast, only 6 per cent of the respondents had an appointment 
committee in place, and only approximately a fifth had a fund-raising committee. 
 
 
Table 4.11: Type of committees  
Type of committees  N % 
None 36 15 
Executive committee 134 54 
Finance committee 128 51 
Other type of committee 81 33 
Personnel committee 73 29 
Fund-raising committee 52 21 
Programme committee 27 11 
Nominating committee 15 6 









Respondents were asked to evaluate their boards’ involvement in twelve areas of responsibility, 
which were adopted from the work of Salamon and Geller (2005) (see Table 4.12).  The 
boundaries between the work of board members and executive members and officers have been 
disputed. There has often been a division imposed between the strategic responsibilities of the 
board and the everyday managerial tasks of officers (Carver, 2006, p. 37).  
 
 
I carried out a factor analysis (and subsequent reliability tests) on the 12 items of board 
responsibilities to identify what we might deem to be strategic and managerial dimensions of 
board responsibilities. This factor analysis clustered areas of responsibility into two 
dimensions: the first was composed of seven roles identified with strategic functions, whilst 
the second brought together the remaining 5 areas of responsibilities as managerial functions. 
Setting organisational missions and goals and objectives, reviewing executive and staff 
compensation, establishing and reviewing budgets and financial objectives, as well as auditing 
and accounting practices and policies, and the approval of significant financial transactions 
were all classified as strategic functions. Fundraising, advocacy, and the setting of programme 
objectives, basic management policies and programme performance measures were all 
considered to be managerial functions.4 Respondents were asked to rank board involvement 
with each item on a scale of 1 to 5. Score of 5 and 4 were considered to be high involvement; 
3 and 2 low to medium involvement; and 1 no involvement. 
 
Overall board members in respondent organisations were considered to be highly involved in 
the strategic duties, when compared to their perceived engagement in managerial activities (see 
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Table 4.12). In less than four per cent of respondent organisations board members were not 
involved in exercising strategic responsibilities, although when considering the setting of 
executive and staff compensation this rose to 9 and 12 per cent respectively. These latter two 
areas of responsibilities were those least highly engaged in by board members, alongside 
setting organisational objectives. Over 70 per cent of respondents suggested that board 
members were highly involved in the setting organisational missions, reviewing budgets, 
approving financial transactions and reviewing auditing and accounting practices and policies.  
 
 
However, this high level of perceived engagement contrasted markedly with the involvement 
of board members in managerial tasks. Approximately half of all respondent organisations 
claimed that board members had low to medium involvement in managerial roles and 
responsibilities, with up to 24 per cent and 27 per cent of respondents suggesting that board 
members were not involved at all in fundraising and advocacy activities. Only 35 per cent of 
respondent organisations asserted that board members were highly involved in setting basic 
management policies, which arguably comparable with the relative low score of board 
engagement highly involved in the strategic responsibility of setting organisational objectives 
(69 per cent).  
 
 
When asked about their level of satisfaction with the extent of their board’s involvement in 
strategic and managerial duties, organisational respondents were broadly satisfied with the 
existing division of responsibilities or board engagement (see Table 4.13). In terms of strategic 
responsibilities, over 70 per cent of respondents had a high level of satisfaction with strategic 
responsibilities in areas of finance, mission goals, and reviewing auditing and accounting 
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practices, although this fell to roughly two-thirds when considering board engagement in the 
setting of organisational objectives, and executive and staff compensation.  In contrast, 
respondents reported lower levels of satisfaction with board engagement in managerial 
responsibilities, with over a third of respondent organisations demonstrating low and moderate 
level of satisfaction across all managerial responsibilities (this rose to almost half of 
respondents when advocacy and fundraising were taken in to account). Consequently 59 per 
cent of respondent organisations suggested that more board member involvement was required 
in fundraising, with 42 per cent calling for more engagement in advocacy activities (see Table 
4.14). This said, and fundraising apart, the majority of respondents, did not call for increased 
engagement of board members in any of the strategic and managerial functions identified. 
Respondents might have expressed some criticisms of board members engagement, but further 



















% % % 
Strategic responsibilities      
Approving significant financial transactions 81 16 3 250 0 
Establishing and reviewing budgets and 
financial objectives 
79 20 1 249 1 
Setting organisational mission and goal 76 21 3 250 0 
Reviewing auditing and accounting policies 
and practices 
72 26 2 250 0 
Setting organisational objectives 69 29 2 250 0 
Setting executive’s compensation 67 24 9 247 3 
Setting staff compensation 52 36 12 244 6 
Managerial responsibilities      
Setting basic management policies 35 54 11 248 2 
Setting programme objectives 31 56 13 243 7 
Setting programme performance measures 24 60 16 243 7 
Fundraising efforts 27 49 24 243 7 
Advocacy activities 21 52 27 241 9 
aInvolvement on each item scored on a scale from 1 (not involved) to 5 (highly involved) 
 
 















%  %  %  
Strategic responsibilities 
Approving significant financial 
transactions 
86 14 0 243 7 
Establishing and reviewing budgets and 
financial objectives 
75 24 1 243 7 
Setting organisational mission and goal 74 23 3 245 5 
Reviewing auditing and accounting 
policies and practices 
73 25 2 243 7 
Setting organisational objectives 68 30 2 243 7 
Setting executive’s compensation 68 27 5 243 7 
Setting staff compensation 67 28 5 239 11 
Managerial responsibilities 











Setting programme objectives 60 37 3 240 10 
Setting programme performance 
measures 
55 40 5 239 11 
Advocacy activities 41 48 11 237 13 
Fundraising efforts 35 50 15 239 11 




Table 4.14: Organisation’s perception on more board involvement in activities is needed 
Board functions 
Organisation’s perception on more board 




data % % 
Strategic responsibilities     
Approving significant financial transactions 12 88 246 4 
Establishing and reviewing budgets and financial objectives 27 73 246 4 
Setting organisational mission and goal 33 67 247 3 
Reviewing auditing and accounting policies and practices 26 74 246 4 
Setting organisational objectives 37 63 246 4 
Setting executive’s compensation 29 71 246 4 
Setting staff compensation 19 81 242 8 
Managerial responsibilities     
Setting basic management policies 19 81 243 7 
Setting programme objectives 19 81 243 7 
Setting programme performance measures 26 74 242 8 
Fundraising efforts 59 41 244 6 
Advocacy activities 42 58 243 7 
 
 
4.3 Issues of Transparency  
 
Having set out the organisational and governance structures of respondent organisations, I now 
turn to assess the practices of transparency associated with these internal structures and 
governance practices. The survey first investigated the level of transparency within respondent 
organisations by examining the public availability (or not) of six items of information. These 
included: details and descriptions about each activity and programme of the organisation; a list 
of key staff, specifying their contact details and the scope of their responsibilities; details about 
the organisations impact on society; any codes, partnerships or coalitions to which the 
organisation is a signatory; information on the governing board members and the executive; 
and finally openness on how stakeholders can input into the different levels of decision-
making. These areas were adapted from the One World Trust Global Accountability Project 
(GAP) (see Blagescu et al., 2005 p.).  Public availability was deemed to be in place if 
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information was available through an appropriate medium, be it website, annual report, 
bulletins, or annual review. Again, respondents were asked to provide a score on a scale of 1 




Overall, organisational respondents claimed to have been providing information regarding the 
six items (see Table 4.15). However, there were stark differences between the different pieces 
of information made available. Although 91 per cent of respondents indicated that they provide 
details and description about each activity and programme to their stakeholders on regular 
basis, only 55 per cent of respondents were frequently open on how stakeholders can input into 
the different levels of decision-making. 16 per cent of respondents openly admitted to 'never' 
conveying this information, whilst 39 per cent only did so infrequently. Between one fifth and 
a third of respondent organisations only infrequently conveyed or made public information 
concerning board details, staff listings, impact of programmes on society and codes or practice 
to which the organisations ascribed. 32 per cent of organisations in the study did not provide 
details regularly about the organisations impact on society, with 7 per cent never making such 
information available to their stakeholders. Similarly, information on the governing board 
members and the executive were not regularly made available by 26 per cent of respondent 
organisations, with 5 per cent never putting such information at the disposal of the public. Lists 
of key staff were seldom or infrequently made available by almost a third of respondents, with 
6 per cent never providing information about the latter. Finally, 14 per cent of the respondent 
organisations have never provided information concerning the codes of governance to which 
they are signatory; 34 per cent made such information available infrequently.   
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Table 4.15:  Transparency level scalea,b 





(2,3) %  
Never 
(1) %  
Details and descriptions about each activity and programme. 91 7 2 
Information on the governing board members and the executive. 73 22 5 
A list of key staff, specifying their contact details and the scope of their 
responsibilities. 
68 26 6 
Details about the organisations impact on society. 61 32 7 
Any codes, partnerships or coalitions to which the organisation is a 
signatory. 
52 34 14 
Openness on how stakeholders can input into the different levels of 
decision-making. 
45 39 16 
aNumber of respondents: 245, missing data: 5 
bRanked on a scale of 1 to 5 
 
 
The survey also sought to analyse whether organisations had formal commitments or policies 
behind such practices, or whether much depended on the ad hoc work of officers (see Chapter 
Six).  It sought to identify the existence within organisations of policies on transparency and 
the guidelines and procedures associated with those policies.  Policy content and guidelines are 
vital for a policy to be effective, that is without clear guidelines for implementing a policy then 
the existence of the policy itself as a (label) would be useless. Drawing again upon the study 
of Blagescu et al. (2005), I pinpointed seven items to test for the policy’s contents (rules, 
guidelines, procedures). These seven items are: how to make an information request, the 
timeframes for dealing with the request and details of how response will be made; details of 
the rules governing decisions; costs of obtaining information; what information it regards as 
confidential and why; and other areas the policy might highlight. Over 95 per cent of 
respondents did not identify any other area their transparency policy highlights.  
When organisations were asked whether they had a transparency policy in place, 47 per cent 
indicated that they have a formal written policy; 41 per cent had an informal unwritten policy; 
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and 12 per cent have no policy at all (see Table 4.16).  Practices were thus relatively divergent 
across the sample, with no clear standard approach emerging from the returns. When they were 
asked for the reasons for not having a policy 10 per cent indicated that it was not important; 30 
per cent indicated that there were not enough resources; 36 per cent indicated that stakeholders 
did not demand it; 9 per cent respondents indicated that there is no support from the Charity 
Commission; and 15 per cent indicated other reasons. 
 
As for the substantive content or guidelines of transparency policies (see Table 4.17), although 
62 per cent of organisational respondents indicated that their transparency policy highlights 
how a stakeholder can make an information request, 32 per cent indicated that their policy did 
not. 40 per cent of respondents indicated that they had no timeframes for dealing with 
information requests, compared to 54 per cent who had timeframes for dealing with 
information request in place. As for how responses would be made, 55 per cent did provide 
information on how responses will be made but 39 per cent did not while 6 per cent did not 
know. Only 52 per cent indicated that their policy on transparency provided details of the rules 
governing decisions, 39 per cent admitted that their policy did not while 9 per cent did not 
know. However, only 25 per cent of respondents indicated that their policy highlights whether 
there is a cost for obtaining information while 65 per cent did not and 10 per cent did not know. 
54 per cent indicated that their policy identified what information is regarded as confidential 
and why, while 37 per cent did not, and 9 per cent stated that they did not know. It seems that 
just over half of respondents had most of the components - not counting costs of information. 
In general the findings indicate that around half of the respondents either do not have policy, 
or policy guidelines, or simply they don’t know if they have. More specifically, 53 per cent of 
respondents did not have a transparency policy in place. Indeed, this is arguably not surprising 
as the organisational culture of voluntary organisations privileges the construction of trust 
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relations playing a major part in the voluntary organisations’ work. Equally, implementing 
transparency is not free and voluntary organisations have limited resources so that most of the 
generated income is always to be spent on the mainstream activities. This throws some doubt 
on the other 47 per cent of respondents who indicated that they have a transparency policy in 
place and whether their policy is effective or not.  
 
 
Table 4.16: Reasons for not having a policy 
Reasons for not having a policy (Multiple choice question) N % 
Not important 11 10 
No enough resources 32 30 
Stakeholders did not demand it 38 36 
No support from the Charity Commission 10 9 
Other reasons 16 15 





Table 4.17: Transparency procedures and guidelines 
Q17 Does organisation’s policy on transparency highlight 





N % N % N % 
How to make an information request 151 62 79 32 16 6 246 
Timeframes for dealing with information request 132 54 99 40 15 6 246 
Details of how response will be made 135 55 95 39 16 6 246 
Details of the rules governing decisions 129 52 96 39 21 9 246 
Costs of obtaining information 61 25 161 65 24 10 246 
What information it regards as confidential and why 132 54 91 37 23 9 246 
Other areas the policy might highlight 11 05 235 95 0 0 246 
 
 




As I set out in Chapter Two of this thesis, the model of participation informing this study 
consists of three interlinked processes: stage of engagement (the stage of decision-making 
cycle in which participation occurs); the level of influence stakeholders have on decisions; and 
the engagement mechanism used in the participation process. Respondents were thus asked a 
series of questions concerning these three processes, as well as how these processes affected 
or impacted upon five different stakeholder groups: beneficiaries; donors; government; staff; 
and others. Each process was also characterised by different practices. There was the first 
process of stage of engagement, comprised of five items from high to low in relation to the 
categories of Arnstein’s ladder of engagement (see Chapter Two). Table 4.18 presents the 
respondents’ answers to the three processes over the five stakeholder groups. 
 
Turning to agenda-setting, the highest stage of engagement, staff were the most common 
participants in such processes with three quarters of respondents indicating staff involvement 
in agenda setting. 54 per cent of respondents have their beneficiaries involved at this stage of 
decision-making; just under half of the organisations surveyed did not engage with 
beneficiaries at this stage of engagement. Donors were also inconsistently involved across the 
sector in agenda-setting, as well government representatives. Although the lack of engagement 
of these two latter stakeholder groups might be explained by the desire of organisations to 
maintain control over the determination of their strategic goals or programmes, the results 
contrast with the ranking of the importance of stakeholders by respondents (see Table 4.19 for 
full results): beneficiaries were rated by 94 per cent of organisations as very important, as were 
staff by 92% of respondents, donors by 73 per cent, and government by 60 per cent. 
 
Table 4.18:  Respondents’ performance on stakeholder engagement 























Stage of engagement           
Agenda setting 54 46 21 79 23 77 76 24 29 71 
Project/ Policy design 66 34 36 64 26 74 85 15 33 67 
Implementation 67 33 31 69 22 78 85 15 32 68 
Monitoring 62 38 37 63 33 67 85 15 33 67 
Evaluation 70 30 42 58 35 65 84 16 36 64 
Level of influence           
Joint decision-making 41 59 24 76 17 83 66 34 30 70 
Participation in design of project or 
policy design 
58 42 26 74 24 76 72 28 33 67 
Consultation 68 32 31 69 28 72 74 26 34 66 
Information sharing 61 39 36 64 34 66 71 29 32 68 
Engagement mechanism used           
Joint committees 29 71 17 83 24 76 45 55 31 69 
Partnerships 44 56 33 67 35 65 56 44 38 62 
Taskforces 23 77 10 90 13 87 37 63 18 82 
Advisory groups 53 47 19 81 24 76 56 44 31 69 
Public hearings 19 81 7 93 9 91 17 83 12 88 
 
Similar patterns of engagement were detected in terms of project and policy design, and 
implementation. For example, 85 per cent of respondents involved staff, and 66 per cent 
involved beneficiaries in project and policy design. However, the other stakeholder groups 
were much less engaged with voluntary organisations at these stages of engagement than staff 
and beneficiaries. 36 per cent of respondents involved donors in project and policy design, 26 
per cent involved government, and 33 per cent involved other groups. At the lowest level of 
engagement, that of evaluation, that the gap between stakeholders is noticeably reduced, 
although staff remain the most engaged stakeholder even at this level of engagement. 84 per 
cent of respondents involved staff in evaluation, 70 per cent involved beneficiaries, 42 per cent 
involved donors, 35 per cent involved government, and 36 per cent involved other groups. 
Survey returns confirm that voluntary organisations engagement with their stakeholders over 
the five stages is low to moderate with the exception of staff. Beneficiaries, donors, and 
governments had a very low to low involvement in the higher stages and low to moderate in 
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the lower stages. The findings show that stakeholder participation was under developed in 
relation to the stage in which stakeholder participation occurs.  
 
 
The responses of voluntary organisations in the sample regarding the stage of engagement 
should correspond to the level of influence and the mechanism used if they are to reflect a real 
and meaningful process of engagement. Mapping such levels of engagement against influence 
begins to clarify the emerging picture of participatory practices across non-governmental 
organisations. 66 per cent of respondents indicated that staff have influence at the level of joint 
decision-making. This fell to less than half, 41 per cent, when beneficiaries were concerned, 
and less than a quarter for donors and less than one fifth for government. Influence of different 
stakeholders was nominally better when considering participation in the design of project or 
policy. 72 per cent of respondents indicated that staff have influence at the level of participation 
in design of project or policy, while 58 per cent of respondents suggested that beneficiaries had 
an influence at the level of participation in the design of projects or policies, 26 per cent for 
donors and 24 per cent for government. Recognition of the influence of beneficiaries increased 
at lower levels of influence: 68 per cent of respondents acknowledged the influence of 
beneficiaries in consultation processes, and 61 per cent in information sharing practices. Again, 
staff appear to have an influence at all levels of engagement against and beyond that of 
beneficiaries, government and donors. 
 
 
Turning to engagement mechanisms, the survey questioned the use of joint committees through 
to partnerships, task forces, advisory groups and public hearings (see Table 4.18). Less than 
half of respondents used joint committees with staff (45 per cent) and 29 per cent engaged 
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beneficiaries in such instances, (22 per cent with government and 17 per cent with donors). 
Partnerships fared little better, although it was broadly a more popular mechanisms of 
engagement, as were advisory groups with over half of respondent organisations claiming to 
use such mechanisms with staff and beneficiaries.  The least popular mechanisms in terms of 
engaging stakeholders were task forces and public hearings. 
 
 
Table 4.19 Stakeholder groups 
Q14 Stakeholder groups 
Very important 
(4,5) 
Low or moderate 








N % N % N % 
Beneficiaries 229 94 9 04 6 02 244 6 4.73 
Staff 224 92 14 06 6 02 244 6 4.64 
Donors 175 73 40 16 26 11 241 9 4.01 
The local community 175 72 47 19 21 09 243 7 3.95 
Customers 166 69 21 09 55 22 242 8 3.76 
Government 145 60 72 30 24 10 241 9 3.64 
The general public 138 57 82 34 23 09 243 7 3.63 
The Charity Commission 137 56 98 40 10 04 245 5 3.70 
Peer organisations 133 55 92 38 16 07 241 9 3.53 
A professional, trade or a 
regulator body 
91 38 93 38 58 24 242 8 2.97 
The Inland Revenue 80 33 112 46 52 21 244 6 2.87 
Local businesses 71 29 106 44 66 27 243 7 2.64 
Bankers or other lenders 66 27 115 47 62 26 243 7 2.65 
 
 
4.5 Type of Policies 
Just over one-third of respondents indicated that their organisation had a formal written policy 
on stakeholder engagement. Of the remaining two thirds of organisations, some 43 per cent of 
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respondents indicated that in the absence of a formal written policy, their organisation did have 
an informal unwritten policy. 23 per cent of respondents said that their organisation had neither 
a written policy nor an unwritten set of agreed practices..  
 
Table 4.20: the type of policy exists in VOs within the sample 
 Transparency Stakeholder Engagement 
No policy 30 (12%) 55 (23%) 
Formal policy 115 (47%) 84 (34%) 
Informal policy 102 (41%) 106 (43%) 
Total 247 (100%) 245 (100%) 
No response  3  5  
 
 
Table 4.20 also shows the number of voluntary organisations in the sample: that have a formal, 
informal or no policy on engagement or transparency in place.  Some 12 per cent of the sample 
had no transparency policy and 22 per cent had no engagement policy. 46 per cent had a formal 
transparency policy and 34 per cent had a formal engagement policy. There are 41 per cent of 
organisational respondents that have informal transparency policies and 42 per cent that have 
informal engagement policies.  
 
 
Exploring what such policies and practices might entail, the survey asked respondents to 
comment on their procedure guidelines for stakeholder engagement across their organisations 
(see Table 4.21). Here I measured such guidelines by asking respondents to indicate how 
frequent they applied six core procedures identified by Blagescu et al (2005) for implementing 
stakeholder engagement processes.  Just over half of respondents, 51 per cent, stated that they 
frequently circulated information regarding engagement processes to key stakeholders. 49 per 
cent claimed that their organisation made such information available to all stakeholders.  19 
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per cent of respondents indicated that they never made this information available to either 
stakeholder groups. 68 per cent of respondents indicated that key stakeholders were not 
prevented from engagement processes due to a lack of physical access, communication barriers 
(language or expert terms) or financial constraints. 69 per cent of respondents indicated that 
disadvantaged stakeholder groups were given special support and encouragement when their 
engagement is appropriate. 75 per cent of respondents indicated that they guaranteed the 
confidentiality of stakeholders during an engagement process. 
 
   
Table 4.21:  Engagement guideline measures 
















Information regarding engagement processes are circulated to 
key stakeholders in appropriate forms and through appropriate 
media. 
51 30 19 244 6 
Information regarding engagement processes are made 
available to all stakeholders in appropriate forms and through 
appropriate media. 
49 32 19 243 7 
Contact details for a relevant person in the organisation are 
provided 
78 11 11 244 6 
Key stakeholders are not prevented from participation 
processes due to lack of physical access, communication 
barriers (language or expert terms) or financial constraints. 
68 17 15 244 6 
The confidentiality of stakeholders during an engagement 
process is guaranteed by the organisation where appropriate. 
75 12 13 244 6 
Disadvantaged groups are given special support and 
encouragement when their engagement is appropriate. 








This chapter has undertaken the first critical reading of the survey returns. Organisational 
respondents offered a sample of relatively mature voluntary organisations, typically employing 
less than 10 employees and volunteers. Organisations were spread across a range of activities 
within the sector and which drew their income from government, private donations, and 
trading. As such, the survey returns confirmed many of the findings of existing studies. On the 
one hand, organisation respondents followed a code of good practice in order to improve 
management of the organisation, had a board of between 5 and 9 members, with boards having 
in general executive and finance subcommittees. On the other hand, the findings reasserted the 
involvement of board members in strategic management rather than managerial tasks. This 
division of labour was not contested by organisational respondents, although it was widely 
expressed that board members should become more involved in fund-raising activities. 
Salamon and Geller (2005) also found that boards were more involved in strategic rather than 
managerial duties. However, at this stage, this is not to suggest any impact of such 
arrangements on organisational performance. Bradshaw, Murray and Wolpin (1992) found no 
relationship between the type of board orientation whether it is purely strategic or managerial 
with board performance. However, their study did not examine the effect of board 
responsibilities on accountability. I will examine such relationships statistically in Chapter Six 
through regression analysis.  
 
 
Importantly, for this research however, the data indicated that at the time of the survey formal 
transparency policies were not consistently in place across the voluntary and community sector.  
Over half of survey respondents did not have a policy in place. And, of those organisations that 
did have a policy in place, there was equally little consistent practice. For example, over a third 
of organisations had policies in place that did not set out how its stakeholders might make a 
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request for information. Similarly some 40 per cent of organisational respondents did not have 
a policy in place as to timeframes expected to make a formal response nor on how the response 
would be made. In short, this study reveals an inconsistent practice towards the formal 
components of a policy towards transparency, with roughly a third of organisation respondents 
failing to offer one of the primary elements of transparency which might be expected of any 
policy. This is not to suggest that the presence or absence of a formal transparency policy 
necessarily impacts upon levels of transparency and accountability experienced by 
stakeholders. Equally, such formal procedures are not without their costs of implementation 
and do not necessarily advance trust between organisations and stakeholders. I will return to 
such questions and assertions in Chapter Six.  
 
 
When turning to the second dimension of the model of accountability tested in this study, that 
of stakeholder participation, there are again inconsistent practices across respondent 
organisations. For example, just over half of organisations claimed to engage stakeholders in 
agenda-setting. First, however, staff were more likely to be involved than beneficiaries in such 
exercises, and staff and beneficiaries were far more likely to be involved than donors, 
government and other groups. These results were replicated across stages of engagement and 
levels of influence, although such disparities did reduce at lower levels of engagement and 
influence. Second, there was a potential clash between stages of engagement and levels of 
influence and mechanisms with the recourse to particular mechanisms not always offering the 
appropriate fit with the stage of engagement and level of influence. I discuss this further in 
Chapter Five. Finally, the existence of a policy on participation was as patchy across the sector 
as that of transparency (respondents were asked separate questions for transparency and 
participation). In terms of the specific elements of such a policy, almost 20 per cent of 
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organisation respondents did not circulate information regarded engagement processes to 
stakeholders, whilst between 25 per cent and 30 per cent could not confirm that stakeholders 
were prevented from engagement due for example to physical access, nor that disadvantaged 
stakeholders were given specific support, and that confidentiality of stakeholders during 
engagement was guaranteed.  
 
 
Overall, therefore, seen through the lens of the two dimensions of transparency and 
engagement, practices of accountability across the voluntary sector appeared somewhat patchy. 
In particular, less than half of organisations had formal transparency or participation policies 
in place, and the elements of what might be considered to constitute such policies in practice 
were not followed by between one-fifth and one-third of respondent organisations (depending 
on the element under discussion). This is a significant finding because accoutnability is best 
viewed as a continuous and interlinked set of processes. Genuine transparency should take 
organisations a step forward towards more than just a mere disclosure. Organisations should 
provide stakeholders with relevant information about their programmes and activities 
continuously and not just in retrospective way. Providing stakeholders with information about 
future activities and plans can encourage them to positively be involved and contribute at least 
with their opinions to the success of these programmes and activities. However, at this stage, I 
have said little about whether such practices vary according to the organisational 
characteristics, be it age, affiliation or sources of income. It is to the impact of such variables 








This chapter subjects the initial survey findings to a series of cross-tabulations 
concerning the organisational characteristics of voluntary organisations. It explores 
whether organisational characteristics impact on transparency and engagement 
practices across the voluntary sector. It thus selects three primary organisational 
characteristics - affiliation, age and income  - and tests whether such characteristics 
explain variations in the practices and levels of transparency and engagement.   
 
The chapter examines a series of assumptions and hypotheses. First, it assesses how far 
wider umbrella groups possess more formal guidelines and central bureaucratic 
resources that impact upon member organisations standard practices of accountability. 
Second, it examines the extent to which an organisation’s practices of accountability 
mature over time as it gains experience in the demands of working in the voluntary 
sector. Finally, it analyses the impact of the level of income, and the source of that 
income, on practices of accountability in voluntary organisations. Here it suggests that 
adopting practices of accountability is not a cost free exercise and that higher levels of 
income can positively influence the practices of accountability in voluntary 
organisations. But, at the same time, it examines sources of income, inquiring as to 
whether reliance on funding from government, private donations or trading activities 
can influence how organisations implement practices of transparency and engagement.   
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With that in mind, the chapter argues that neither affiliation, age nor levels of income 
impacts consistently on practices of transparency. By contrast, the source of income 
does appear to exercise an impact on practices of transparency. Organisations more 
reliant on government funding tend to have higher levels of transparency, whilst those 
organisations reliant on trading as a source of income tend to perform worse across all 
the elements of transparency identified and assessed in the survey.  
 
However, the picture of practices of engagement across organisational respondents is 
more complicated. Affiliation had a very weak influence on the stage of engagement, 
but it exercised a strong impact on the level of influence attributed to stakeholders and 
the mechanism deployed. The maturity of the organisation, and size of income, 
influenced the third dimension of engagement, namely the engagement mechanism. 
However, sources of income did not appear to have any consistent impact on the three 
dimensions of engagement studied. Analysis thus reveals a disjuncture across 
organisations between the stage of engagement at which they work with stakeholders, 
the level of influence attributed to stakeholders, and the engagement mechanism 
deployed; and this was the case for affiliation, age and annual income. This disjuncture 
had a consistent impact on organisational capacities, with organisational respondents 
appearing broadly reluctant to use the highest mechanism of engagement. I turn first to 
practices of transparency, testing for the impact of affiliation, age and income, before 










Affiliation to wider umbrella groups 
 
I posited in the introduction that an organisation’s affiliation to a wider umbrella group 
could influence its practice of transparency. The hypothesis is that wider umbrella 
groups possess more formal guidelines and central bureaucratic resources that impose 
upon member organisations standard practices of accountability. However, as I move 
through this analysis of the different dimensions of transparency, this hypothesis is not 
confirmed by the data generated. Rather, the data suggests that belonging (or not) to a 
wider umbrella organisation has little or no impact on how organisations operationalise 
transparency. For example the availability of details about activities and programmes, 
as well as information about staff and board members, affiliation to a wider umbrella 
group appears to have little or no discernible impact on whether such details are made 
available by organisations in this sample (see Table 5.1). If anything, non-affiliated 
groups do better at making such information available, although the practices of 
making programme details available are broadly followed across the organisations in 
the sample (less so those of making available information about staff and board 
members).  
 
Similarly, even when those less common elements of transparency activities are taken 
into account, affiliation does not seem to increase the availability of information (see 
for example the provision of details about impact on society). Most importantly for our 
 
127 
analysis, non-affiliated organisations were more likely than their affiliated counterparts 
to provide information to their stakeholders on how to input into the different levels of 
decision-making. Whilst only 26 per cent of all respondent organisations always made 
such detailed information on stakeholder input available, only 37 per cent of these 
organisations were affiliated within a wider network, compared to 63 per cent who 
were not. The results through the six items show that voluntary organisations across the 
sector adopt similar transparency practices regardless of whether they are affiliated to a 
wider network or not.  
 
 
Table 5.1:  Affiliation and Transparency (information made available to stakeholders) 
(1) Details and description about each activity and programme 
VO affiliation 
Never % Infrequently % Sometimes % Frequently % Always % 
% of all 
respondents 
Not affiliated 100 100 53 63 59 60 
Affiliated 0 0 47 37 41 40 
% of all respondents 2 1 6 19 72 100 
(2) A list of key staff, specifying their contact details and the scope of their responsibilities 
VO affiliation Never % Infrequently % Sometimes % Frequently % Always % % 
Not affiliated 67 65 56 69 57 60 
Affiliated 33 35 44 31 43 40 
% of all respondents 6 9 17 17 51 100 
(3) Details about the organisation’s impact on society 
VO affiliation Never % Infrequently % Sometimes % Frequently % Always % % 
Not affiliated 83 65 47 68 58 60 
Affiliated 17 35 53 32 42 40 
% of all respondents 7 8 24 27 34 100 
(4) Providing details about any codes, partnerships or coalitions to which the organisation is a signatory 
VO affiliation Never % Infrequently % Sometimes % Frequently % Always % % 
Not affiliated 77 63 49 65 58 60 
Affiliated 23 37 51 35 42 40 
% of all respondents  14 11 22 20 33 100 
(5) Information on the governing board members and the executives. 
VO affiliation Never % Infrequently % Sometimes % Frequently % Always % % 
Not affiliated 75 64 56 59 60 60 
Affiliated 25 36 44 41 40 40 
% of all respondents 5 9 13 20 53 100 
(6) Openness on how stakeholders can input into the different levels of decision-making 
VO affiliation Never % Infrequently % Sometimes % Frequently % Always % % 
Not affiliated 70 56 56 57 63 60 
Affiliated 30 44 44 43 37 40 
% of all respondents 16 13 26 19 26 100 
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Age of voluntary organisations  
 
Turning to the age of organisations, I posited above that mature organisations might 
have a time advantage over younger organisations in both becoming more aware and 
more able over time to take into account the demands of undertaking practices of 
transparency.  In other words, organisations might be expected to learn over time. The 
results show that, broadly speaking, age matters little in terms of the availability of 
information about activities and programmes. Organisations whether in existence for 
less than or more than 20 years follow similar practices, with approximately three-
quarters of respondent organisations always making available such information. When 
analysed over five age groups (see Table 5.2), some variation does emerge, with 
organisations less than 8 years old, as well as those organisations more than 50 years 
old, less likely to make such information available. Interestingly, whilst organisations 
less than 8 years old were also less likely to make available details of staff, this was not 
the case for mature organisations, where organisations over 50 years old were the most 
likely to make such information available, although there was little discernible pattern 
to the impact of age on the practices of organisation respondents in relation to this 
particular element of transparency.  
 
This absence of a clear distinction between organisations in different age categories 
also relates to the level of openness on the organisation's impact on society and the 
codes and partnerships which it signs up to. Organisations between 8 and 14 years old 
were the most likely to make information on impact available, whilst those younger 
organisations, less than 8 years old, were most likely to make information on codes 
available to stakeholders (see Table 5.2). different age categories tended to perform 
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better across different elements of transparency. Respondent organisations in the age 
group of 50 years and over were the most transparent with regard to making 
information available about the governing board members and executives, as well as in 
terms of openness to how stakeholders can input into decision-making processes. 
However, organisations aged between 8 and 14 years old outperformed all other 
categories in terms of making information available concerning activities and 
programmes, staff, and impact on society.  
 
Overall, therefore, data suggests that age does not play a major role in influencing the 
practices of voluntary organisations with regard to transparency. Although there were 
some differences in the findings across the five age categories, there was no clear trend 
or direction, which suggests a homogeneous tendency or consistent pattern of 




Table 5.2:  Cross-tabulating VO Age with Transparency (information made available to stakeholders) 
(1) Details and description about each activity and programme 
VO Age Never % Infrequently % Sometimes % Frequently % Always % 
Total
% 
% of all 
respondents 
Less than 8 years 0 0 20 25 55 100 8 
8 to 14  2 0 4 11 83 100 19 
15 to 24 0 2 6 18 74 100 27 
25 to 49 0 1 3 20 76 100 29 
50 & more 8 1 8 25 58 100 17 
% of all respondents  2 1 6 19 72 100 100 
(2) A list of key staff, specifying their contact details and the scope of their responsibilities 
VO Age Never % Infrequently % Sometimes % Frequently % Always % T % % all resp 
Less than 8 years 15 10 25 10 40 100 8 
8 to 14  6 2 13 17 62 100 19 
15 to 24 5 17 18 21 39 100 27 
25 to 49 8 8 17 16 51 100 29 
50 and over 0 7 15 18 60 100 17 
% of all respondents 6 10 17 17 50 100 100 
(3) Details about the organisation’s impact on society 
VO Age Never % Infrequently % Sometimes % Frequently % Always % % % all resp 
Less than 8 years 5 20 20 30 25 100 8 
8 to 14  4 8 28 17 43 100 19 
15 to 24 9 9 23 26 33 100 27 
25 to 49 8 6 20 35 31 100 29 
50 and over 7 5 30 23 35 100 17 
% of all respondents 7 8 24 27 34 100 100 
(4) Providing details about any codes, partnerships or coalitions to which the organisation is a signatory 
VO Age Never % Infrequently % Sometimes % Frequently % Always % % % all resp 
Less than 8 years 20 10 20 10 40 100 8 
8 to 14  13 4 21 26 36 100 19 
15 to 24 14 10 29 18 29 100 27 
25 to 49 11 14 21 23 31 100 29 
50 and over 20 15 15 15 35 100 17 
% of all respondents 14 11 22 20 33 100 100 
(5) Information on the governing board members and the executives 
VO Age Never % Infrequently % Sometimes % Frequently % Always % % % all resp 
Less than 8 years 5 15 15 25 40 100 8 
8 to 14  6 6 13 19 56 100 19 
15 to 24 7 14 11 12 56 100 27 
25 to 49 4 4 18 30 44 100 29 
50 and over 0 10 7 15 68 100 17 
% of all respondents 5 9 13 20 53 100 100 
(6) Openness on how stakeholders can input into the different levels of decision-making 
VO Age Never % Infrequently % Sometimes % Frequently % Always % % % all resp 
Less than 8 years 30 20 10 20 20 20 8 
8 to 14  13 2 32 21 32 47 19 
15 to 24 14 15 30 18 23 66 27 
25 to 49 17 14 27 17 25 71 29 
50 and over 17 17 20 18 28 40 17 





Voluntary organisations and income 
 
I first examined the responses according to broad categories of income, above or below 
£1 million a year (see Table 5.3). This did not show any emerging patterns of 
transparency related to income. It merely suggested that organisation respondents with 
an annual income of less than £1 million were more likely to make available 
information on society impact and codes, whilst those with an income over £1 million 
were more likely to make available information on board members and executives, and 
how stakeholders might get involved in decision-making. Breaking down this broad 
distinction into five narrower categories did not offer a clearer picture or pattern of the 
impact of income on transparency. For example, the performance of organisational 
respondents in relation to making available information about activities and 
programmes was relatively similar across all five categories, although those 
organisations with an annual income over £5 million were less likely to make such 
information frequently available. Alternatively, in terms of making lists of key staff 
always available, organisations with an income between £1 million and £5 million 
were the worst performers, whilst organisations with an annual income below £250,000 
were the highest. Indeed, organisations with an annual income below £250,000 were 
the highest performers on three of the six elements. Indeed, they were most likely to 
make always available information on activities, staff and ways that stakeholders could 
engage in decision-making. Yet, as this analysis of the data suggests, the size of an 
organisation annual income does not relate in a coherent or consistent pattern to the 
practices of transparency across all the elements against which it was tested. 
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Table 5.3:  Cross-tabulating VO Size with Transparency (information made available to stakeholders) 
(1) Details and description about each activity and programme 
VO Size Never% Infrequently% Sometimes% Frequently % always% Total% 
% of all 
respondents 
Less than £250,000 0 0 8 17 75 100 5 
£250,000 to £499,999 2 0 7 17 74 100 30 
£500,000 to £999,999 1 2 7 16 74 100 24 
£1 million to £4,999,999 1 3 5 18 73 100 31 
£5 million to £10 million 4 0 5 27 64 100 10 
% of all respondents 2 1 6 18 73 100 100 
(2) A list of key staff, specifying their contact details and the scope of their responsibilities 
VO Size Never% Infrequently% Sometimes% Frequently % always % Total% % all resp 
Less than £250,000 0 0 33 0 67 100 5 
£250,000 to £499,999 8 13 16 13 50 100 30 
£500,000 to £999,999 6 11 11 14 58 100 24 
£1 million to £4,999,999 3 8 21 23 45 100 31 
£5 million to £10 million 9 0 14 23 54 100 10 
% of all respondents 5 9 17 17 52 100 100 
(3) Details about the organisation’s impact on society 
VO Size Never% Infrequently% Sometimes% Frequently % always % Total% % all resp 
Less than £250,000 8 8 33 25 25 100 5 
£250,000 to £499,999 4 11 26 22 37 100 30 
£500,000 to £999,999 11 7 19 26 37 100 24 
£1 million to £4,999,999 8 7 18 34 33 100 31 
£5 million to £10 million 9 5 27 27 32 100 10 
% of all respondents 8 8 22 27 35 100 100 
(4) Providing details about any codes, partnerships or coalitions to which the organisation is a signatory 
VO Size Never% Infrequently% Sometimes% Frequently % always % Total% % all resp 
Less than £250,000 25 9 0 33 33 100 5 
£250,000 to £499,999 10 11 23 20 36 100 30 
£500,000 to £999,999 18 5 16 26 35 100 24 
£1 million to £4,999,999 15 14 30 14 27 100 31 
£5 million to £10 million 14 18 23 18 27 100 10 
% of all respondents 15 11 22 20 32 100 100 
(5) Information on the governing board members and the executives 
VO Size Never% Infrequently% Sometimes% Frequently % always % Total% % all resp 
Less than £250,000 0 17 25 8 50 100 5 
£250,000 to £499,999 7 10 14 23 46 100 30 
£500,000 to £999,999 9 1 14 23 53 100 24 
£1 million to £4,999,999 0 10 12 16 62 100 31 
£5 million to £10 million 4 14 9 18 55 100 10 
% of all respondents 5 8 14 20 53 100 100 
(6) Openness on how stakeholders can input into the different levels of decision-making 
VO Size Never% Infrequently% Sometimes% Frequently % always % Total% % all resp 
Less than £250,000 17 8 25 17 33 100 5 
£250,000 to £499,999 16 11 31 17 24 100 30 
£500,000 to £999,999 19 11 26 23 21 100 24 
£1 million to £4,999,999 14 18 24 14 30 100 31 
£5 million to £10 million 23 13 18 23 23 100 10 






Voluntary organisations and sources of income 
 
Having cross-tabulated practices of transparency against annual income, I also 
examined whether the source of income could begin to account for differences of 
practices across the multiple elements of transparency (see Table 5.4). I turn first to 
dependence on government funding. Overall, organisations with between 76 per cent 
and 100 per cent reliance on government funding performed better across all categories 
or elements of transparency. However, the performance of such organisations was not 
noticeably out of step with other organisations that were less dependent on government 
funding, particularly when mapped against organisations with no government funding. 
Voluntary organisations, that were either highly reliant or not at all reliant on 
government funding, had similar and consistent levels of performance on each of the 
elements of transparency (in terms of making information available to stakeholders). 
Organisations with less than half their funding dependent on government funding 
tended to perform the worst across the different elements. However, again, there was 
no obvious consistency or patterns to these results. Testing for the impact of 
government funding did not reveal any clear impact on the outcomes of transparency 
across voluntary organisations. 
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Table 5.4:  Government sources of income vs Transparency (information made available to 
stakeholders) 
(1) Details and description about each activity and programme 
income from government Never% Infrequently% Sometimes% Frequently % always% Total% 
% of all 
respondents 
zero % 4 2 6 15 73 100 35 
Up to 25% 2 0 4 27 67 100 20 
from 26% to 50% 0 3 10 7 80 100 13 
from 51% to 75% 0 0 14 24 62 100 12 
from 76% to 100% 0 0 2 22 76 100 20 
% of all respondents 2 1 6 19 72 100 100 
(2) A list of key staff, specifying their contact details and the scope of their responsibilities 
income from government Never% Infrequently% Sometimes% Frequently % always % Total% % all resp 
zero % 10 6 11 15 58 100 35 
Up to 25% 6 15 29 17 33 100 20 
from 26% to 50% 3 13 10 17 57 100 13 
from 51% to 75% 4 17 24 17 38 100 12 
from 76% to 100% 4 2 13 24 57 100 20 
% of all respondents 6 9 17 18 50 100 100 
(3) Details about the organisation’s impact on society 
income from government Never% Infrequently% Sometimes% Frequently % always % Total% % all resp 
zero % 12 5 32 18 33 100 35 
Up to 25% 6 6 19 33 36 100 20 
from 26% to 50% 7 13 17 33 30 100 13 
from 51% to 75% 0 21 14 31 34 100 12 
from 76% to 100% 7 7 24 30 32 100 20 
% of all respondents 8 9 23 27 33 100 100 
(4) Providing details about any codes, partnerships or coalitions to which the organisation is a signatory 
income from government Never% Infrequently% Sometimes% Frequently % always % Total% % all resp 
zero % 28 11 15 12 34 100 35 
Up to 25% 6 6 23 40 25 100 20 
from 26% to 50% 10 17 26 17 30 100 13 
from 51% to 75% 7 21 41 0 31 100 12 
from 76% to 100% 9 9 19 28 35 100 20 
% of all respondents 15 12 22 20 31 100 100 
(5) Information on the governing board members and the executives 
income from government Never% Infrequently% Sometimes% Frequently % always % Total% % all resp 
zero % 6 10 11 15 58 100 35 
Up to 25% 2 6 17 31 44 100 20 
from 26% to 50% 10 4 23 23 40 100 13 
from 51% to 75% 0 14 17 17 52 100 12 
from 76% to 100% 6 9 6 20 59 100 20 
% of all respondents 5 9 14 20 52 100 100 
(6) Openness on how stakeholders can input into the different levels of decision-making 
income from government Never% Infrequently% Sometimes% Frequently % always % Total% % all resp 
zero % 28 11 18 15 28 100 35 
Up to 25% 12 17 27 23 21 100 20 
from 26% to 50% 16 7 40 17 20 100 13 
from 51% to 75% 3 17 45 14 21 100 12 
from 76% to 100% 9 15 20 26 30 100 20 





Similarly, reliance of income from private sources did not reveal any discernible 
pattern of influence or impact on the practices of transparency (see Table 5.5). On the 
contrary, when compared to the impacts of government funding, there was more 
inconsistency or less of a pattern to how an organisation's reliance on private income 
shaped practices of transparency. Thus, organisations who were reliant for over three-
quarters of their income on the private sector were least likely to make information on 
staff frequently available and, with organisations reliant for between half and three-
quarters of their income on private sources, were also least likely to make available 
information on how stakeholders might become involved in decision-making. 
However, these two income categories were more likely to make frequently available 
information on organisational impact on society - perhaps to be expected given their 
reliance on attracting external funding from private donors.  
 
Finally, I turn to the financial reliance of organisations on trading activities (see Table 
5.6). In contrast to other streams of income, there was arguably a more consistent 
picture to emerge from the cross-tabulations. Organisations with more than three 
quarters of their income coming from trading activities tended to perform worse across 
four elements of information transparency, particularly information on stakeholder 
engagement, on board members and executives, on codes and partnerships, and on the 
impact of the organisation on society. This category was also the second lowest 
category in terms of the proportion of organisations frequently making available 
information about activities and programmes. Overall, therefore, increasing reliance or 
over-reliance on trading activities tends to work against making information frequently 




Table 5.5:  Donations from the private sector and individuals vs Transparency (information made 
available to stakeholders) 
(1) Details and description about each activity and programme 
income from the Private sector Never% Infrequently% Sometimes% Frequently % always% Total% 
% of all 
respondents 
zero % 3 2 9 13 73 100 24 
Up to 25% 1 0 6 22 71 100 41 
from 26% to 50% 0 0 0 26 74 100 11 
from 51% to 75% 0 0 9 9 82 100 10 
from 76% to 100% 3 6 6 21 64 100 14 
% of all respondents 2 1 6 19 72 100 100 
(2) A list of key staff, specifying their contact details and the scope of their responsibilities 
income from the Private sector Never% Infrequently% Sometimes% Frequently % always % Total% % all resp 
zero % 6 7 14 16 57 100 24 
Up to 25% 4 8 18 19 51 100 41 
from 26% to 50% 7 11 11 15 56 100 11 
from 51% to 75% 9 13 22 17 39 100 10 
from 76% to 100% 12 12 18 18 40 100 14 
% of all respondents 7 9 17 17 50 100 100 
(3) Details about the organisation’s impact on society 
income from the Private sector Never% Infrequently% Sometimes% Frequently % always % Total% % all resp 
zero % 14 2 34 20 30 100 24 
Up to 25% 3 10 28 30 29 100 41 
from 26% to 50% 0 26 15 22 37 100 11 
from 51% to 75% 9 4 9 35 43 100 10 
from 76% to 100% 15 6 9 30 40 100 14 
% of all respondents 8 9 23 27 33 100 100 
(4) Providing details about any codes, partnerships or coalitions to which the organisation is a signatory 
income from the Private sector Never% Infrequently% Sometimes% Frequently % always % Total% % all resp 
zero % 30 5 20 16 29 100 24 
Up to 25% 6 15 27 22 30 100 41 
from 26% to 50% 4 15 22 22 37 100 11 
from 51% to 75% 26 17 9 26 22 100 10 
from 76% to 100% 15 6 21 15 43 100 14 
% of all respondents 15 11 22 20 32 100 100 
(5) Information on the governing board members and the executives 
income from the Private sector Never% Infrequently% Sometimes% Frequently % always % Total% % all resp 
zero % 7 14 9 14 56 100 24 
Up to 25% 5 6 17 24 48 100 41 
from 26% to 50% 4 4 15 22 55 100 11 
from 51% to 75% 0 0 30 18 52 100 10 
from 76% to 100% 6 15 0 21 58 100 14 
% of all respondents 5 9 14 20 52 100 100 
(6) Openness on how stakeholders can input into the different levels of decision-making 
income from the Private sector Never% Infrequently% Sometimes% Frequently % always % Total% % all resp 
zero % 20 16 20 10 34 100 24 
Up to 25% 10 16 28 21 25 100 41 
from 26% to 50% 7 0 41 26 26 100 11 
from 51% to 75% 13 13 48 13 13 100 10 
from 76% to 100% 40 12 6 24 18 100 14 







Table 5.6:  Income from Trading activities vs Transparency (information made available to 
stakeholders) 
(1) Details and description about each activity and programme 
Income from trading activity Never% Infrequently% Sometimes% Frequently % always% Total% 
% of all 
respondents 
zero % 4 1 8 17 70 100 36 
Up to 25% 0 1 6 16 77 100 34 
from 26% to 50% 0 0 8 28 64 100 11 
from 51% to 75% 0 5 0 16 79 100 8 
from 76% to 100% 3 0 4 26 67 100 11 
% of all respondents 2 1 6 19 72 100 100 
(2) A list of key staff, specifying their contact details and the scope of their responsibilities 
Income from trading activity Never% Infrequently% Sometimes% Frequently % always % Total% % all resp 
zero % 8 5 17 14 56 100 36 
Up to 25% 1 14 16 19 50 100 34 
from 26% to 50% 12 20 8 20 40 100 11 
from 51% to 75% 11 10 21 16 42 100 8 
from 76% to 100% 7 0 22 22 49 100 11 
% of all respondents 6 9 17 18 50 100 100 
(3) Details about the organisation’s impact on society 
Income from trading activity Never% Infrequently% Sometimes% Frequently % always % Total% % all resp 
zero % 8 7 23 31 31 100 36 
Up to 25% 7 9 16 28 40 100 34 
from 26% to 50% 8 12 16 28 36 100 11 
from 51% to 75% 10 10 32 16 32 100 8 
from 76% to 100% 4 7 48 22 19 100 11 
% of all respondents 8 9 23 27 33 100 100 
(4) Providing details about any codes, partnerships or coalitions to which the organisation is a signatory 
Income from trading activity Never% Infrequently% Sometimes% Frequently % always % Total% % all resp 
zero % 20 11 18 18 33 100 36 
Up to 25% 11 11 24 21 33 100 34 
from 26% to 50% 12 12 16 24 36 100 11 
from 51% to 75% 5 5 48 16 26 100 8 
from 76% to 100% 19 19 19 22 22 100 11 
% of all respondents 15 11 22 20 32 100 100 
(5) Information on the governing board members and the executives 
Income from trading activity Never% Infrequently% Sometimes% Frequently % always % Total% % all resp 
zero % 5 8 11 17 59 100 36 
Up to 25% 2 10 13 20 55 100 34 
from 26% to 50% 8 4 12 36 40 100 11 
from 51% to 75% 11 0 26 16 47 100 8 
from 76% to 100% 7 15 19 22 37 100 11 
% of all respondents 5 9 14 20 52 100 100 
(6) Openness on how stakeholders can input into the different levels of decision-making 
Income from trading activity Never% Infrequently% Sometimes% Frequently % always % Total% % all resp 
zero % 23 10 24 18 25 100 36 
Up to 25% 14 14 24 25 24 100 34 
from 26% to 50% 12 12 40 8 28 100 11 
from 51% to 75% 10 21 32 5 32 100 8 
from 76% to 100% 15 15 26 22 22 100 11 





5.2 PRACTICES OF STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT AND 
ORGANISATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Having explored the relation between organisational characteristics and practices of 
transparency, this section of the chapter cross-tabulates the three dimensions of 
stakeholder engagement with the three main variables representing organisational 
characteristics: annual income (size and source), age, and affiliation to an umbrella 
group. I will start with cross-tabulating the variable of affiliation with each of the three 
dimensions of engagement. As with practices of transparency, the hypothesis to be 
explored is that affiliation might expose voluntary organisations to centrally-driven 
cultures, rules norms and resources that impact positively on their capacity to 
undertake engagement activities with stakeholders.  
 
Affiliation and Engagement 
The first dimension of engagement explores the stage of decision-making in which a 
voluntary organisation engages with their key stakeholders (as summed up by question 
19 in the survey). Around 60 per cent of organisational respondents were not affiliated 
to an umbrella group (see Table 5.7). 82 per cent of these voluntary organisations 
claimed to be engaged with their stakeholders at the highest stage of decision-making, 
that of agenda setting. 10 per cent engaged at the second highest stage of project/policy 
design.  Turning to the 40 per cent of all organisational respondents who are affiliated 
to an umbrella group, around 83 per cent also claim to be engaged with stakeholders at 
the highest stage of agenda setting. 10 per cent are engaged with stakeholders at the 
second highest stage of project/policy design. Only 6 per cent of affiliated voluntary 
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organisations claim not to use any stage of stakeholder engagement (compared to 10 
per cent of non-affiliated organisations). In short, the answers of affiliated and 
unaffiliated respondents are similar with regard to the stage of engagement. This 
suggests that affiliation does not influence the stage of engagement used by NGOs to 
engage with their stakeholders.    
 
The second dimension of engagement captures the level of influence stakeholders have 
on decision-making process (as investigated in question 20 in the survey). 69 per cent 
of unaffiliated voluntary organisations said that they attributed stakeholders the highest 
level of influence in decision-making, that of joint decision-making. However, 21 per 
cent of non-affiliated respondents claimed not to give stakeholders any effective 
influence on decision-making process across their organisations. In contrast, 82 per 
cent of affiliated organisational respondents claimed to engage their stakeholders in 
joint decision-making, the highest level of influence. Equally, there was only 
approximately 12 per cent of affiliated respondents who claimed not to give 
stakeholders any influence on their decision-making processes. In terms of this 
particular dimension of stakeholder level of influence on the decision-making process, 
the findings thus show clearly that affiliated voluntary organisations are more involved 
with their stakeholders than their unaffiliated counterparts.  
 
Finally, the third dimension relates to the engagement mechanism deployed by 
voluntary organisations in the engagement process (as investigated by question 21 in 
the survey). 53 per cent of unaffiliated organisational respondents claimed to use the 
highest engagement mechanism of joint committees. 18 per cent said that they used the 
second highest mechanism of partnerships.  However, there were 18 per cent of 
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unaffiliated voluntary sector organisations which reported the use of no engagement 
mechanism. As for affiliated respondents, there were roughly 63 per cent who claimed 
to use the highest engagement mechanism of joint committees and 19 per cent who 
reported using the second highest mechanism of partnerships. 16 per cent of these 
organisational respondents reported the use of no engagement mechanism. In relation 
to engagement mechanisms, affiliated organisations did appear once again to 
outperform non-affiliated organisations, albeit relatively marginally. 
 
Overall, therefore, the cross-tabulation of affiliation with the three dimensions of 
stakeholder engagement process revealed that a concentration of respondents situated 
themselves in the top engagement category across the three dimensions. This result 
came regardless of whether the respondent voluntary organisation was affiliated to an 
umbrella group or not. However, there was some difference between the two groups 
where the performance of affiliated voluntary organisations was greater than 
unaffiliated counterparts, especially at the second and third dimensions of level of 
engagement and engagement mechanism.  
 
However, the findings also show that the performance of unaffiliated voluntary 
organisation regarding their level of involvement over the three engagement 
dimensions was to some extent fragmented and inconsistent. Unaffiliated voluntary 
organisations levels of engagement over the three dimensions do not match or are even 
roughly close to each other. For example 82 per cent of unaffiliated organisations 
claimed to use the highest stage of engagement but only 69 per cent reported using the 
highest level of influence and just 53 per cent said that they  used the highest 
engagement mechanism. To demonstrate these figures in practice, let us say a 
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voluntary organisation involves its stakeholders with agenda setting but it does not 
allow its stakeholders to effectively influence decisions and when it comes to the 
mechanism it uses for the engagement process it uses the mechanism of public 
hearings, advisory groups or taskforces when do not necessarily go beyond ‘question 
and answer’ consultation. A proper engagement at the stage of agenda setting should 
give stakeholders power in making and influencing decisions. If those who are 
involved in setting the agenda have no power to influence decisions in setting the 
agenda then their involvement can be described as superficial or not genuine. Low 
levels of influence and weak mechanisms do not have power that can match the level 
of power in the stage of agenda setting.     
 
 
Table 5.7:  Affiliation vs Engagement 
Affiliated within 
an umbrella group 
Q19 Stage of Engagement 









y design % 
Agenda 
Setting % 
No 8 0 0 0 10 82 146 60 
Yes 6 0 1 0 10 83 97 40 
% of total resp 7  0 1 0 10 82 243 100 
Affiliated within 
an umbrella group 
Q20 Level of Influence on decisions 






Participation in design of 
project or policy % 
Joint decision 
making % 
No 21 0 2 8 69 146 60 
Yes 12 2 2 2 82 96 40 
% of total resp 17 1 2 5 74 242 100 
Affiliated within 
an umbrella group 
















No 18 0 7 4 18 53 146 60 
Yes 16 1 2 0 19 62 96 40 







Voluntary Organisations, Age and Engagement 
 
As with transparency, the age of a voluntary organisation was the second variable 
tested, as to its influence on the three dimensions of stakeholder engagement (see Table 
5.8). Initially I divided organisational respondents into two groups to see if there is a 
distinct difference between them: the first group was for those who had been in 
existence for up to 20 years; and the second group was for those organisations over 20 
years old. 48 per cent of organisations had been in existence up to 20 years compared 
to 52 per cent that were more than 20 years old. The survey returns demonstrated that 
86 per cent of respondents aged up to 20 years old claimed to have recourse to the 
highest stage of engagement, that of agenda-setting. 74 per cent of these organisations 
reported allowing their stakeholders to have the highest level of influence on decisions 
(joint decision-making).  But, only 54 per cent matched the first two dimensions with 
the highest mechanism of engagement, that of joint committees. This disparity in the 
engagement process over the three dimensions again suggests potential weaknesses and 
contradictions in the implementation of the engagement process.  
 
As for the voluntary organisations who had been in existence for more than 20 years, 
the survey returns demonstrated that 78 per cent of these organisational respondents 
claim to engage with their stakeholders at the highest stage of agenda setting. Three 
quarters reported allowing these stakeholders to have the highest level of influence by 
allowing them to form decisions jointly.  However, only 59 per cent of organisational 
respondents who had been in existence for over 20 years referred to their use of the 
highest engagement mechanism,  joint committees, which corresponds to the higher 
level of engagement in the first two dimensions. Although the findings show that older 
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voluntary organisations have a consistent level of engagement in the first two 
dimensions, indicating that they have a more effective model of engagement with their 
stakeholders than younger respondents. However both groups of voluntary organisation 
were poor in choosing the right mechanism which matches the level of engagement in 
the first two dimensions (level of influence and stage of engagement).  
 
In order to give more detailed results, I decided to divide the age of respondent 
organisations into 5 groups: less than 8 years old ; 8-14 years old; 15-24 years old; 25-
49 years old; and 50 years old or more. Voluntary organisations who have been in 
existence for 50 years or more were more consistence in their involvement over the 
three engagement dimensions than other age groups. However, there was still a 
moderate drift in the level of mechanism used compared with the first two dimensions 
(stage of engagement and the level of influence on decisions).   
 
In fact, 89 per cent of respondents between 8 and 14 years old engaged at the highest 
stage of agenda setting. Second came voluntary organisations that were less than 8 
years old, with 84 per cent of these respondents reporting to engage on the highest 
stage of agenda setting. Third came respondents aged between 15-24 years with 83 per 
cent of them engaged at the highest level. Fourth place was for those respondent 
organisations which were over 50 years old, with 78 per cent of them engaged on the 
highest stage. Finally fifth place was occupied by voluntary organisations aged 
between 25 and 49 years old, with 77 per cent of them indicating that they had recourse 
to engage stakeholders in the highest stage of agenda setting in the decision-making 
process. The variation between the five age groups was not judged to be significant 
which means that in general most respondents have similar practice regardless of their 
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age although younger organisations indicated slightly more usage of the highest stage 
of agenda setting than the older organisations. However, the use of this highest stage of 
engagement could be meaningless if it is not matched with higher levels of influence 
and mechanism on the second and third dimensions of the engagement process.  
 
As for the relationship between the age of voluntary organisation respondents and the 
second dimension of engagement or the level of influence on decisions, the results 
reveal that 80 per cent of organisations aged between 8-14 years old and between 25-
49 years old claimed to use the top level of influence on decisions, which is joint 
decision-making.  But this level of influence does not differ significantly according to 
age. Thus 74 per cent of voluntary organisations under 8 years old also reported the use 
of joint decision making or the top level of influence, in comparison to those 
organisations aged 50 years old or over where 70 per cent of respondents claimed to 
use the top level of influence.  Similarly, as for the last age group, voluntary 
organisations aged between 15 and 24 years old, 67 per cent of respondents referred to 
the use of joint decision-making with stakeholders. The results of age in relation to the 
second dimension of engagement are in line with those of the first dimension as the 
vast majority of respondents are engaged with their stakeholders using the top level of 
influence on decisions.  
 
Turning to the relationship between age and the third dimension of engagement, the 
engagement mechanism, the majority of respondent organisations aged 50 years or 
more, (63 per cent) reported using the highest mechanism, that of joint committees. 
Next highest in terms of the proportion of respondents using joint committees were 
those organisations aged between 8 and 14 years old, with 59 per cent of respondents 
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claiming to use this mechanism. In third position came respondent organisations aged 
between 25 and 49 years old with 57 per cent; fourth were  organisations aged between 
15 and 24 years old (53 per cent); and finally the fifth place was for respondents who 
have been in existence for 7 years or less (47 per cent). Unlike the pattern of 
respondents’ performance in the first and second dimensions, the result show that older 
voluntary organisations were more likely to perform more highly on the third 
dimension than younger organisations, with the notable exception of organisations 
aged between 8 and 14 years old. To complete this picture, an average of 17 per cent of 
respondents reported no engagement in terms of the second and third dimensions 
whilst some 7 per cent reported no level of stakeholder engagement on the first 
dimension.  
 
By comparing the involvement of the five age groups over the three dimensions of the 
engagement model, the findings reveal that the youngest group of voluntary 
organisations who have been in existence less than 8 years were the least consistent 
with their involvement over the three dimensions. The third youngest group, those 
organisations who have been in existene for 15 to 24 years were the second least 
consistent. On the other hand, the oldest age group, voluntary organisations over  50 
years old were the most consistent across the three dimensions, and the second oldest 
age group were the second most consistent. Nevertheless, even with those respondents 
who were considered to be consistent in their involvement over the three dimensions of 
engagement, there was slight disparity between their involvements over the three 
dimensions of engagement, particularly between the first two dimensions and the third 




Table 5.8:  Age Summary vs Engagement 
VO Age Summary 
















up to 20 years of existence 5 0 0 0 9 86 116 48 
over 20 years of existence 9 0 1 1 12 78 126 52 
Total 7 0 0 0 10 82 242 100 
VO Age Summary 














up to 20 years of existence 15 1 3 7 74 115 48 
over 20 years of existence 18 2 2 4 75 126 52 
Total 17 1 2 5 74 241 100 
VO Age Summary 















up to 20 years of existence 17 0 5 4 20 54 115 48 
over 20 years of existence 17 1 5 1 17 59 126 52 
Total 17 0 5 3 18 56 241 100 
 
Table 5.9:  Age split into 5 groups vs Engagement 
5 Age categories 














Less than 8 years 5 0 0 0 11 84 19 
8 to 14  6 0 0 0 4 89 47 
15 to 24 5 0 0 0 12 83 66 
25 to 49 9 0 0 0 14 77 70 
50 & more 10 0 1 1 8 78 40 
Total  7 0 0 0 10 82 242 
5 Age categories 








Participation in design 
of project or policy % 
Joint decision 
making % 
Less than 8 years 21 0 0 1 74 19 
8 to 14  11 0 2 2 80 46 
15 to 24 20 2 1 6 67 66 
25 to 49 16 1 1 1 80 70 
50 & more 20 0 1 3 70 40 
Total 17 1 2 5 74 241 
5 Age categories 














Less than 8 years 16 0 0 5 32 47 19 
8 to 14  15 0 2 4 20 59 46 
15 to 24 17 0 10 3 17 53 66 
25 to 49 19 1 0 1 21 57 70 
50 & more 17 0 12 0 8 63 40 






Income and Engagement 
 
Testing levels of income against the stage of engagement, an initial look at the findings 
in Table 5.11 shows that there was only little variation across the five categories of 
income. Approximately four fifths of respondent organisations reported that they 
engage stakeholders at the agenda-setting stage (whatever their reported level of 
income). Equally, no clear pattern of level of stakeholder influence emerged to support 
the initial hypothesis that larger income supports greater levels of engagement. There 
was however variation across the categories. For example, 84 per cent of respondent 
organisations with an annual income between £500,000 and £999,999 claimed to 
engage in joint decision-making, compared to 74 per cent for those organisations with 
an annual income less than £500,000, 69 per cent of those respondents with annual 
income between £1m and £4,999,999, and 71 per cent of those with annual incomes 
above £5 million. Finally, turning to the impact of income on engagement mechanisms, 
joint committees were used by 65 per cent of respondent organisations with an annual 
income between £500,000 and £999,999. This income category of respondents 
outperforms other categories consistently across all three dimensions of engagement.  
Although the worst performers were organisations with an annual income of less that 
£250, 000 as only 45 per cent of respondents in this category used joint committees 
(See Table 5.10).  Overall, therefore, respondents have similar practices with regard to 
the three engagement dimensions regardless of annual income. There is no identifiable 
trend in the relationship between engagement size of annual income, although, 
organisations with an annual income between £500,000 and £999,999 perform 
consistently (but not significantly) better across the three dimensions of engagement.   
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However, the three dimensional model of engagement proposes that the engagement 
process should be looked at and assessed simultaneously over the stage of engagement, 
the level of influence allowed to stakeholders by voluntary organisations, and the 
mechanism used to carry out the engagement process. The findings (Table 5.11) 
suggest that engagement practices over the five income groups can be described as 
patchy and fragmented at best and arbitrary at worst. There are clear inconsistencies in 
implementing the three dimensions by respondents. However, the least consistent 
respondents were those who belong to the category with smallest annual income and 
the most consistent were respondents with annual income between one and five million 
pounds. The distinction between the five income groups was hard to draw which 
provides for a relatively weak evidence base to support any hypothesis.  
 
  
Table 5.10:  VO size: annual income summary vs Engagement 
VO annual income summary 











y design % 
Agenda 
Setting % 
£250000 up to £999,999 7 0 0 0 9 84 138 59 
£1million up to £10m 5 0 1 1 13 80 94 41 
Total 6 0 1 1 10 82 232 100 
VO annual income summary 








Participation in design 
of project or policy % 
Joint decision 
making % 
£250000 up to £999,999 14 2 2 4 78 138 60 
£1million up to £10m 18 1 3 8 70 93 40 
Total 16 1 2 6 75 231 100 
VO annual income summary 














£250000 up to £999,999 17 1 5 3 17 57 138 60 
£1million up to £10m 15 0 6 2 19 57 93 40 






Table 5.11:  Annual income split into 5 categories vs Engagement 
Annual income 5 
categories 















Less than £250,000 0 0 0 0 0 100 11 5 
£250,000 to £499,999 8 0 0 0 11 81 70 30 
£500,000 to £999,999 9 0 0 0 7 84 57 25 
£1m to £4,999,999 5 0 1 0 14 79 73 31 
£5 million to £10 m 5 0 0 5 10 81 21 9 
Total  6 0 1 1 10 82 232 100 
Annual income 5 
categories 










Participation in design 




Less than £250,000 9 0 0 18 73 11 5 
£250,000 to £499,999 14 3 3 6 74 70 30 
£500,000 to £999,999 16 0 0 0 84 57 25 
£1m to £4,999,999 21 0 4 6 69 72 31 
£5 million to £10 m 10 5 0 14 71 21 9 
Total 16 1 2 6 75 231 100 
Annual income 5 
categories 

















Less than £250,000 18 0 0 0 36 45 11 5 
£250,000 to £499,999 20 1 9 1 16 53 70 30 
£500,000 to £999,999 12 0 2 5 16 65 57 25 
£1m to £4,999,999 15 0 4 3 19 58 72 31 
£5 million to £10 m 14 0 14 0 19 53 21 9 
Total 16 0 6 3 18 57 231 100 
 
 
Sources of voluntary sector income and engagement 
I carried out further examinations on respondent organisation annual income by 
identifying the income streams, investigating whether the reliance on a specific source 
of funding might influence practices of accountability. As with transparency, for this 
purpose, I examined three sources of income: income from government, income from 
the private sector, and income from trading activities. Each source of income category 
was divided into five income portions including zero reliance, up to 25 per cent, from 
26 per cent to 50 per cent, from 51 per cent to 75 per cent, and finally from 76 per cent  




Turning first to income from government, respondent organisations, whatever the 
extent of their reliance on this source of funding, performed strongly, both in terms of 
stage of engagement and level of influence. Broadly speaking, approximately three 
quarters of respondents claimed to engage stakeholders in agenda setting and joint 
decision-making. Yet, this was not matched by concurrent levels of engagement in 
joint committees (see Table 5.12). This finding reinforces the existence of an apparent 
mismatch between commitments to engagement and the mechanisms deployed by 
respondent organisations. Only 60 per cent of organisations who depend on 
government for over three quarters of their funding used joint committees, compared to 
80 per cent of respondents with less than 50 per cent dependence on government 
funding. Overall, respondents who rely on government the most (75 to 100 per cent) 
tend to perform better, but the variation is not substantial. Notably around quarter of 
organisations with no funding from government do not have any engagement 
mechanism with stakeholders at all. However, only 48 per cent of these organisations 
worked with stakeholders in joint committees. Indeed, this latter survey finding tends 




Table 5.12:  VO source of income: from Government as a % from the total annual income  
Income from 
government % 











y design % 
Agenda 
Setting % 
zero % 13 0 1 1 9 76 80 34 
from 0.1% to 25% 6 0 0 0 11 83 48 21 
from 25.1% to 50% 3 0 0 0 13 83 30 13 
from 50.1% to 75% 3 0 0 0 17 79 29 12 
from 75.1% to 100% 4 0 0 0 9 87 46 20 
Total  7 0 0 0 11 81 233 100 
Income from 
government % 








Participation in design 
of project or policy % 
Joint decision 
making % 
zero % 19 1 2 3 75 79 34 
from 0.1% to 25% 21 0 4 8 67 48 21 
from 25.1% to 50% 13 3 0 0 83 30 13 
from 50.1% to 75% 10 0 0 7 83 29 12 
from 75.1% to 100% 17 2 2 9 70 46 20 
Total 17 1 2 5 74 232 100 
Income from 
government % 














zero % 23 0 7 4 18 48 79 34 
from 0.1% to 25% 15 0 10 4 21 50 48 21 
from 25.1% to 50% 10 0 0 0 10 80 30 13 
from 50.1% to 75% 10 3 3 3 21 59 29 12 
from 75.1% to 100% 17 0 2 0 20 61 46 20 
Total 17 0 6 3 18 56 232 100 
 
 
The imbalance between stages of engagement, levels of influence and mechanisms was 
confirmed when the reliance of private donations and trading activities were taken into 
account (see Table 5.13). Reliance on private funding appeared to be less of a driver to 
use joint committees. Indeed, as reliance on private funding increased, the use of joint 
committees with stakeholders did not increase, with organisations who relied on 
private funding for over three-quarters of their income using joint committees less than 
those organisations with no private funding,  41 per cent and 49 per cent respectively. 
In comparison, the use of joint committees was more consistent as reliance on trading 
activities as a source of income increased (relative to other sources of income) (see 




By drawing a rough comparison between the three sources of income, the findings 
from the survey demonstrate that organisational respondents who derived over 25 per 
cent  of their annual income from governmental sources were more likely to be more 
consistent in their engagement processes. These organisations, the data suggests, 
mapped the three dimensions of engagement more in line with each other, particularly 
in terms of mechanisms and stakeholder influence and stage of engagement. This was 
the case in comparison to organisational respondents who derived their annual income 




Table 5.13:  VO source of income: from Private sector and Individuals as a % from the total annual 
income 
Private sector and 
Individuals % 














zero % 11 0 2 0 11 76 55 24 
from 0.1% to 25% 3 0 0 1 11 85 96 41 
from 25.1% to 50% 7 0 0 0 7 85 27 11 
from 50.1% to 75% 9 0 0 0 13 78 23 10 
from 75.1% to 100% 13 0 0 0 13 75 32 14 
Total  7 0 0 0 11 81 233 100 
Private sector and 
Individuals % 








Participation in design 
of project or policy % 
Joint decision 
making % 
zero % 16 2 4 9 69 55 24 
from 0.1% to 25% 14 0 2 5 79 95 41 
from 25.1% to 50% 18 0 0 4 78 27 11 
from 50.1% to 75% 26 4 4 0 65 23 10 
from 75.1% to 100% 22 3 0 3 72 32 14 
Total 17 1 2 5 74 232 100 
Private sector and 
Individuals % 














zero % 22 2 7 4 16 49 55 24 
from 0.1% to 25% 12 0 3 1 15 69 95 41 
from 25.1% to 50% 19 0 11 3 15 52 27 11 
from 50.1% to 75% 22 0 8 4 17 49 23 10 
from 75.1% to 100% 19 0 3 3 34 41 32 14 








Table 5.14:  VO source of income: from trading activities as a % from the total annual income 
from trading activities  
% 














zero % 8 0 0 0 11 80 82 35 
from 0.1% to 25% 9 0 1 0 9 81 80 34 
from 25.1% to 50% 4 0 0 0 12 84 25 11 
from 50.1% to 75% 5 0 0 0 11 84 19 8 
from 75.1% to 100% 4 0 0 4 15 77 27 12 
Total  7 0 0 0 11 81 233 100 
from trading activities  
% 








Participation in design 
of project or policy % 
Joint decision 
making % 
zero % 16 4 1 7 72 82 35 
from 0.1% to 25% 21 0 3 3 74 80 34 
from 25.1% to 50% 12 0 0 8 80 25 11 
from 50.1% to 75% 16 0 5 0 79 19 8 
from 75.1% to 100% 15 0 4 8 73 26 12 
Total 17 1 2 5 74 232 100 
from trading activities  
% 














zero % 16 1 2 4 28 49 82 35 
from 0.1% to 25% 15 0 7 0 19 59 80 34 
from 25.1% to 50% 20 0 0 8 4 68 25 11 
from 50.1% to 75% 16 0 5 5 11 63 19 8 
from 75.1% to 100% 23 0 15 0 4 58 26 12 
Total 17 0 6 3 18 56 232 100 
 
 
5.3 CONCLUSIONS  
 
This chapter has investigated the extent to which organisational characteristics 
(affiliation, age and income) account for variations in practices of transparency and 
engagement. First, its analysis revealed that there is no positive influence on practices 
of transparency exercised either by affiliation, age, or levels of income. The source of 
income did explain more of the variation in practices across organisation respondents. 
On the one hand, reliance on government funding did appear to have a positive impact 
on how organisations engaged with the different practices of transparency. On the other 
hand, reliance on trading had a broadly negative impact on an organisation’s 
engagement in the practices of transparency identified in the survey. This finding has 
 
154 
important implications for recent changes to funding, as with more reliance on trading 
and less funding being made available by government to voluntary organisations, it is 
possible to hypothesise that the engagement of voluntary organisations with 
transparency practices may decline (this hypothesis is discussed further in the 
conclusion to this thesis).   
 
Second, the analysis demonstrated the complexities of organisation respondents’ 
practices of stakeholder engagement. Affiliation had a very weak influence on the stage 
of engagement but it exercised a strong positive impact on the level of influence 
attributed to stakeholders and the mechanism that organisations reported to deploy. 
Similarly, age and income had a positive influence on the engagement mechanism 
deployed. As for sources of income, it is notable that organisations which attract 25 to 
50 per cent of their income from government performed well across all three 
dimensions of engagement, although broadly speaking sources of income did not 
appear to have any consistent impact on the three dimensions of engagement studied. 
 
Importantly, however, the analysis reveals a disjuncture across organisations between 
the stage of engagement at which they work with stakeholders, the level of influence 
attributed to stakeholders, and the engagement mechanism deployed. This was the case 
for affiliation, age and annual income. Looking at the third dimension of engagement 
mechanism shows that organisations were less keen to use the highest mechanism 
compared to the highest levels in terms of the stage of engagement and the level of 
influence; and that was the case regardless of age, affiliation and income. This 
disjuncture may well contribute to critical accounts of the limits of stakeholder 
engagement within voluntary organisations, as well as surfacing new policy challenges 
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for government; an issue to which I return in Chapter Seven. Having examined the 
impact of organisational variables, I now turn however to an analysis of the final piece 
of the jigsaw: the analysis of the impact of policy on levels of accountability across 





DO POLICIES MATTER? 
   
At this stage in the analysis, I have yet to investigate directly the influence policies on the 
practices of transparency and participation generated by the survey returns5. Neither have I 
submitted the explanatory capacity of the 'thick' account of interactive accountability to 
examination. In this chapter, I address these two tasks. I use multiple regression analysis to 
test the power of policies regarding transparency and participation, as well as guidelines on 
transparency and participation, and codes of standards, to explain practices of accountability. 
More specifically, these independent variables are analysed to demonstrate how far they can 
account first for respondents’ scores on stakeholder engagement (SE) and second for 
practices of transparency (TR). After conducting the regression analysis, I test the 'thick 
model' of accountability, which allows for the interaction of participation and transparency,  
to see how far it offers an effective model of predicting an organisation’s practices of 
accountability. This chapter examines the interaction  between participation and 
transparency, seeking to examine the validity of the interactive model of accountability. 
 
Applying multiple regression analysis, a form of general linear modelling, is justified by the 
fact that relationships and predictions in real life scenarios, as in this case, are best 
established and made by a combination of factors. By applying this analysis, the relative 
contribution of each independent variable in explaining variance in the criterion (dependent) 
variables, i.e. transparency, participation, or thick interactive accountability, can be 
                                                 
5 In this chapter and throughout the thesis, I am using the terms stakeholder engagement in 
the decision-making process and participation interchangeably. For the purpose of this thesis 




determined. With this in mind, each of the analyses performed at each stage is regarded as a 
model, with a view to establishing the model that best explains the criterion (dependent) 
variables. The series of regression analyses undertaken in this chapter examine whether there 
is a relationship between the accountability framework and the existence of policies, between 
the accountability framework and the extent of guidelines for participation and transparency 
practices, as well as the impact of the existence of a board code of standards. Before turning 
to the results of these regression analyses, I first outline the assumptions underpinning and 
the verification of the results of the regression tests. I then turn to the explanation and 
interpretation of these results.  
 
6.1  Validating the Regression Analysis 
The relationships between policy, guidelines and board code of standards and stakeholder 
engagement, transparency and 'thick' accountability are presented in three different models. 
The first model, SE, examines the explanatory power of the five independent variables 
mentioned below to account for the first dimension of the accountability framework, namely 
the practices of Stakeholder Engagement (SE). The second model, TR, analyses the 
explanatory power of these independent variables to the second dimension of the 
accountability framework, namely practices of Transparency (TR). The third model, TA, 
investigates the explanatory power of the independent variables on the combined dimensions 
of accountability, namely SE and TR brought together in one dependent variable, TA = SE + 





The five independent variables, were I selected from a close reading of existing literature as 
the most common aspects considered to be proxies for validating accountability (see for 
example the work of Blagescue (2005) and Salamon (2005). The independent variables are: 
i) Stakeholder engagement guidelines, a continuous variable (PPG) 
ii) Existence of policy on stakeholder engagement, a dummy variable6 (DEP)  
iii) Transparency guidelines, a continuous variable (TPG) 
iv) Existence of policy on transparency, a dummy variable (DTP) 
v) Existence of board code of standards, a dummy variable (DBS)  
 
In relation to these variables, let me restate the distinction I drew between policy and 
guidelines. In some ways this may be interpreted as a false distinction. In much of the 
literature, policy and guidelines might be conflated. To some, guidelines might thus be a 
policy. However, for the purposes of this study, I draw an analytical distinction between 
guidelines and policy. I define policy as a statement of intent, while I associate guidelines 
with the codified rules and norms informing steps for implementation. I draw this analytical 
distinction because it aids the identification of those organisations with a 'tick box' attitude 
towards transparency and participation as opposed to those who provide tools and rules to 
govern the implementation process.   
 
However, at this stage, let me say a few words about the validation of the regression analyses 
undertaken and whether or not the assumptions of regression analysis hold for the study 
(namely multicollinearity, normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, and independence of 
                                                 
6




residuals) (Hair et.al, 1998). Assessing these assumptions is necessary part of any exercise in 
regression analysis in order to avoid any  bias or negative impact on the accuracy of the 
results obtained. For example, the multicollinearity assumption, which indicates a high 
correlation between independent variables in one model, if violated, can have serious impact 
on the explanatory effect of each independent variable in a regression model. It can also limit 
the size of the coefficient of determination. Indeed, violation of multicollinearity can also 
significantly affect the estimation of the regression coefficients (Hair et.al., 1998). Non-
violation of these assumptions thereby increases the likelihood of generalising the model 
results to the entire population (Field, 2005).  
 


















1 SE  1 0.368 0.769 0.607 0.302 0.260 0.127 0.164 
2 TR   1 0.877 0.543 0.382 0.373 0.184 0.126 
3 TA    1 0.682 0.412 0.383 0.178 0.148 
4 PPG    1 .392 0.337 0.253 0.184 
5 TPG     1 0.352 0.369 0.093 
6 DEP      1 0.545 0.163 
7 DTP       1 0.230 
8 DBS        1 
 
 
With this in mind, a simple observation of the correlation matrix (Table 6.1) for the five 
independent variables indicates a low to moderate correlation between them, suggesting 
absence of collinearity. The variance inflation factor (VIF) for the independent variables in 
SE, TR, and TA should be less than 10 for non-violation: PPG has VIF = 1.271; DEP VIF = 
1.537; TPG VIF = 1.323; DTP VIF = 1.542; and DBS VIF = 1.077. These values indicate 




models SE, TR, and TA. Equally, the normal probability plot (P-P) of the regression 
standardised residual and the scatter plot suggest no deviation from normality.7 The points lie 
in a reasonable straight diagonal line, and the residuals are roughly rectangularly distributed 
with concentration of the scores in the centre. Thus, the assumptions of normality, linearity, 
homoscedasticity, and independence of residuals are not violated. Residuals with values that 
are far from the mean in a distribution are called outliers. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) 
define outliers as cases that have a standardised residual of more than 3.3 or less than -
3.3.The case-wise diagnostics table8 shows three cases having residual values between -3.3 
and -4.00. With large samples, it is not uncommon to find a number of outlying residuals. 
According to Pallant (2007) if there are few outliers, it may not be necessary to take any 
action. To check if these three outliers are having any undue influence on the results for the 
proposed TA model, I checked the value for Cook’s Distance in the Residuals Statistics table. 
According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) cases with values of Cook’s Distance larger than 
1 may indicate potential problems. In this case the maximum value for Cook’s Distance is 
0.099, which suggests the absence of any undue influence by these outliers on the model’s 
results as a whole. 
Table 6.2 gives a summary of the results for the regressions.  It shows results for the three 
models, SE, TR and TA, and for sub-models, denoted by 1, 2, et cetera.  Each model is 
presented in its own panel. For each model the table shows the R2 and the model F-statistic, 
and for each variable the coefficient value β, its t-statistic t, and the p-value ρ.  Variables 
excluded from particular models are indicated with an X in their coefficient boxes. 
 
                                                 
7 The assumptions of normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, and independence of residuals were tested for the TA model 
M3 only. 
8




The following sections now lay down the statistical results of the regression analyses of the 
three alternative models of the accountability framework plus their interpretations and 
implications on policy and practice. I begin by analysing the capacity of the multiple 
variables identified and tested to explain the practices regarding participation or the level of 
stakeholder engagement in the decision-making process (SE). 
 
 
Table 6.2:  Summary of regression results 
Dep 
variables  Model 
Coefficients Independent variables 
R2 F 
















































































































































































































































6.2  STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT (SE)  
Here I conducted multiple regression exercises to test the relationship between the 
independent variables of policies, guidelines and codes of governance and the dependent 
variable of stakeholder engagement model. In each regression test a number of variables were 
added to the regression and the test was repeated until the best model (combination of 
variables) was reached. After conducting three regression alternatives, the best result was 
reached by the second sub-model of engagement (SE2) where about 38 per cent of the 
variance of the level of stakeholder engagement was explained by four of the independent 
variables, codes of standards having been eliminated. 
 
The SE-1 model had 38.5 per cent of its variance explained by the independent variables. The 
model has a very significant F statistic, with ρ-value of 0.000 which indicates that the 
independents variables in the model are making a significant contribution to the model. The 
results clearly show that the extent of participation guidelines (PPG) makes the largest unique 
contribution (βPPG = 0.559) to explaining stakeholder engagement, SE, as compared with the 
extent of guidelines and procedure of transparency policy (TPG) where βTPG = 0.085. These 
contributions had significance of 0.000 and 0.149 respectively. PPG is highly significant at 
the 1 per cent level, TPG is not significant at the 10 per cent level. This means that the extent 
of guidelines and procedures of transparency policy has no significant impact on explaining  
levels of participation. Rather, it is the extent of participation guidelines that make the most 
significant impact. Equally, policies and codes of standards are not significant in terms of 
explaining practices of participation. The results show that that all three dummy variables 




(βDTP = -0.110) and the existence of board code of standards (βDBS = 0.064)) make modest 
contributions to the participation model (SE). Of these, the ρ-values were ρ DEP = 0.155, ρ DTP 
= 0.085, and ρ DBS = 0.228, so that board code of standards (DBS) has the least significance. 
The existence of policy regarding transparency (DTP) is significant at the 10 per cent which 
indicates that it has a weak to a moderate impact on the level of stakeholder engagement. 
 
 
In an attempt to find whether the SE model can be improved, I decided to change the 
formation of the independent variables within the SE model.  I repeated the test by excluding 
the existence of board code of standards (DBS) because it had the lowest significance where 
its ρ-value was the highest, (ρ DBS = 0. 228).  This model is called model SE-2.  The results in 
SE-2 are very similar to that of SE-1. The R2 (the percentage of variance explained in the 
model) goes down very slightly from 38.5% in SE-1 to 38.1% in SE-2. The model’s F (the 
hypothesis testing generated by the regression test) the stat has significance = 0.000, the same 
as SE-1. The beta values are almost the same as for model SE-1. 
 
As a whole the regression is improved by removing DBS which had no significant 
contribution to the model as it leaves a more parsimonious model. The results in SE-2 clearly 
show that, the extent of guidelines for transparency practice (TPG) and the existence of 
policy regarding transparency (DTP) have contributed to a lesser extent to the level of 
participation (the SE model) than the contribution of guidelines for participation (PPG) and 
the existence of a participation policy (DEP).  Having a transparency policy is not statistically 





With this in mind, I decided to repeat the regression test after removing the independent 
variables (TPG and DTP). This  new model is called model (SE-3) which has PPG and DEP 
as independent variables with SE remaining as the dependent variable. However, Model SE-3 
recorded an R2 of 37.1%, which is slightly lower than the R2s for SE-1 and SE-2 but not 
notably so. The betas for PPG and DEP in SE-3 are similar to those in models SE-1 and SE-
2. However the ρ-value of DEP has risen to 0.258 from 0.149 which shows that participation 
policy become less influential to the level of participation. This indicates that the extent of 
guidelines for transparency (TPG) and the existence of policy regarding transparency (DTP) 
might have indirect influence in explaining the variance of the dependent variable of 
participation and so that they should remain in the SE model.  
 
There are a number of implications of these regression analyses. The data suggests that 
stakeholder engagement processes are positively correlated to the extent of guidelines and 
procedures that organise the engagement process in practice. What matters most is having 
participation guidelines in place. Having a policy statement does not impact on the level of 
stakeholder engagement in an organisation’s decision-making process. The mere existence of 
policy does not have an effective contribution to make to the process of stakeholder 
engagement in the decision-making process. The sign of βDTP is negative which implies that 
the existence of a policy, as opposed to transparency measures themselves, actually reduces 
participation (SE). The interactions between transparency and participation are complicated. 
It might be expected that engagement process impacts on transparency or vice versa. 
However, the data shows that guidelines and procedures regarding transparency do not 




policy and guidelines has an indirect and minor effect on participation. 
 
Overall, this suggests that organisations might declare to have a policy statement in place 
with regard to participation processes. However, as might be expected, this can be no 
guarantee as to the level of participation remains low.  In many ways, these findings clarify a 
distinction between two groups of respondents: the first group, have practiced engagement 
process through the implementation of procedures and guidelines that lead to real 
engagement with stakeholders; the other group of respondents only have a policy statement 
regarding engagement which is relatively inactive with the negative consequences for 
outcomes. Real engagement is not about the labels but it is about the substance of everyday 
practices.  But, equally, the complex interactions between participation and transparency are 
beginning to be sketched out by this study. I now turn to the explanation of practices of 
transparency, with the aim of shedding more light on these interactions. 
 
6.3 TRANSPARENCY (TR) 
 
Here I conducted multiple regression analyses to test the relationship between selected 
independent variables and, in this case,  practices of transparency. Again, in each regression 
test a number of variables were added to the regression and the test was repeated until the 
best model (combination of variables) was reached.  The results of the regression analysis 
revealed that the best combination of variables to explain levels of transparency was the 




transparency practices was explained by four of the independent variables, codes of standards 
having been eliminated. 
 
The result of the regression analysis for the full TR model (TR-1), registered an R2 of 0.364 
indicating that the five independent variables managed to explain 36.4% of the variance of 
the independent variable of transparency. The model has a very significance F statistic, with 
ρ-value of 0.000. Importantly as I discuss below, the results clearly show that the extent of 
guidelines for participation practices (PPG) makes the largest unique contribution (βPPG = 
0.422) to explaining the level of transparency (TR). The extent of guidelines for transparency 
(TPG)matter less (βTPG = 0.178). These contributions had significance of 0.000 and 0.003 
respectively. PPG and TPG are both significant at the 1% level.  
 
As for the dummy variables, all except the existence of board code of standards (DBS) made 
a sizeable contribution to explaining transparency. The existence of board code of standards 
clearly made nearly no contribution to explaining the variance in the level of transparency 
(βDBS = 0.022). However, the complex interactions between transparency and participation 
were made visible. The existence of policy regarding participation made a sizeable 
contribution of βDEP = 0.230, but somewhat paradoxically, the existence of policy regarding 
transparency made a moderate negative contribution of βDTP =  -0.119. The ρ-values were 
ρDEP = 0.000, ρDTP = 0.067, and ρDBS = 0.686, so that again DBS has least significance; DTP 
is significant at the 10% level. The sign of βDTP was negative as in model one (SE) which 






In an effort to improve the predictive capacity of the model, TR, I repeated the test, as with 
stakeholder engagement, by excluding DBS because of its low contribution to explaining 
variance. This revised model is called model TR-2. The results show that TR-2 has an 
identical R2 value to that in TR-1which means the eliminated variable of (DBS) did not have 
any impact at all on the model. The model (TR-2) F statistic has significance = 0.000, the 
same as TR-1. The beta values are almost the same as for model TR-1. Once again, removal 
of the DBS variable generates a more parsimonious model by only keeping the variables that 
make a sizeable contribution to explaining variance in the dependent variable. As Table 6.2 
demonstrates, the results in TR-2 clearly show that the two independent variables of the 
extent of guidelines for transparency (TPG) and the existence of transparency policy (DTP) 
contribute less than the extent of guidelines for participation (PPG) and the existence of 
participation policy (DEP) to the variance in the dependent variable of transparency (TR). 
PPG, DEP, and TPG are significant at the 1 per cent level whereas DTP is at the 10% level of 
significance. 
 
Importantly, these results in the transparency model (TR-2) expose further the complexity of 
the interactions between transparency and participation in relation to accountability practices. 
Participation guidelines and policy have a more positive impact on the level of transparency 
than actual transparency policies and guidelines.  Participation frameworks, as widely 
acknowledged, are multidimensional and have an element of information provision 
embedded within them. With this in mind, and seeking to isolate how much of the variance in 




repeated the regression test after removing the independent variables related to participation 
measures (PPG and DEP).  
 
The new model is called model TR-3 which focusses solely on the extent of guidelines for 
transparency practices (TPG) and the existence of policy regarding transparency (DTP), with 
transparency (TR) remaining as the dependent variable. Model TR-3 recorded an R2 value of 
14.8%, which is considerably lower than the R2s for TR-1 and TR-2. The TR-3 model’s F 
statistic has significance = 0.000 so although the TR-3 model is still very significant, its 
contribution to the level of transparency (TR) is much less than TR-1 and TR-2. The betas for 
the independent variables in TR-3 (βTPG = 0.364 and βDTP = 0.049) were different to the betas 
in TR-1 (βTPG = 0.178 and βDTP = -0.119) and TR-2 (βTPG = 0.177 and βDTP = -0.115). The ρ-
values for the sub-variables in TR-3 were ρ TPG = 0.000 and ρ DTP = 0.442. These results 
indicate that the variables of the extent of guidelines for participation practices (PPG) and the 
existence of policy regarding participation (DEP) had an explanatory power and should 
remain in the model, with the conclusion that TR-2 offers the most effective combination of 
variables. 
 
Overall, the result of the regression in TR-2 first confirms the interactions, and often 
surprising interactions, between transparency and participation practices. Levels of 
transparency can be positively influenced by having guidelines and procedures that organise 
transparency practices. But, levels of transparency are more positively impacted by applying 
guidelines and procedures that organise participation practices. Notably, this was not the case 
where participation was concerned, transparency guidelines did not explain levels of 




exposed the ineffectiveness in certain conditions of having policies and board codes of 
standards in the voluntary sector. Board codes of standards make little difference to 
transparency.  The variable of the existence of policy regarding participation did had a 
positive impact on the level of transparency. However, there is a substantive negative impact 
of the existence of policy regarding transparency on the level of transparency. As such, the 
best indicator of transparency practices, the data suggests, is participation guidelines and to a 
lesser extent a policy on participation. The existence of a transparency policy will run the risk 
of reducing levels of transparency.  
 
 
6.4 THE THICK ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL (TA) 
 
At this stage of the analysis, the study has begun to surface the complex interactions between 
participation and transparency in explaining accountability practices. In so doing, it has 
limited its focus to explanations of the focal assumptions of what might be termed thin and 
thick models of accountability. In this section I take the examination of the interactive 
dynamics of participation and transparency one step further by presenting the regression test 
for the ‘thick' accountability’ model. The dependent variable is the ‘thick accountability’ 
(TA) and independent variables used are the same as in the previous regression tests for 
participation (SE) and for transparency (TR). The new regression analyses suggested two 
alternative options to explaining the ‘thick' accountability model in voluntary organisations. 
The result of the regression analysis reveals that the best combination of independent 
variables to explain the ‘thick' accountability model was in the second alternative option of 




before, the first model, TR1, tested all five independent variables, but the existence of board 
code of standards (DBS) did not make a significant contribution to explaining variance hence 
it was removed in the second option (TA-2). The remaining four independent variables 
(policies and guidelines on participation and transparency all made a significant contribution 
to the ‘thick' accountability model (TA-2). 51.9 per cent of the variance in the TA-2 was 
explained by the four variables.  This is considerably higher than the R2s for either SE or TR 
models. The model TA-2 has a very significance F statistic with ρ-value of 0.000. The results 
clearly show that all the four independent variables had large betas (βPPG = 0.584, βDEP = 
0.207, βTPG = 0.163, and βDTP = -0.143). The ρ-values of the four variables in TA-2 were ρ 
PPG = 0.000, ρ DEP = 0.000, ρ TPG = 0.002, and ρ DTP = 0.009. The ρ-values show that all 
variables are significant at least at the 1 per cent  level which means that they all made high 
contribution to the TR-2 model. These ρ-values in TA-2 are much healthier than the ρ-values 
in models SE and TR which suggest that transparency and participation can work together in 
a way that they do not when they are separate. 
 
The findings of the thick accountability model have also shown a clear integration and 
interdependency between transparency and participation. Combining participation and 
transparency in one model which I call the thick accountability model (TA) provides 
significant evidence to suggest that participation and transparency complement each other 
and when taken together as a proxy for accountability, they offer  better explanatory 
outcomes than when participation or transparency alone are taken as thin proxies for 
accountability. As for the independent variables the TA model was tested against, the 
findings show that guidelines for participation practices, existence of participation policy, and 
guidelines for transparency practices all were associated with increased level of 




with decreased levels of accountability (TA), that is, it had a negative association with 
accountability.    
In general the findings show that the main contributor to improving organisations’ 
accountability is the extent of having practical guidelines for implementing engagement and 
transparency. The regression analysis has identified a clear distinction between the impact of 
having a policy and the impact of having guidelines among organisations in the voluntary 
sector. The analyses, over the three models (TR, SE and TA) have pointed to a policy culture 
in the voluntary sector where having a policy does not mean having guidelines for 
implementation. Therefore, one implication from the analyses would be that contract 
providers such as government and local authorities should not be too concerned about the 
existence of policies among voluntary organisations and should not take them as an 
indication for accountability when contracting out services to the voluntary sector. This is 
because policies do not necessarily lead to better accountability.  
  
However, the picture emerging from this analysis has to be further nuanced. Table 6.3 
provides a summary for the regression findings from table 6.2. The (~) sign indicates no 
significance in the relationship between an independent and a dependent variable. The 
upward arrow indicates a significant positive relationship whereas the downward arrow 
indicates a significant negative relationship between an independent and a dependent 
variable. The existence of participation policy has no explanatory power on the level of 
participation (SE) but it does has a positive explanatory power on the level of Transparency 
(TR) and also in relation to the 'thick' accountability model (TA). The existence of 
transparency policy has a negative explanatory power in relation to the all three models (TR, 




explanatory power to the all three models (TR, SE, and TA). The extent of guidelines for 
transparency has no explanatory power in relation to participation (the SE model) but it has a 
positive explanatory power to transparency (TR) and to thick accountability (TA). Overall, 
combining transparency and participation in one model of thick accountability (TA) has led 
to a greater contribution by the same independent variables. 




The existence of a policy on participation did not improve the level of participation but it 
improved the level of transparency and also it was positively related to increased level of 
'thick' accountability. On the other hand the existence of policy regarding transparency was 
related to a reduced level of transparency, to a reduced level of participation and to a reduced 
accountability. Therefore, in order to gain more understanding on the impact of the existence 
of policies on the three models I decided to separate the existence of policy variables into 
formal (written) and informal (unwritten) policies to see if this distinction can lead to a 
different findings. In order to do so, I therefore repeat in the next section the correlation and 




formal and informal components and also after separating the existence of policy regarding 
transparency (DTP) into these similar elements.  
 
 
6.5  INFORMAL AND FORMAL POLICIES 
 
Table 6.4 presents the correlation matrix for all the variables involved in the regression 
analysis after separating policy into formal and informal variations. The existence of formal 
transparency policy is denoted by DFTP; the existence of informal transparency policy is 
denoted by DITP; the existence of formal participation policy denoted by DFEP; and the 
existence of informal participation policy denoted by DIEP.  
 
 
























1  (TA) Thick accountability  1 0.769 0.877 0.682 0.412 0.201 -0.090 0.321 0.008 0.148 
2  (SE) Participation   1 0.368 0.607 0.302 0.101 -0.021 0.192 0.030 0.164 
3  (TR) Transparency   1 0.543 0.382 0.219 -0.103 0.329 -0.004 0.126 
4  (PPG) Guidelines for participation     1 0.392 0.181 -0.019 0.256 0.036 0.184 
5  (TPG) Guidelines for transparency     1 0.433 -0.194 0.390 -0.076 0.093 
6  DFTP formal transparency policy       1 -0.783 0.464 -0.154 .088 
7  DITP informal transparency policy       1 -0.308 0.306 0.063 
8 DFEP formal participation policy        1 -0.631 .030 
9 DIEP informal participation policy         1 0.109 




The correlation between the existence of informal and formal transparency policy (DITP and 




policy regarding participation (DIEP and DFEP) is -0.631. Both are greater than minus one 
which suggests that some voluntary organisations had formal and informal policy in place but 
that the majority of respondents had only one type of policy (either formal or informal) in 
existence.  
 
There is a positive correlation between the existence of informal policy regarding 
participation (DIEP) and the existence of informal transparency policy (DITP) (0.306). There 
is also a positive correlation between the existence of formal participation policy (DFEP) and 
the existence of formal transparency policy (DFTP)(0.464). These correlations suggest that if 
a voluntary organisation has an informal policy regarding transparency then it is likely to also 
have an informal policy regarding participation. The same is true regarding the existence of 
the formal policy. 
 
The correlation scores between the three models SE, TR, and TA and the existence of formal 
policies are greater than the informal ones. This might indicate that the existence of formal 
policy variables DFTP and DFEP will contribute more to the variance in the SE, TR and TA 
models than the existence of informal policy variables, DITP and DIEP. This will be 





Table 6.5: Summary of regression results after separating the existence of policy into formal and 
informal 
Dep 
variables  Model 
Coefficients Independent variables 
R2 F 








































































































X X 0.375 
35.296 
[0.000] 
   








































































































X X 0.350 
31.720 
[0.000] 
   















































































DVs Model Coefficients PPG DFEP DIEP TPG DFTP DITP DBS R2 F 
 
 
Table 6.5 provides a summary of results for the regression analysis using the same dependent 
and independent variables in Table 6.2 but after separating the ‘existence of policy’ variables 
(DEP and DTP) into formal and informal where DFEP = formal participation policy, DIEP = 
informal participation policy, DFTP = formal transparency policy, and DITP = informal 
transparency policy. The dependent variables used in this round of regressions are given 
slightly distinguished labels from those in Table 6.2. The sub-models of participation (SE) 




P3), and finally the sub-models of thick accountability (TA) are denoted by (P1, P2). Each 
model is presented in its own panel. For each model the table shows the model alpha, the R2 
and the model F-statistic, and for each variable the coefficient value unstandardized beta B, 
standardised beta β, its t-statistic t, and the ρ-value ρ. Variables excluded from particular 
models are indicated with an X in their coefficient boxes. 
 
 
The stakeholder engagement model (SE)  
The dependent variable of participation has three sub-models. The first one (SE-P1) shows 
that seven independent variables (the existence of formal participation policy, the existence 
of informal participation policy, guidelines for participation, the existence of formal 
transparency policy, the existence of informal transparency policy, guidelines for 
transparency, and board code of standards) explained 38.6% of the variance in the (SE-P1) 
which is almost identical to the proportion of the explained variance 38.5% in the (SE-1) 
model in Table 6.2. The results show that the unique contributions of the existence of formal 
policy and informal policy regarding participation (DFEP, DIEP) are not substantially 
different from the previous regression test (Table 6.2). There is no substantial difference 
between whether the existence of participation policy is formal or informal in terms of their 
explanatory power on the level of participation. However, the existence of informal policy 
regarding participation (DIEP) is slightly less significant than the existence of formal 
participation policy (DFEP). The existence of formal policy thus has slightly more 





The results identified a difference in the explanatory power of the existence of formal or 
informal transparency policy against the level of participation. The existence of formal 
transparency policy reduces the level of participation greater than the existence of informal 
transparency policy. Indeed, the existence of formal transparency policy (DFTP) is 
significant at slightly above the 5 per cent level whereas the existence of informal 
transparency policy (DITP) has significance above the 10 per cent level. In comparison, the 
existence of transparency policy (DTP) in the SE-1 model  (see Table 6.2) has a level of 
significance below the 10 per cent  level with ρ-value ρ = 0.085.  The signal of the betas of 
DFTP, DITP and DTP is negative. In other words, the negative influence of the existence of 
formal transparency policy is statistically twice as significant as an informal policy in relation 
to practices of participation. 
 
The existence of a board code of standards (DBS) in the SE-P1 did not have any significant 
explanatory power as to the level of participation. Hence, the regression test was repeated 
after removing the insignificant variable (DBS) from the formation, with the new model is 
called (SE-P2) being comparable to its counterpart (SE-2) (see Table 6.2). The results in SE-
P2 resonate with those of SE-2. The proportion of the identified variance in both models is 
almost identical with 38.2 per cent for SE-P2 compared to 38.1 per cent for SE-2. As for the 
explanatory power of the remaining independent variables after removing (DBS) they remain 
relatively unchanged.  
 
The existence of formal policies regarding participation and transparency offer a slightly 
better contribution to the explanation of the variance of dependent variables, when compared 




transparency and engagement produced the new model, SE-P3 which has the following four 
independent variables: the extent of guidelines for participation (PPG), the extent of 
guidelines for transparency (TPG), the existence of formal policy regarding participation 
(DFEP) and the existence of formal transparency policy (DFTP) with SE remaining as the 
dependent variable. The model  SE-P3 shows that the explanatory power of the existence of 
formal policies regarding participation and transparency has decreased dramatically. This 
indicates that the existence of informal policy regarding participation (DIEP) and the 
existence of informal policy regarding transparency (DITP) have explanatory power and 
should remain in the model, confirming the effectiveness of the sub-model SE-P2.  
 
The transparency model (TR)  
The dependent variable of transparency has three alternative sub-models (P1, P2 and P3). The 
first sub-model (TR-P1) has the same seven independent variables as in the participation 
model in the previous section. 37.4 per cent  of the variance in the transparency model (TR-
P1) was explained by the seven independent variables which is slightly higher than the 36.4 
per cent  in the previous regression test (TR1) (see Table 6.2). As for the explanatory power 
of the extent of guidelines for participation (PPG), the extent of guidelines for transparency 
(TPG), and the board code of standards (DBS), they are almost the same with no substantial 
differences. Board code of standards, DBS, is the least significant variable with ρ-value ρ > 
0.500 in both models indicating no contribution to the level of transparency. 
The existence of formal participation policy (DFEP) and the existence of informal 
participation policy (DIEP) have a sizeable positive contribution in explaining transparency 




The regression test was repeated after removing the insignificant variable of board code of 
standards (DBS) from the formation, with the new model called (TR-P2) which will be 
compared to its counterpart (TR-2) (Table 6.2).The new model of TR-P2 has slightly more 
variance explained 37.3% per cent than the former  TR-2 model 36.4  per cent (Table 6.2). 
Both variables, the existence of formal and informal policies regarding participation, make 
similar contributions to the level of transparency (TR-P2). Also the result shows no 
significant differences between formal transparency policy and informal transparency policy 
in terms of their contributions to the level of transparency in voluntary organisations.  They 
are both negative. Given these similar contribution to the variance in the TR-P2 model, I 
decided not to do further regression tests on the model. 
 
The thick accountability model (TA) 
The seven independent variables identified above explained 52.4 per cent of the variance in 
the thick accountability model (TA); compared to 52 per cent in the former regression test 
(see Table 6.2).  Results were thus very similar to each other. As for the extent of guidelines 
and board code of standards (PPG, TPG and DBS), they all have no substantial differences to 
their previous results in the earlier regression, with DBS is the least significant variable in 
both regression tests. As in the earlier regression, the existence of formal and informal 
policies regarding participation and transparency each made a significant contribution to 
explaining the variance in the TA-P1 model however, the existence of transparency formal 
and informal policies had a negative but significant impact on the thick model TA-P1. There 
were no discrepancies in the results between formal and informal policies. The regression test 
was repeated after removing the insignificant variable of board code of standards (DBS); the 




informal versions of transparency and engagement policies highly contribute to the variance 
in the 'thick' accountability model (TA) and there is no need for removing any of the 
variables in TA-P2 (see Table 6.4). 
 
Formal and informal versions of the existence of participation policy have similar 
explanation power on the three dependent variables. The explanatory power of the existence 
of formal transparency policy has more significant against the SE model than the existence of 
an informal policy. However, both formal and informal policies have a similar influence on 
the other two models of transparency (TR) and thick accountability (TA). Overall, however, 
this round of regressions confirms the general importance of guidelines over policies in 
explaining practices of accountability.  
 
Against this background, Figures (6.1) and (6.2) thus provide a further analytical insight 
regarding the association between the existence of policy and the extent of guidelines in both 
participation (PPG) and transparency(TPG) models. 9DEP, DTP = 1 indicates the existence of 
policy on participation or on transparency and DEP, DTP = 0 indicate there absence of a 
policy. The proportion of voluntary organisations in the sample with transparency policy was 
217(88 per cent) whilst 190 (77 per cent) voluntary organisations had a participation policy in 
place. As for voluntary organisations without policy, 12 per cent were without a transparency 
policy and 23 per cent without a participation policy.  At the same time, there were some 
voluntary organisations that had a participation policy in place but they had not established 
guidelines for implementing the participation policy they had in place. The rest of the 
                                                 




voluntary organisations respondents’ scores have fluctuated between low to high on the 
participation’s guidelines scale. This suggests that the desired aim of having a participation 
policy in place could become irrelevant if the organisation does not support it with 
guidelines.   
 
As for voluntary organisation respondents who have got a transparency policy in place, 
Figure 6.2 shows that there was a sizeable proportion of them that did not have any 
guidelines regarding the transparency policy which was supposed to be in place. Some of the 
respondents who had a transparency policy scored low to moderate on the transparency’s 
guideline scale. This identifies some disconnection between practice and policy, confirming 
the negative impact of transparency policies. In general respondents who had a policy and 
those without a policy had roughly similar performances.  Some voluntary organisations 
without a policy in place have followed low to moderate level of guidelines and just few of 














6.6 CONCLUSIONS  
 
In this chapter I reported on a series of regression analyses which I ran to investigate the 
































and engagement. These tests, made it possible to evaluate the explanatory capacity of the new 
combined model of interactive accountability. Board codes of standards had little explanatory 
impact. I have tested the impact of the existence of policies on outcomes by making the 
distinction between policies and guidelines. This distinction is based on an assumption that if 
policies are designed for the purpose of improving the implementation of the activity through 
a set of rules and procedures, the existence of a policy does not necessarily mean that the 
rules and procedures are in place. I wanted to pursue the issue of a tick box culture that 
questions whether, if an organisation has set up a policy regarding an activity then does this 
mean that the organisation has in place and follows a set of procedures and guidelines to 
implement this policy. Therefore, this thesis has asked two set of questions one concerning 
the existence of a transparency and participation policy and another regarding the procedures 
and guidelines of the transparency and participation practices.  
 
Turning to engagement policies, the data shows a strong association between the extent of 
procedures and guidelines for implementing stakeholder engagement process by voluntary 
organisations in the sample, and the levels of stakeholder engagement that they have (model 
SE-2 table 6.2).  The findings revealed that there was no significant association between a 
voluntary organisation having a policy on stakeholder engagement (declaring the existence of 
an engagement policy), and the level of stakeholder engagement (see table 6.2 SE-2).  In 
theory it might be expected that these two variables, the extent of guidelines and the 
existence of policy, would be connected. The existence of policy might be thought to reflect 
positively on the extent of guidelines, and so on the level of engagement stakeholders have 
with a voluntary organisation. The data however suggests otherwise. Correlation analysis 
(Table 6.1) confirms that there is a only weak correlation (i) between the level of stakeholder 




of guidelines on engagement and the existence of engagement policy.  Since the existence of 
a policy does not influence the level of engagement nor the extent of engagement guidelines, 
this suggests that in practice the issue of engagement policy and guidelines is more complex. 
One interpretation is that voluntary organisations might adopt a policy of engagement for 
reasons other than increasing the level of genuine and effective engagement process. These 
reasons might include for example, meeting a certain contractual requirement or expectation 
‘tick the box’ on funding requirements, improving image, publicity, legitimacy. 
 
As for transparency policies, the findings were arguably more ambiguous. On the one hand, 
the existence of procedures and guidelines of transparency policy impacted positively upon 
the level of transparency that organisational respondents have (see table 6.2 TR-2). On the 
other hand however, there was a negative association between the existence of a transparency 
policy and the level of transparency. In other words, the existence of a transparency policy 
made transparency worse. The relationship between policy and guidelines was negative such 
that in practice the existence of a transparency policy impacts negatively and reduces the 
level of transparency.  
 
In order to explain this result I conducted further analysis on policies. First, I divided 
responses on the existence of policies into formal written policies and informal unwritten 
policies. I then re-ran the regressions for all the models to find out if this distinction could 
explain the absence of, or negative, relationship between the existence of policy and the level 
of the practice. The findings (Table 6.5) gave relatively similar results to the previous ones 
with no significant differences between the results of whether policy was formal or informal. 




6.2). This time the findings showed that some respondents have in reality practiced 
transparency without having a policy on transparency and some had a transparency policy but 
they did not practice transparency effectively through implementing guidelines regarding 
transparency to a high level (see Figure 6.2 TPG density). This further analysis has confirmed 
the regression result which suggests that the existence of transparency policy does not 
necessarily mean that transparency guidelines are effectively in operation.   
 
The interaction between participation and transparency and how they influence each other 
may offer one further element to the analysis. By looking at SE-2 and TR-2 (see Table 6.2), 
the findings suggest that policies across transparency and engagement might partially explain 
each other’s models. Hence, I repeated the regression tests for each model after eliminating 
policies related to the other model to find out the net influence of policies on each other’s 
model. I found that although policies and guidelines of both stakeholder engagement and 
transparency appear to have some significant influence on the level of transparency, the 
findings revealed a clear domination for the existence of engagement policy (DEP) and the 
extent of guidelines for engagement (PPG) over the existence of transparency policy (DTP) 
and the extent of guidelines for transparency (TPG). Paradoxically, extent of guidelines and 
existence of policies regarding engagement matters more in determining levels of 
transparency than transparency extent of guidelines and existence of policies.  
 
This explanatory power of engagement policies and guidelines (PPG and DEP) in accounting 
for the level of transparency by more than half of the variance could provide another 
explanation for the negative influence of the existence of transparency policy on the level of 
transparency. One suggestion is that in practice voluntary organisations might have confused 




understanding about transparency among voluntary organisations. The transparency model 
(table 6.2 TR-3) shows that when engagement policies and guidelines variables (PPG and 
DEP) were removed from the model, the negative influence of the existence of policy on the 
level of transparency disappeared. However, on the other hand when we look at the influence 
of engagement guidelines the results revealed that participation guidelines managed to 
explain most of the variance in the level of engagement, much more than the existence of 
participation policy (see table 6.2 SE-3). These findings suggest that in practice the issue of 
participation and transparency is far more complex than one might think. A voluntary 
organisation might chose to have a policy on transparency and participation for different 
reasons so that having a policy in place will not definitely will improve the level of 
transparency and participation. It all depends on the intention of the voluntary organisation or 
on its knowledge about providing these activities to their stakeholders. 
 
In addition, the regression analysis also confirmed that there was no significant association 
between a voluntary organisation that has a board code of standards (code of governance), 
and its level of engagement with stakeholders (SE-1 table 6.2). Similarly, codes of 
governance had no impact on the level of transparency (TR-1 table 6.2). These findings 
confirm and add to the results of other bodies of research that have attributed little influence 
or significance to codes of governance. Notably Bradshaw, Murray and Wolpin (1992) who 
investigated the influence of codes of governance on voluntary organisations’ effectiveness 
found that there was no relationship between the code of governance and an organisation’s 
effectiveness (Bradshaw, Murray and Wolpin, 1992).  
Finally, this chapter has tested the effectiveness of the thick model of accountability: the 
thick model of accountability which has combined both the level of transparency and 




using the same independent variables that I used in the other models. The findings show that 
the existence of policy and the extent of guidelines of engagement and transparency all have 
a statistically significant influence on the new model of accountability.  The regression has 
clearly revealed that the association between transparency and participation added 
explanatory significance to the model of thick accountability. Combining transparency and 
engagement were statistically proven to better explain accountability in the voluntary sector. 
Policies and guidelines of engagement and of transparency have both explained about 52 per 
cent of the variance in the thick accountability model (see table 6.2 TA-2). This was a huge 
improvement by comparison to what transparency and engagement managed to achieve 
separately. This result suggests that engagement and transparency each explain only one facet 
of accountability and that the thick model of accountability (the TA model) is a more 
comprehensive measure for voluntary organisations accountability. 
 
Having reported on the analysis of the survey over this chapter and the other previous two 
chapters I now turn to the conclusion in which I will be discussing the findings and its 










This thesis set out to address the absence of a systematic study into the practices of 
accountability across voluntary and community organisations. It established three research 
questions to investigate how accountability across voluntary organisations could be best 
understood and modelled, and to capture what factors or variables best explained practices of 
accountability across the sector. More specifically, the thesis aimed to fulfil two primary 
objectives. The first was to develop and test a new model for evaluating accountability in the 
voluntary and community sector which combines transparency and participation together in 
order to better grasp the complex practices of accountability. The second was to gain an 
overarching picture as to the state of accountability across the voluntary and community 
sector in England and Wales before austerity. Much has been made of the accountable and 
citizen-focussed services of voluntary organisations. It is often taken for granted that 
voluntary organisations are closer to service-users, making the most of their supposed 
competitive advantage over public and private organisations to deliver user-led and flexible 
services. However, there remains little agreement as to what constitutes accountability across 
the voluntary sector, or how to conceptualise the practices of accountability in such a way as 
to be able to measure their effectiveness and draw lessons for policy and practices.   
 
Addressing such lacuna, the thesis constructed an innovative model for evaluating 
accountability in the decision- making process of voluntary organisations in England and 
Wales. As such, it responds to the calls of recent studies that identify a lack of consensus over 




practices of accountability, particularly the testing of relationship between transparency and 
participation (Brandsma ,2013; Boven,2010;, Willems and Van Drooon, 2012; Ebrahim 
2010; and Brandsma and Schillemans,2012). Therefore, the ‘thick’ interactive model of 
accountability developed in this thesis supplements the deficiencies of narrow uni-
dimensional models, which privilege either stakeholder engagement or transparency in 
isolation from one another. In contrast, the model developed here seeks to account for both 
practices of stakeholder engagement and of transparency, as well as the interactions between 
these elements, in order to bring together a composite assessment of accountability. These 
interactions, it was suggested, could not be taken for granted or deemed to be necessarily 
positive. Rather, it was assumed that the interactions between engagement and transparency 
would be contingent and messy, with unexpected outcomes, both negative and positive. 
 
With this in mind, this concluding chapter reports on the empirical findings drawn from the 
application of the ‘thick’ interactive  model of accountability to a sample of voluntary 
organisations in England and Wales, critically assessing the lessons for policy and practice, 
as well as the systematic mapping and conceptualisation of practices of accountability. It 
begins with a brief confirmation of the validity of the sample of respondents engaged in the 
study before examining the lessons from the survey data in terms of the baseline of practices 
before austerity, and the impact of organisational and policies on practices of accountability. 
It then turns to a discussion of the impact of the findings of the study for future research and 








7.1  A BRIEF RECAP 
 
Before setting out the contribution of the thesis to existing understandings of accountability 
practices within the voluntary sector, let us first confirm the validity of the research design 
that underpins the findings of the thesis. The findings are drawn from an online survey 
questionnaire that was administered to voluntary organisations in England and Wales. 
Voluntary organisations vary in size and complexity, with such fragmentation often 
undermining attempts to draw out broad or general lessons and insights across the whole of 
the sector. The capacity to apply or generalise lessons from this particular study thus came to 
rest on the meeting of two main conditions: the construction of a targeted population to test 
the validity of the assumptions of the thick model of accountability; and the assembling of a 
representative, sizable sample that mirrors the targeted population (Fink, 2003). To meet 
these conditions, the study restricted the population to 15,699 organisations. A cross-sectional 
randomly selected sample of 2,714 organisations was subsequently drawn from the identified 
population. In total, 250 questionnaires were completed by this random sample and returned. 
The response rate for the survey was therefore over 9 per cent, which was satisfactory and 
within the average response rate of other online surveys.  
 
Importantly, tThe distribution of the respondents represented the range of types of charitable 
status as defined by the Charity Act 2006, as well as matching the distribution in other 
research studies (see Dhanani and Connolly, 2012; see also Chapter 3). The majority of 
organisation respondents were thus at least 15 years in existence with 10 or less workers and 
volunteers. Organisations were spread across a range of activities within the voluntary sector 
and drew their income from a variety of funders and combination of government contracts 




most organisations but 60 per cent of respondents were not affiliated to, or part of, an 
umbrella group of voluntary organisations. Over half of respondents had between five and 
nine board members whilst over a third had between 10 and 19. Typically, most boards had at 
least two subcommittees with executive and finance subcommittees. The data analysis 
revealed that there were two primary types of boards within voluntary organisations: strategic 
and managerial. Respondent organisations were more involved in strategic than in managerial 
roles.  
 
The survey was designed to explore five areas: organisational characteristics; governance 
practices; policies and extent of formality procedures for participation and transparency; 
transparency practices; and stakeholder participation in the decision-making process within 
voluntary organisations. Chapter Four reported on the findings of the survey to give an initial 
picture of the practices of accountability across voluntary organisations at the time of the 
survey. Chapter Five subsequently undertook a series of cross-tabulations in order to 
investigate the relations between key organisational variables and the variation of practices 
across the sample of respondent voluntary organisations. In so doing, it tested the extent to 
which organisational characteristics, i.e affiliation, size, age, income and source of income, 
impacted upon levels of transparency and stakeholder engagement. Finally, Chapter Six used 
multiple regression analyses to examine the influence of policies and the extent of formality 
on the practices of transparency and participation, as well as testing the effectiveness of the 
accountability model. What did this multiple analysis reveal? What key lessons emerged 






7.2  KEY LESSONS: PRE-AUSTERITY BASELINE AND PATCHY PRACTICES 
OF TRANSPARENCY AND ENGAGEMENT  
 
 As posited in the introduction to this thesis, the data generated by the survey carried out as 
part of this study offers valuable insights into the practices of accountability across the 
voluntary sector before the turn to austerity, notably by the Cameron government in 2010.  
The primary focus of the study was on explaining and modelling accountability, but it equally 
provides a valuable baseline against which to systematically measure existing practices after 
30 per cent cuts to local government revenue support grants, as well as reductions in social 
and welfare benefits. I begin to examine this pre-austerity baseline of accountability practices 
by first setting out the main findings of the survey.  
 
When measured in terms of the public availability of key elements of information on the 
work and internal processes of an organisation, the practices of transparency across voluntary 
organisations and the sector as a whole were patchy and inconsistent. The study has shown 
that the level of an organisation’s involvement on one item of transparency did not 
necessarily match the level of its involvement on the other items. Voluntary organisations 
provided uneven information to stakeholders. The survey, as discussed in Chapter Three, 
asked organisations to comment for example on the availability of details and descriptions 
about activity and programmes, about its key staff, members of the governing board and the 
executive, as well as its impact on society, any codes, partnerships or coalitions to which the 
organisation is a signatory and how stakeholders can input into the different levels of 
decision-making. Public availability was deemed to be in place if information was available 
through an appropriate medium, be it website, annual report, bulletins, or annual review, etc.  




details and description about programmes to their stakeholders, 34 per cent seldom made 
information concerning codes of governance available to stakeholders (14 per cent never 
made such information available).  
 
More strikingly, there was a clear lack of commitment among many voluntary organisations 
to transparency. Over half of the organisation respondents (53 per cent) did not have a formal 
transparency policy in place although I discuss below that paradoxically the absence of a 
policy on transparency might impact positively on outcomes. As for the substantive content 
or guidelines of transparency policy, the survey returns revealed that around a third of 
respondents who did have a transparency policy in place failed to communicate how its 
stakeholders could make an information request. 40 per cent of respondents had no timeframe 
for dealing with information requests and 6 per cent of respondents do not know whether or 
not there was a time limit in place. This picture of inconsistency in implementing 
transparency by the voluntary sector resonates with previous research on accountability 
undertaken by Blagescu and Lloyd (2006) into the transparency of international non-
governmental organisations. This study reported a lack of commitment to practices of 
transparency, confirming that while there was an emerging recognition of the need for 
policies regarding transparency, very little was done towards putting a transparency policy in 
place.  Although this survey engaged with voluntary organisations in England and Wales, 
organisational respondents demonstrated a similar lack of organisational focus on putting 
transparency practices in place. Even those organisations that had a transparency policy in 
place did not reflect such principles in practice so that in general there was a lack of 





Such findings are in keeping with the lessons of recent studies carried out since the advent of 
austerity politics in England and Wales following the election of the Cameron government in 
2010. Hyndman and McConville (2016) found a lack of transparency in reporting of top 100 
UK charities in the wake of austerity, both in terms of the extent and manner of disclosure.  
They also found, as I suggest earlier, that voluntary organisations focused their efforts mostly 
on meeting statutory requirements and meetings expectations of powerful donors, driven 
more by a desire to appear legitimate rather than by an aspiration to provide ethically-driven 
and transparency accounts of their efficiency. Such findings suggest that austerity has only 
accentuated the patchy nature of transparency practices identified in this thesis. Equally, as 
with the study of Hyndman and McConville (2016), the findings of this thesis show that 
transparency is a complex issue and it is far more comprehensive and continuous process 
rather than just information disclosure once a year in the annual report.  
    
With this in mind, I now turn to the second dimension of the model of accountability tested in 
this thesis, which is that of stakeholder engagement in the decision-making process. The 
study revealed inconsistent practices of stakeholder engagement across voluntary sector 
organisations. Indeed, staff and employees were involved in the participation process more 
than any other stakeholder groups. Beneficiaries were repeatedly placed second in terms of 
their levels of involvement in the decision-making process. Notably, their involvement was in 
general to be more likely found on lower levels of participation where there is little or no 
influence on decisions.  
 
In addition, there was also inconsistent involvement of beneficiaries across the three elements 
of participation. The participation dimension, consists of three interlinked elements (see 




and the mechanism used to carry out the participation process. In order for the participation 
process to be meaningful, the involvement across the three parts has to be on the similar or 
matched level. Inconsistencies across stages of engagement, levels of influence and 
appropriate mechanisms, as revealed by the analysis of survey returns, thus provides potential 
further evidence to suggest that stakeholder engagement processes with beneficiaries were in 
some cases flawed and at best poor.  
As for of the existence of policy regarding participation, there was the same inconsistency 
among respondents as with transparency. Only 34 per cent of organisation respondents 
indicated that they had a formal written participation policy in place whilst almost two-thirds 
indicated that they relied on informal unwritten practices or no policy at all.  In terms of the 
specific elements of such a policy, almost 20 per cent of respondents did not circulate 
information regarding engagement processes to stakeholders, whilst between 25 per cent and 
30 per cent could not confirm whether their stakeholders were prevented from engagement 
due for example to physical access or that disadvantaged stakeholders were given specific 
support, and that confidentiality of stakeholders during engagement was guaranteed.   
 
Overall, therefore, seen through the lens of the two dimensions of transparency and 
engagement, pre-austerity practices of accountability across the voluntary sector appeared 
somewhat patchy. In particular, there are less than half of voluntary organisations in the 
survey with formal transparency or participation policies in place, and the elements of what 
might be considered to constitute such policies in practice were not followed by between one-
fifth and one-third of respondent organisations (depending on the element under discussion). 
This broad finding takes on significant relevance for the understanding of accountability 
practices because accountability is best viewed as a continuous and interlinked set of 




democratic or relational conceptualisations of accountability (see Unerman and Bennet, 2004 
and Rinaldi, Unerman and Tilt, 2014). Indeed, the findings of this study suggest that 
inconsistent patterns of participation across different stages of decision-making hamper in 
practice the supposed organisational learning from the engagement with the multiple 
viewpoints of different actors. On the contrary, whilst not a sham, this study confirms the 
critical assessments of participation of recent studies (see for example the work of Ebrahim, 
2010 and Dereli, 2011).  
 
As argued above, genuine transparency should thus take organisations a step forward beyond 
more than just mere disclosure. Organisations should provide stakeholders with relevant 
information about their programmes and activities continuously and not just retrospectively. 
Providing stakeholders with information about future activities and plans can encourage them 
to positively be involved and contribute at least with their opinions to the success of these 
programmes and activities. But as this study confirms, information giving is one stage of the 
cycle of accountability, alongside that of discussion and the setting of consequences and 
sanctions (see Brandsma and Schillemans, 2012); evidence for these latter stages is equally 
patchy, with the findings on participation shedding doubt on the role of discussion over other 
stages of the accountability cycle (see the claims of Brandsma and Schillemans, 2012). 
Indeed, the findings of this study undermine assertions of accountability as virtue, with little 
evidence of responsiveness and transparency (see Bovens, 2010).  
However, at this stage, the analysis has said little about how to account for this state of affairs 
and whether such practices vary according to the organisational characteristics, be it age, 
affiliation or sources of income. It is to the impact of such variables on patterns of 






7.3 ORGANISATIONAL MATTERS  
 
In recent years, we have witnessed significant changes to the organisation and composition of 
‘the’ voluntary sector. ‘Big beasts’ or large voluntary sector organisations have come to 
dominate local voluntary sector networks across different service sectors, and organisations 
have come to increasingly rely on the delivery of service contracts and government funding. 
These changes have led to the generation of a number of potential hypotheses on the impact 
of organisational change on practices of accountability. In Chapter Five, I tested such 
hypothesis, investigating, the relational influence of transparency and participation against 
organisational capacity (affiliation, age, size, and sources of income). I tested four main 
hypotheses. First, I examined how far wider umbrella or affiliated groups possess more 
formal guidelines and central bureaucratic resources that impose upon member organisations 
standard practices of accountability in terms of transparency and participation. Second, I 
analysed whether mature organisations might have an advantage over younger organisations 
in building up the expertise over time to undertake practices of transparency and 
participation. Third, I assessed the extent to which organisations with higher annual income 
might have a strategic advantage over organisations with smaller income in terms of the 
availability of resources for investing in the undertaking of transparency and participation 
practices. Finally, I examined sources of income to explore whether organisations relying 
heavily on one source of income (particularly income from government) might be more likely 
to be complying with certain standards and practices of accountability in terms of 





Strikingly, the analytical findings in relation to transparency have revealed that there was no 
identifiable trend in the relationship between organisational affiliation, age, and size and 
transparency practices, The influence of these three organisational variables on transparency 
practices was not significant. Hence, the hypothesised relationships were not proven by the 
cross-tabulation analysis. However, the same cannot be assumed for the fourth variable, 
sources of income, and its influence on transparency practices. The analysis revealed that 
organisations with higher reliance on government grants and funding tended to have a higher 
level of transparency.  In other words, reliance on government funding did appear to have a 
positive influence on how voluntary organisations engaged with the different practices of 
transparency. In marked contrast, as organisations became more reliant on trading activities, 
this appeared to have a negative impact on how they engaged with the practices of 
transparency identified in the survey. 
 
In terms of practices of participation, organisational characteristics had a more mixed 
influence on outcomes. In the first instance, the survey revealed that affiliation matters; 
affiliated respondents out performed unaffiliated ones on the three dimensions of 
participation. However, such assertions require clarification. The impact of affiliation was 
weak on the first dimension, that of the stage of engagement. It was strong on the other two 
dimensions; the level of influence attributed to stakeholders and the engagement mechanism 
deployed to carry out the engagement process. Unaffiliated respondents’ level of performance 
across the three dimensions was highly inconsistent whereas affiliated respondents 






Second, taking into account the different elements of participation, age did not impact on the 
stage of engagement and the level of influence, but it did have a positive influence on the 
engagement mechanism deployed. 63 per cent of respondent organisations in the age 
category of 50 years or more thus used the highest engagement mechanism. Thirdly, and in 
relation to annual income, organisations with an annual income between £500,000 and 
£1million reported combined stakeholder engagement practices at the most influential levels 
across the three dimensions (stage of engagement, decision-making or mechanism). 
Organisations within this income category had the most consistent performance across the 
three dimensions of participation. Respondents within this income category had similar levels 
of performance on the stage of engagement and the level of influence.  
Finally, the analysis of survey returns revealed that organisations that attracted 25 to 50 per 
cent of their income from government, reported the highest influence of stakeholder 
engagement and their performance was consistent across the three dimensions of 
engagement. However, in contrast to practices of transparency, and broadly speaking, sources 
of income, whether governmental, private or trading, did not appear to have any consistent 
impact on the three dimensions of participation.  
 
Notably, however, the analysis of survey returns revealed a disjuncture across organisations 
between the stage of engagement at which they worked with stakeholders, the level of 
influence attributed to stakeholders and the engagement mechanism deployed; and this was 
the case for affiliation, age and annual income. Looking at the third dimension of engagement 
mechanism suggests that organisations were less keen to use the highest level of mechanisms 
compared to the stage of engagement and the level of influence; this was the case regardless 
of age, affiliation and income. This disjuncture may well contribute to critical accounts of the 




policy challenges for government; an issue to which I return when I discuss the implications 
of the findings later in this chapter.  
 
In conclusion, this analysis of organisational variables begins to shed light on the complex 
interactions between practices of engagement and transparency. Organisational 
characteristics have differential impacts on practices of accountability, whether engagement 
practices or transparency are under consideration. Affiliation might impact on participation 
practices but it does not impact on levels of transparency. Government income and trading 
have an impact on transparency but less so on levels of engagement across the three 
dimensions.   
 
In short, organisational characteristics do not appear to present with an organisational fix to 
improve accountability (see below). But, under the politics of austerity governance, the 
impact of organisational variables may arguably have heightened.  Considine, O’Sullivan and 
Nguyen (2014) argue that increased income from contractualisation and trading will 
encourage organisations to adopt more business-like models of behavior. Against the 
background of the findings of this study, increased trading and contractualisation under 
austerity has likely to have further impacted on patterns of reporting in order to maintain 
legitimacy and income from contracts, the selection and paying of new board members, as 
well as the potential for mission drift and loss of local forms of legitimacy in the eyes of 
stakeholders and local community. Of course, such claims require further testing, but with 
such arguments in mind, I now turn however to the third and final part of the data analysis 
presented in Chapter Six which examined the impact of policy on the levels of accountability 






7.4 POLICY MATTERS  
 
Throughout the study, emergent findings repeatedly pointed to the analytical distinction 
between policy and practice, and the limits of the existence of a policy to deliver improved 
accountability. Organisational respondents in their survey returns signposted the potential 
limits of formal policies, as well as the unspoken or embedded set of guideline practices that 
might constitute an everyday policy across the organisation. Exploring such emergent 
questions, I conducted a series of regression tests to investigate the explanatory capacity of 
policies and codes of governance on the practices of transparency and engagement. These 
tests, made it possible to evaluate the explanatory capacity of the new combined model of 
interactive accountability.  
 
More specifically, I tested the impact of the existence of policies on outcomes by making the 
distinction between policies as a statement of intent and guidelines as a set of practices to 
navigate the implementation of policies. This distinction is based on an assumption that if 
policies are designed for the purpose of improving the implementation of the activity through 
a set of rules and procedures, the existence of a policy does not necessarily mean that the 
rules and procedures are in place. However, in theory it might be expected that the extent of 
procedures and the existence of policy would be connected and so that both would contribute 
to a better level of practice. Therefore, I tested the hypothesis for this relationship, 
questioning whether the existence of policies and the extent of guideline procedures of 
participation and transparency positively influence the level of participation and 




initial findings of the survey, which risked taking as given that the existence or not of a policy 
was a positive or negative characteristic of practices of transparency and engagement. 
 
Interestingly, tThe regression analysis produced a marked contrast, depending on whether 
participation or transparency were taken into account, and indeed whether the complex 
interactions between these two dimensions were being investigated. The extent that 
guidelines for participation policy were in place proved to be associated with higher levels of 
participation. However, simply declaring the existence of a participation policy by respondent 
organisations did not lead to a significant association with, or rather explain, levels of 
participation (see Table 6.2). The existence of policy might be thought to reflect positively on 
the extent of guidelines and procedures, and so on the level of engagement stakeholders have 
in the decision-making processes of a voluntary organisation. The data however suggests 
otherwise. There was only a weak explanatory relationship between the level of participation 
and the existence of participation policy and between the extent of procedures on 
participation and the existence of participation policy (see Table 6.1).  Since the existence of 
a participation policy does not influence the level of participation nor the extent of 
participation procedures, this suggests that in practice the issue of participation policy and 
procedures is more complex. One interpretation is that voluntary organisations might adopt a 
policy of participation for reasons other than increasing the effectiveness of participation 
process. These reasons might include for example, meeting a certain contractual requirement 
or expectation ‘tick the box’ on funding requirements, improving image, publicity, 
legitimacy, et cetera. 
 
As for transparency policies, the findings were arguably more ambiguous. On the one hand, 




the level of transparency that organisational respondents have in place (see Table 6.2). On the 
other hand however, there was a negative association between the existence of a transparency 
policy and the level of transparency. In other words, the existence of a transparency policy 
made transparency worse and reduced the level of transparency. Against this background, I 
conducted further analyses in Chapter Six to test whether distinguishing between the 
existences of formal written or informal unwritten policies can lead to different results. 
However, results were relatively similar (see Table 6.5). There were no significant 
differences between the results of whether policy was formal or informal. Further analysis 
tested the density of procedures in relation to the existence or not of a policy for transparency 
(see Figures 6.1 and 6.2).  Here the analysis of findings showed that some organisational 
respondents have practiced transparency without having a policy on transparency whereas 
others had a transparency policy but they did not practice transparency effectively through 
implementation guidelines and procedures (see Figure 6.2). This further analysis confirmed 
the regression result, which suggested that the existence of transparency policy does not 
necessarily mean that transparency procedures and guidelines are effectively in operation.  
 
ImportantlyIn keeping with the interactive model of accountability, the interactions between 
participation and transparency and how they influence each other was also examined as part 
of the analysis of survey returns (see Chapter Six Table 6.2). This analysis concluded that the 
existence of policies and guideline procedures for both stakeholder engagement and 
transparency appear to have some significant influence on the level of transparency. But,  the 
explanatory capacity of participation policies and guideline procedures clearly dominates that 
of transparency policies and guideline procedures. In other words, policies and guidelines for 
participation have more positive impacts on both levels of participation and levels of 




determining levels of transparency than transparency policies and guidelines. Chapter Six 
suggested that the explanatory power of participation policies and guidelines in accounting 
for the level of transparency by more than half of the variance could provide another 
explanation for the negative influence of the existence of transparency policy on the level of 
transparency.  
 
What we can imply from this analysis is that in practice voluntary organisations might have 
confused participation with transparency as the findings show that the existence of policy on 
participation has contributed to higher level of transparency. In other words, if an 
organisation wants to increase its level of transparency it adopts a participation policy. 
Another possible explanation is that there may be a lack of understanding to the term of 
transparency among voluntary organisations and how it should be implemented. Equally, 
transparency policies have an element of information that crossover into, and might support, 
stakeholder participation practices. Typically, these complex interactions between 
transparency and participation polices and guidelines are explained by a combination of all 
these factors. The main and most important conclusion from the analysis was that both 
transparency and participation were interlinked and that any attempts to increase 
accountability in voluntary organisations would be less productive if it chose to apply one of 
these two elements without considering the other.  
But, this is not to dismiss the relative insignificance of the existence of polices in explaining 
outcomes. When we take into account the influence of engagement guidelines and procedures 
on the level of engagement, the results revealed that engagement guidelines managed to 
explain most of the variance in the level of engagement; much more than the existence of 
engagement policy (see Table 6.2). There was a weak relationship between existence of 




both transparency and participation made a statistically significant contribution to the level of 
both of these independent variables. Having a transparency policy could negatively impact on 
the level of transparency practiced by the voluntary organisation. Having a participation 
policy in place proved to have a neutral impact on the level of participation, but a positive 
influence on the levels of transparency within a voluntary organisation.  
 
Finally, the study also put to the test the effectiveness of the thick model of accountability. 
This interactive model of accountability combines both the level of transparency and 
participation in one composite model that draws out the interactions between these two 
elements. The model was tested by repeating the regression analysis by using the same 
independent variables of policies that I used in the other models. The findings show that the 
existence of policy and the extent of guideline procedures for participation and transparency 
all have a statistically significant influence on the new model of accountability.  Most 
importantly, the analysis of findings clearly showed that the association between transparency 
and participation added explanatory significance to the model of thick accountability. 
Combining transparency and engagement as proxies for accountability explained 
approximately 52 per cent of the variance in the accountability model (see Table 6.2). This 
result suggests that engagement and transparency each explain only one facet of 
accountability and that the thick model of accountability (the TA model) is a more 
comprehensive measure for voluntary sector accountability. 
 
In conclusion, this study provides a pre-austerity picture on how voluntary organisations were 
practicing transparency and participation. Most importantly, it brings to the fore how in 
practice the issues of engagement and transparency, core elements of accountability, are far 




organisations increase their levels of transparency and participation. Policies and guidelines 
interact in somewhat unexpected ways. Charity commissions, government policy makers, 
local authorities, voluntary organisations and the public must take further into consideration 
that mere existence of policies is not necessarily a relevant indicator for better accountability 
practices (transparency and participation); in the case of transparency, policies might even 
lower levels of transparency. It appears that a voluntary organisation might chose to have a 
policy on transparency and participation for many different reasons so that having a policy in 
place does not guarantee to improve the level of transparency and participation. In many 
ways, much depends on the intention of the voluntary organisations, its leadership and its 
knowledge and experience in providing these activities and practices to their stakeholders. 




7.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE  
 
The starting point for this thesis was the argument that our understanding of accountability 
practices in voluntary and community organisations rely on a set of untested myths. There is 
an established conventional understanding in the literature that transparency is the key to 
good governance (Hood, 2007), and that voluntary sector organisations had some strategic 
advantage over other organisations in their capacity to develop the trust of clients and to 
identify ad respond to their needs (see Wallace and Chapman, 2003).  Much of this strategic 
advantage has traditionally been tied to the autonomy of the sector, and the belief that this 
autonomy drives forward the efficiency of voluntary organisations in delivering services to 




narrative, scrutinising the voluntary sector accountability especially by government might be 
a sensitive issue, viewed by voluntary organisations and others as an attempt to undermine 
the good work of the voluntary sector.  
 
Many of the elements of this established and traditional narrative remain outside the confines 
of this study. However, four potential lessons for policymakers and leaders of voluntary 
organisations emerged from this study. These lessons call into question elements of the 
narrative of voluntary sector accountability and autonomy, not least the patchy practices of 
accountability before austerity that question assumptions about the privileged relationship 
between voluntary organisations and beneficiaries. Firstly, and more specifically, there is no 
straightforward organisational fix to practices of accountability, be it promoting larger or 
smaller voluntary organisations or encouraging support for older or affiliated organisations. 
Organisational fixes neither managed to influence levels of transparency nor levels of 
participation. There were very small exceptions such as affiliation where it had some impact 
on the level of participation, whilst the size of an organisation in terms of its annual income 
had an impact on the level of transparency.  But overall, unlike the existing literature on 
accountability which remains mostly prescriptive, the findings of the thesis have empirically 
proven that size age and affiliation did not have a significant impact on the two dimensions of 
accountability: transparency and participation.  
 
Secondly, policymakers and leaders of voluntary organisations should be cautious of an over-
reliance on trading activities. Sources of income in general whether it is government contracts 
or private sector donations did not have significant impacts on levels of participation or 
transparency (although organisations with significant income from government had a more 




income generated from trading activities by a voluntary organisation the less commitment it 
showed towards both accountability dimensions of transparency and participation. One might 
suggest that because of public spending cuts, which have progressively hit frontline services 
and funding since the turn to austerity in 2010, voluntary organisations must be increasingly 
eager, and perhaps more than in the past, to increase their ability to generate income in order 
to survive and offset cuts to funding. In fact, there was a wide spread desire among 
organisations that board members should become more involved in fundraising activities. 
However, while a response to reduced funding, the findings of this study suggest that the turn 
to trading and commercialisation will have a negative impact on transparency.  
 
Thirdly, voluntary organisations and central government should reconsider the recourse to 
policies as a regulatory tool. The findings have shown that the existence of participation 
policy did not influence the level of participation but it did positively influence the level of 
transparency. On the other hand, the existence of transparency policy had a negative impact 
on the level of transparency but it did not influence the level of participation. Though it is 
beyond the confines of this study to fully explain the mechanisms behind these differential 
outcomes, such findings do provoke questions about the design of regulatory regimes and the 
motivation behind the adoption of policies on accountability practices by voluntary 
organisations. Declaring the existence of certain policies might be translated into a 
competitive advantage over other organisations into the world of competitive funding and so 
organisations might be culturally motivated to declare having an accountability policy. But, 
having such policies might not deliver the desired outcomes for regulators. 
 
Indeed, Understanding the influence of policies on transparency and participation practices in 




the complexities surrounding these issues. Voluntary organisations need to take a look at 
policies – make sure that they are workable and reflecting a full system of processes and then 
audit their own practices accordingly – indeed this could be complicated, however, the 
findings on the other hand have shown that both transparency and participation are 
interlinked and correlated with each other. That may explain the positive influence of the 
existence of participation policy on the level of transparency. However, inconsistent practices 
may suggest that there is an element of weak understanding by organisations of both 
transparency and participation and how they can be implemented.  
 
Finally, stakeholder participation in the decision-making process, as this study argues, is not 
just one element but three interconnecting elements. Organisation respondents tended to 
perform inconsistently across these elements, with negative impacts on participation and 
engagement. Voluntary organisations need to take a holistic evaluation to their participation 
policies. A new approach should evaluate how stages of engagement, levels of engagement 
and engagement mechanisms come together to provide a complete cycle of stakeholder 
participation in the decision-making process of voluntary organisations.  
What does this imply for future research? The findings of this thesis provide a systematic 
study to accountability practices in the voluntary sector. Further research should follow two 
paths. First, the interactive model of accountability should be tested in other contexts. Future 
research should explore a cross-sectoral survey that applies the accountability model beyond 
the voluntary sector. This would enable researchers to undertake a comparative analysis of 
voluntary sector practices in relation to the private and public sectors and critically assess the 
influences of accountability practices across different sectors. At the same time, further 




the interactions between transparency and stakeholder engagement, should submit the 
findings of this study to systematic testing and elaboration.  
 
Second, the data was collected just before the financial crash in 2008. This study is unique in 
terms of providing an overarching picture to the state of accountability across the voluntary 
sector in England and Wales just before the financial crises. It provides a pre-austerity 
baseline picture about accountability practices of across the voluntary sector. Future research 
should re-run the survey, with this baseline in place, to investigate how austerity has 
impacted upon the commitment of organisations to accountability, and whether those 
expectations that accountability has declined due to funding pressures and changes to funding 
regimes are supported in practice. Indeed, this offers in itself a number of significant avenues 
of exploration. The collapse of government funding to support frontline services as part of the 
regime of austerity might have pushed voluntary organisations to become more involved in 
trading activities, with negative impacts on accountability practices. In contrast, the 
contracting out of public services to voluntary organisations by governments might have 
raised expectations and put pressure on voluntary organisations to provide a high level of 
accountability practices (in terms of transparency and participation). With the baseline 
evidence provided by this study, there is the possibility to run a time-sensitive analysis, re-
running this survey to systematically test the impact of austerity over time on the daily reality 
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Dear Chief executive / Manager,  
 
Over the last decade, the issue of governance and accountability by nongovernmental organisations has 
become an increasingly important topic. It has also led to increased scrutiny by the Charity Commission 
as well as calls for greater regulation of the NGO sector as a whole. To help find out more about this 
important issue, your assistance in participating in a brief, confidential survey would be greatly 
appreciated. Please, follow the link to start the survey at http://survey.dmu.ac.uk/NGOs  
 
I am a PhD candidate at De Montfort University conducting research on NGO registered charities with 
the Charity Commission in England and Wales. Your organisation has been carefully chosen, along 
with others, as providing a representative sample and perspective of the NGO community at large.  
My research has two objectives: firstly to learn about the governance practices that NGOs are using; 
secondly to shed some light on the commitment of NGOs to the principles and values of accountability. 
 
The survey focuses specifically on five key areas of NGO operations: 
1. Adherence to codes and standards. 
2. Board roles and responsibilities. 
3. Transparency and openness.  
4. Stakeholder engagement in the decision making process. 
 
The research observes the university’s code of ethics on confidentiality. The completion of the online 
questionnaire would be greatly appreciated and will help to understand the issues involved. I would also 
be glad to share with you the outcome of this study upon its completion. You will also have the 
satisfaction of knowing that you have contributed your knowledge and opinions to a research project 
designed to help the Ngo community at large. 
  
 




Osama Al-Kayyali  
PhD Researcher 
Postgraduate Business School 2.4 
De Montfort University  





The summary will be sent to you via the internet.  














Your organisation's name (optional):  
 
 
1.  Please briefly indicate the primary nature or purpose of your organisation (i.e. culture and 




2.  What is the type of your charity organisation? 
 




3.  Approximately how many years has your organisation been in existence?  
 
 
4.  What is the organisation's total income for the last financial year? £  
 





Governmental sources %  
 
Donations from private sources e.g. individuals and businesses %  
 
Income from trading activities and fees %  
 
Other sources of income e.g. rent, investment and general %  
 
 
5.  How many staff and volunteers does your organisation currently have? 
 
Full-time staff  
 






















8.  What type of board standards (code of best practice, accreditation programmes) does your 
organisation adhere to? Please tick as appropriate. 
 
Sector wide standards 
Industry standards 
Government-associated standards 
Internally developed standards 
None 









9.  What are the reasons (motivations or pressures) for adhering to board standards (code of 
best practice) in your organisation? Please tick as appropriate. 
 
Desire to achieve excellence 





Reputation and public image 
Government funder demands 
Required to operate in field 
Other funder demands 
Beneficiary (Client) / customer demands 
Media attention 






10.  What are the (anticipating) consequences of adhering to board code of standards for your 
organisation? Please tick as appropriate. 
 
Improved staff knowledge 




Improved staff attention to mission 
Improved ability to meet goals 
Improved reputation 
Improved staff morale 
Improved staff / board ethics 
Improved fundraising 
Improved board recruitment 









11.  How do you rate the current level of board involvement in the following functions? 
 
1 = Not involved, 5 = Highly involved 
1. Setting organisational missions / goals   1  2  3  4  5 
  
2. Setting executive's compensation   1  2  3  4  5 
  
3. Establishing / reviewing budgets and financial 
objectives   
1  2  3  4  5 
  
4. Setting organisational objectives   1  2  3  4  5 
  
5. Reviewing auditing and accounting policies and 
practices   
1  2  3  4  5 
  
6. Approving significant financial transactions   1  2  3  4  5 
  
7. Fundraising efforts   1  2  3  4  5 
  
8. Advocacy activities   1  2  3  4  5 
  
9. Setting programme objectives   1  2  3  4  5 
  
10. Setting basic management policies   1  2  3  4  5 
  
11. Setting programme performance measures   1  2  3  4  5 
  





12.  Do you consider the current level of board involvement is satisfactory? And do you think 
more board involvement is needed? 
 
Satisfaction level: 1 = Low, 5 = High 
 Satisfaction level   
More board 
effort is needed 
1. Setting organisational missions 
/ goals   
1  2  3  4  5 
  
 Yes  No 
      
2. Setting executive's 
compensation   
1  2  3  4  5 
  
 Yes  No 
      
3. Establishing / reviewing 
budgets and financial objectives   
1  2  3  4  5 
  
 Yes  No 
      
4. Setting organisational 
objectives   
1  2  3  4  5 
  
 Yes  No 
      
5. Reviewing auditing and 
accounting policies and practices   
1  2  3  4  5 
  
 Yes  No 
      
6. Approving significant financial 
transactions   
1  2  3  4  5 
  
 Yes  No 
      
7. Fundraising efforts   1  2  3  4  5 
  
 Yes  No 
      
8. Advocacy activities   1  2  3  4  5 
  
 Yes  No 




9. Setting programme objectives   1  2  3  4  5 
  
 Yes  No 
      
10. Setting basic management 
policies   
1  2  3  4  5 
  
 Yes  No 
      
11. Setting programme 
performance measures   
1  2  3  4  5 
  
 Yes  No 
      
12. Setting staff compensation   1  2  3  4  5 
  
 Yes  No 



















14.  Would you please rate the following stakeholders in terms of their level of importance to 
the organisation? 
 
1 = Not important, 5 = Extremely important 
1. A professional, trade, or similar body of which 
organisation is a member   
1  2  3  4  5 
  
2. Bankers or other lenders   1  2  3  4  5 
  
3. Beneficiaries (Clients)   1  2  3  4  5 
  
4. Customers   1  2  3  4  5 
  
5. Donors   1  2  3  4  5 
  
6. Government   1  2  3  4  5 
  
7. Local businesses   1  2  3  4  5 
  





9. Staff   1  2  3  4  5 
  
10. The Charity Commission   1  2  3  4  5 
  
11. The general public   1  2  3  4  5 
  
12. The Inland Revenue   1  2  3  4  5 
  





15.  Does the organisation have developed guidelines / policies which highlight the following 
areas? 
 Yes No 
1. Organisation's openness about 
activities, providing information on what 
it is doing, where and how this takes 













2. The role of stakeholder engagement 

















16.  If any answer in question 15 is No, please explain the absence of such mechanism(s)? 
Please tick as appropriate. 
 
We do not perceive one or both of the activities mentioned above as important to our 
organisation. 
We do not have enough resources (time, money and personnel) for implementing such 
activities. 
Our stakeholders have not demanded these activities from our organisation. 
We do not receive enough support (information, training) on these areas from charity 
commission. 
 




17.  Does the organisation's policy on transparency highlight the following areas? 























6. What information it regards as confidential, and why (this 
might be related to third party confidentiality, commercial 
confidentiality, staff confidentiality)  









18.  Does the organisation make the following information available to its stakeholders 
through a relevant medium e.g. (website, annual report, bulletins, annual review, etc)? 
 
1 = Never, 5 = Frequently if not always 
1. Details and descriptions about each activity and 
programme   
1  2  3  4  5 
  
2. A list of key staff, specifying their contact details and 
the scope of their responsibilities   
1  2  3  4  5 
  
3. Details about the organisations impact on society   1  2  3  4  5 
  
4. Any codes, partnerships or coalitions to which the 
organisation is a signatory   
1  2  3  4  5 
  
5. Information on the governing board members and the 
executive   
1  2  3  4  5 
  
6. Openness on how stakeholders can input into the 
different levels of decision-making   





19.  At which stage in the decision-making cycle is engagement sought with stakeholder 
groups? Please tick as appropriate. 
 
1. Agenda setting 
 
No engagement  Beneficiaries (Clients)  Donors  Government  Staff  





2. Project and / or policy design 
 
No engagement  Beneficiaries (Clients)  Donors  Government  Staff  




No engagement  Beneficiaries (Clients)  Donors  Government  Staff  




No engagement  Beneficiaries (Clients)  Donors  Government  Staff  




No engagement  Beneficiaries (Clients)  Donors  Government  Staff  
Other groups   
 
 
20.  What level of influence does your stakeholder engagement process have? Please tick as 
appropriate. 
 
1. Information sharing 
 
No engagement  Beneficiaries (Clients)  Donors  Government  Staff  




No engagement  Beneficiaries (Clients)  Donors  Government  Staff  
Other groups   
 
3. Participation in design of project or policy 
 
No engagement  Beneficiaries (Clients)  Donors  Government  Staff  
Other groups   
 
4. Joint decision-making 
 
No engagement  Beneficiaries (Clients)  Donors  Government  Staff  







No engagement  Beneficiaries (Clients)  Donors  Government  Staff  
Other groups   
 
 
21.  What mechanisms of engagement are used? Please tick as appropriate. 
 
1. Public hearings 
 
No engagement  Beneficiaries (Clients)  Donors  Government  Staff  
Other groups   
 
2. Advisory groups 
 
No engagement  Beneficiaries (Clients)  Donors  Government  Staff  




No engagement  Beneficiaries (Clients)  Donors  Government  Staff  




No engagement  Beneficiaries (Clients)  Donors  Government  Staff  
Other groups   
 
5. Joint committees 
 
No engagement  Beneficiaries (Clients)  Donors  Government  Staff  
Other groups   
 
 
22.  Please provide your response to the following statements. 
 
1 = Never, 5 = Frequently if not always 
1. Information regarding the engagement processes are 
circulated to key stakeholders in appropriate forms and 
through appropriate media.  
 1  2  3  4  5 
  
2. Information regarding engagement processes are made 
available to all stakeholders in appropriate forms and 
through appropriate media.  
 1  2  3  4  5 
  
3. Contact details for a relevant person in the organisation 
are provided.   





4. Key stakeholders are not prevented from participation 
processes due to lack of physical access, communication 
barriers (language or expert terms) or financial 
constraints.  
 1  2  3  4  5 
  
5. The confidentiality of stakeholders during an 
engagement process is guaranteed by the organisation 
where appropriate.  
 1  2  3  4  5 
  
6. Disadvantaged groups are given special support and 
encouragement when their engagement is appropriate.   













Factor analysis and reliability test  
1. The accountability framework of stakeholder engagement in the decision making process and 
transparency (dependent variables). 
 
 
i) Stakeholder engagement SE: 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .689 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 






 Initial Extraction 
Q19 Stage of Engagement 1.000 .628 
Q20 Level of Influence on decisions 1.000 .701 
Q21 Engagement Mechanism 1.000 .698 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 2.026 67.547 67.547 2.026 67.547 67.547 
2 .539 17.968 85.515    
3 .435 14.485 100.000    










Q20 Level of Influence on 
decisions 
.837 
Q21 Engagement Mechanism .835 
Q19 Stage of Engagement .792 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 1 components extracted. 
 
 
Table: ... Comparison of the Actual Eigenvalues with the Parallel analysis for stakeholder engagement (SE) 
Component 
Number 
Actual Eigenvalues from 
PCA 
Criterion Value from 
Parallel analysis 
Decision 
1 2.026 1.1042 Accept 
2 .539 1.0006 Reject 






Stakeholder Engagement in the decision-making process (SE) scale 
Dimension Scale items Reliability 
Stakeholder 
Engagement (SE) 
1. Stage of engagement  
.750 2. Level of influence on decisions 




ii) Transparency (TR): 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy. 
.841 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 







 Initial Extraction 
info made avlble to stkh (details about activities 
&prgr) 
1.000 .420 
info made avlble to stkh (staff contact details& 
respons 
1.000 .454 
info made avlble to stkh (NGO impact on society) 1.000 .529 
info made avlble to stkh (any code partnership ect) 1.000 .517 
info made avlble to stkh (board members& 
executive) 
1.000 .514 
info made avlble to stkh (Openness& stkh input) 1.000 .562 







Total Variance Explained  
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 2.996 49.942 49.942 2.996 49.942 49.942 
2 .782 13.035 62.977    
3 .660 10.999 73.976    
4 .605 10.082 84.058    
5 .484 8.070 92.128    
6 .472 7.872 100.000    










info made avlble to stkh (Openness& stkh input) .750 
info made avlble to stkh (NGO impact on society) .727 
info made avlble to stkh (any code partnership ect) .719 
info made avlble to stkh (board members& 
executive) 
.717 
info made avlble to stkh (staff contact details& 
respons 
.674 
info made avlble to stkh (details about activities 
&prgr) 
.648 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 




Table: ... Comparison of the Actual Eigenvalues with the Parallel Analysis for Transparency 
(TR) 
Component Actual Eigenvalues from 
PCA 
Criterion Value from 
Parallel Analysis 
Decision 
1 2.996 1.2034 Accept 
2 .782 1.1082 Reject 
3 .660 1.0306 Reject 
4 .605 0.9635 Reject 
5 .484 0.8906 Reject 
6 .472 0.8037 Reject 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Transparency (TR) scale  
Dimensio
n 




1. Details and descriptions about each activity and programme  
.794 
2. A list of key staff, specifying their contact details and the 
scope of their responsibilities  
3. Details about the organisations impact on society   
4. Any codes, partnerships or coalitions to which the 
organisation is a signatory  
5. Information on the governing board members and the 
executive   
6. Openness on how stakeholders can input into the different 




2. Formality  
 i) Stakeholder holder engagement guidelines (PPG) 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy. 
.850 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 





 Initial Extraction 
info reg engagement processes circulated to stkhs 1.000 .696 
info reg engagement process made avlble to all stkhs 1.000 .672 
Contact details for a relevant person are provided 1.000 .738 
Accessibility to participation processes 1.000 .684 
Stkhrs confidentiality during participation is guarded 1.000 .744 
Disadvantaged groups Accessibility to participation 1.000 .706 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 4.241 70.675 70.675 4.241 70.675 70.675 
2 .642 10.702 81.377    
3 .418 6.972 88.349    
4 .305 5.087 93.437    
5 .233 3.879 97.316    
6 .161 2.684 100.000    
















Stkhrs confidentiality during participation is 
guarded 
.862 
Contact details for a relevant person are provided .859 
Disadvantaged groups Accessibility to 
participation 
.840 
info reg engagement processes circulated to stkhs .834 
Accessibility to participation processes .827 
info reg engagement process made avlble to all 
stkhs 
.820 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 








Table: ... Comparison of the Actual Eigenvalues with the Parallel Analysis for Stakeholder engagement 
guidelines (SEG) 
Component Actual Eigenvalues from 
PCA 
Criterion Value from 
Parallel Analysis 
Decision 
1 4.241 1.2074 Accept 
2 .642 1.1144 Reject 
3 .418 1.0323 Reject 
4 .305 0.9669 Reject 
5 .233 0.8851 Reject 
6 .161 0.7940 Reject 






Stakeholder Engagement Guidelines (SEG) 
Dimension Scale items  Reliability 
Stakeholder 
Engagemen
t Guidelines  
1. Information regarding engagement processes are circulated to 
key stakeholders in appropriate forms and through appropriate 
media  
.917 
2. Information regarding engagement processes are made available 
to all stakeholders in appropriate forms and through appropriate 
media  
3. Contact details for a relevant person in the organisation are 
provided    
4. Key stakeholders are not prevented from participation processes 
due to lack of physical access, communication barriers (language 
or expert terms) or financial constraints   
5. The confidentiality of stakeholders during an engagement 
process is guaranteed by the organisation where appropriate    
6. Disadvantaged groups are given special support and 




3. Board Functions (BF): 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .806 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 






 Initial Extraction 
Board involvement rate in Setting organisational 
M&Gs 
1.000 .577 
Board involvement rate in Setting executive's compen 1.000 .780 
Board involvement rate in E&R budgets& FinObj 1.000 .692 
Board involvement rate in Setting organisational 
object 
1.000 .695 
Board involvement rate in Rev Aud&Acc policies 1.000 .596 
Board involvement rate in Approving financial 
transac 
1.000 .371 
Board involvement rate in Fundraising efforts 1.000 .705 
Board involvement rate in Advocacy activities 1.000 .807 
Board involvement rate in Setting program objectives 1.000 .649 
Board involvement rate in Setting basic Mang 
policies 
1.000 .747 
Board involvement rate in Setting Prog Per Measures 1.000 .773 
Board involvement rate in Setting staff compensation 1.000 .767 




Total Variance Explained 
Compo
nent 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of 
Squared Loadingsa 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total 
1 4.512 37.603 37.603 4.512 37.603 37.603 3.657 
2 1.543 12.862 50.465 1.543 12.862 50.465 3.054 
3 1.080 9.001 59.466 1.080 9.001 59.466 1.919 
4 1.023 8.524 67.990 1.023 8.524 67.990 2.174 
5 .922 7.685 75.675     
6 .711 5.925 81.600     
7 .494 4.115 85.716     
8 .438 3.647 89.362     
9 .407 3.390 92.753     
10 .346 2.882 95.635     
11 .295 2.461 98.096     
12 .228 1.904 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 









1 2 3 4 
Board involvement rate in Setting organisational 
object 
.791    
Board involvement rate in E&R budgets& FinObj .717    
Board involvement rate in Setting organisational 
M&Gs 
.702    
Board involvement rate in Setting Prog Per 
Measures 
.694 -.380  -.303 
Board involvement rate in Setting basic Mang 
policies 
.656 -.390 .337  
Board involvement rate in Setting program 
objectives 
.649 -.396   
Board involvement rate in Rev Aud&Acc policies .629  -.365  
Board involvement rate in Fundraising efforts .539 -.365  .463 
Board involvement rate in Approving financial 
transac 
.512    
Board involvement rate in Setting executive's 
compen 
.375 .655 .345 .301 
Board involvement rate in Setting staff 
compensation 
.463 .400 .587  
Board involvement rate in Advocacy activities .491 -.344  .663 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 








1 2 3 4 
Board involvement rate in E&R budgets& FinObj .816    
Board involvement rate in Rev Aud&Acc policies .779    
Board involvement rate in Setting organisational 
object 
.694    
Board involvement rate in Setting organisational 
M&Gs 
.691    
Board involvement rate in Approving financial 
transac 
.605    
Board involvement rate in Setting basic Mang 
policies 
 -.852   
Board involvement rate in Setting Prog Per 
Measures 
 -.835   
Board involvement rate in Setting program 
objectives 
 -.720   
Board involvement rate in Setting staff 
compensation 
  .847  
Board involvement rate in Setting executive's 
compen 
  .837  
Board involvement rate in Advocacy activities    .899 
Board involvement rate in Fundraising efforts    .773 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 








1 2 3 4 
Board involvement rate in E&R budgets& FinObj .830 -.308 .310  
Board involvement rate in Setting organisational 
object 
.804 -.506 .331  
Board involvement rate in Rev Aud&Acc policies .758   .306 
Board involvement rate in Setting organisational 
M&Gs 
.747 -.409   
Board involvement rate in Approving financial 
transac 
.602    
Board involvement rate in Setting Prog Per 
Measures 
.440 -.870   
Board involvement rate in Setting basic Mang 
policies 
.354 -.863   
Board involvement rate in Setting program 
objectives 
.347 -.786  .422 
Board involvement rate in Setting executive's 
compen 
.357  .860  
Board involvement rate in Setting staff 
compensation 
 -.304 .856  
Board involvement rate in Advocacy activities  -.308  .892 
Board involvement rate in Fundraising efforts .361 -.348  .824 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
 
Component Correlation Matrix 
Component 1 2 3 4 
1 1.000 -.390 .316 .300 
2 -.390 1.000 -.153 -.332 
3 .316 -.153 1.000 .088 
4 .300 -.332 .088 1.000 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.   






Table: ... Comparison of the Actual Eigenvalues with the Parallel Analysis for board 
functions (BF) 
Component 
Actual Eigenvalues from 
PCA 
Criterion Value from 
Parallel Analysis 
Decision 
1 4.512 1.3722 Accept 
2 1.543 1.2746 Accept 
3 1.080 1.1984 Reject 
4 1.023 1.1322 Reject 
5 .922 1.0693 Reject 
6 .711 1.0149 Reject 
7 .494 0.9617 Reject 
8 .438 0.9120 Reject 
9 .407 0.8552 Reject 
10 .346 0.7969 Reject 
11 .295 0.7362 Reject 
12 .228 0.6764 Reject 




Total Variance Explained 
Compo
nent 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of 
Squared Loadingsa 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total 
1 4.512 37.603 37.603 4.512 37.603 37.603 3.598 
2 1.543 12.862 50.465 1.543 12.862 50.465 3.516 
3 1.080 9.001 59.466     
4 1.023 8.524 67.990     
5 .922 7.685 75.675     
6 .711 5.925 81.600     
7 .494 4.115 85.716     
8 .438 3.647 89.362     
9 .407 3.390 92.753     
10 .346 2.882 95.635     
11 .295 2.461 98.096     
12 .228 1.904 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 







Board involvement rate in Setting organisational object .791  
Board involvement rate in E&R budgets& FinObj .717  
Board involvement rate in Setting organisational M&Gs .702  
Board involvement rate in Setting Prog Per Measures .694 -.380 
Board involvement rate in Setting basic Mang policies .656 -.390 
Board involvement rate in Setting program objectives .649 -.396 
Board involvement rate in Rev Aud&Acc policies .629  
Board involvement rate in Fundraising efforts .539 -.365 
Board involvement rate in Approving financial transac .512  
Board involvement rate in Advocacy activities .491 -.344 
Board involvement rate in Setting staff compensation .463 .400 
Board involvement rate in Setting executive's compen .375 .655 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 






Board involvement rate in Setting Prog Per Measures .762  
Board involvement rate in Setting program objectives .748  
Board involvement rate in Setting basic Mang policies .747  
Board involvement rate in Fundraising efforts .652  
Board involvement rate in Advocacy activities .604  
Board involvement rate in Setting executive's compen -.339 .806 
Board involvement rate in E&R budgets& FinObj  .692 
Board involvement rate in Setting staff compensation  .632 
Board involvement rate in Setting organisational object .346 .617 
Board involvement rate in Rev Aud&Acc policies  .603 
Board involvement rate in Setting organisational M&Gs .326 .529 
Board involvement rate in Approving financial transac  .504 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 








Board involvement rate in Setting Prog Per Measures .788 .345 
Board involvement rate in Setting basic Mang policies .762 .309 
Board involvement rate in Setting program objectives .759  
Board involvement rate in Fundraising efforts .651  
Board involvement rate in Advocacy activities .599  
Board involvement rate in E&R budgets& FinObj .431 .758 
Board involvement rate in Setting organisational object .566 .741 
Board involvement rate in Setting executive's compen  .685 
Board involvement rate in Rev Aud&Acc policies .381 .662 
Board involvement rate in Setting organisational M&Gs .515 .645 
Board involvement rate in Setting staff compensation  .609 
Board involvement rate in Approving financial transac .301 .548 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  






Component Correlation Matrix 
Component 1 2 
1 1.000 .356 
2 .356 1.000 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.   






Reliability analysis for board Functions scale  
Board Functions 1  
Dimension Scale items  Reliability 
Strategic 
model 
1. Setting organisational missions and goals 
.783 
2. Setting executive’s compensation 
3. Setting staff compensation  
4. Establishing / reviewing budgets and financial 
objectives 
5. Setting organisational objectives  
6. Reviewing auditing and accounting policies and 
practices 
7. Approving significant financial transactions 
Board Functions 2 
Dimension Scale items Reliability 
Managerial 
model 
1. Fundraising efforts 
.774 
2. Advocacy activities  
3. Setting programme objectives  
4. Setting basic management policies  




Correlation and Regression analysis 
 
Table.... presents the independent and dependent variables involved in the regression analysis  
Variables Type  Question 
number in 
the survey  




The independent variables of formality 
The existence of code of board 
standards 
y/n Q8 250 (100%) 0 (0%) 
The existence of policy on 
transparency 
y/n Q15a 247 (98.8%) 3 (1.2%) 
The existence of policy on 
stakeholder engagement. 
y/n Q15b 245 (98%) 5 (2%) 
Transparency Guidelines (TRG) cont Q17 246 (98.4%) 4 (1.6%) 
Stakeholder Engagement 
Guidelines (SEG) adapted from 
Blagescu et.al., 2005 
scale  Q22 244 (97.6%) 6 (2.4%) 
Other independent variables 
NGO age cont Q3 249 (99.6%) 1 (0.4%) 
NGO size of annual budget  cont Q4 239 (95.6%) 11 (4.4%) 
Affiliation with a wider network   y/n Q7 250 (100%) 0 (0%) 
Board size (number of 
members) 
cont Q6 249 (99.6%) 1 (0.4%) 
Number of committees  cont Q13 249 (99.6%) 1 (0.4%) 
Board functions (BF) adapted 
from Salamon and Geller, 2005 
scale  Q11 241 (96.4%) 9 (3.6%) 
Dependent variables  
Transparency scale (TR) 
adapted from Neligan, 2003 
scale Q18 245(98%) 5 (2%) 
Stakeholder Engagement (SE) 
adapted from Blagescu et.al. 
2005 
scale Qs 19,20, 
and 21 




Examining the contribution of the independent variable of formality to the two models of 
accountability namely stakeholder engagement (SE) and transparency (TR). 
 
Correlation Analysis  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Level of stakeholder engagement scale (LSE) 1.000       
Level of transparency scale (LETR) .368** 1.000      
Participation process guideline  scale (PPG) .607** .543** 1.000     
the existence of engagement policy .260** .373** .337** 1.000    
the existence of transparency policy .127* .184** .253** .545** 1.000   
Transparency process guideline (TPG) .302** .382** .392** .352** .369** 1.000  
Board adheres to a code of standards .164* .126* .184** .163* .230** .093 1.000 













Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .620a .385 .371 3.07261 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Board adheres to a code of standards, TPG, the existence of engagement policy, PPG, the existence of 
transparency policy. 





Variable Beta T value Sig. Of T 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
(Constant)  3.831 .000   
Participation process guideline (PPG) .559 9.660 .000 .787 1.271 
the existence of transparency policy -.110 -1.732 .085 .648 1.542 
the existence of engagement policy .091 1.428 .155 .650 1.537 
Transparency process guideline  (TPG) .085 1.447 .149 .756 1.323 
Board adheres to a code of standards .064 1.209 .228 .928 1.077 







Case Number Std. Residual LSE Predicted Value Residual 
60 -3.344 .00 10.2738 -10.27376 
83 -3.029 5.00 14.3068 -9.30677 
126 -3.416 .00 10.4953 -10.49533 







 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 4.8974 14.7414 11.4994 2.36329 240 
Std. Predicted Value -2.730 1.366 .017 .983 240 
Standard Error of Predicted Value .232 1.055 .440 .187 240 
Adjusted Predicted Value 5.2967 14.7999 11.5307 2.33935 238 
Residual -10.49533 6.75925 .02039 3.00971 238 
Std. Residual -3.416 2.200 .007 .980 238 
Stud. Residual -3.486 2.243 .006 .994 238 
Deleted Residual -10.93021 7.02882 .01547 3.09838 238 
Stud. Deleted Residual -3.572 2.263 .004 1.001 238 
Mahal. Distance .370 27.155 4.772 5.217 240 
Cook's Distance .000 .084 .005 .011 238 
Centered Leverage Value .002 .114 .020 .022 240 










Model 2: Level of transparency LETR 
 
Model 
Beta T value Sig. Of T. 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant)  10.342 .000   
Total level of engagementQ22 .422 7.194 .000 .787 1.271 
the existence of transparency policy -.119 -1.843 .067 .648 1.542 
the existence of engagement policy .230 3.563 .000 .650 1.537 
total number of areas highlighted by 
transparency policy Q17 
.178 2.975 .003 .756 1.323 
Board adheres to a code of standards .022 .404 .686 .928 1.077 








Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .603a .364 .350 4.18740 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Board adheres to a code of standards, TPG, the existence of engagement policy, PPG, the existence of 
transparency policy 





Board Roles and Responsibilities 
 
This section is to answer the following research question: 
What is the relationship between board roles and responsibilities and NGO’s accountability? 






 1 2 3 4 
Level of stakeholder engagement (LSE) 1.000 .368** .028 .017 
Level of Transparency (LETR) .368** 1.000 .163* .174** 
Board roles 1 (managerial model) 5items .028 .163* 1.000 .480** 
Board roles 2 (strategic model)  7items  .017 .174** .480** 1.000 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 




Regression analysis  
Dependent variable Level of stakeholder participation in decision-making process (LSE) 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .028a .001 -.008 3.89107 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Board roles1 (managerial model), Board roles2 (strategic model). 
b. Dependent Variable: LSE 
 
   
 
Model 
Beta T value Sig. Of T 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
(Constant)  7.763 .000   
Board roles1 (managerial model) .025 .334 .738 .769 1.300 
Board roles2 (strategic model) .005 .067 .946 .769 1.300 















Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .196a .038 .030 5.11664 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Board roles1 (managerial model), Board roles2 (strategic model). b. Dependent 








Beta T. value Sig. Of T 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
(Constant)  9.581 .000   
Board roles1 (managerial model) .104 1.412 .159 .769 1.300 
Board roles2 (strategic model) .124 1.683 .094 .769 1.300 




Board structure  
 
This section is to answer the following research question: 
What is the relationship between board structure and NGO’s accountability? And how well is 






 1 2 3 4 
Level of stakeholder engagement (LSE) 1.000    
Level of transparency (LETR) .368** 1.000   
Number of committees  .149* .248** 1.000  
Board size  .048 .084 .356** 1.000 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 






Dependent variable: LSE 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .149a .022 .014 3.84848 






Beta T. value Sig. of T 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
(Constant)  15.878 .000   
Number of committees  .151 2.204 .028 .873 1.145 
Board size -.006 -.092 .927 .873 1.145 










Dependent variable: LETR 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .248a .062 .054 5.05360 
 a. Predictors: (Constant), Board size, Number of committees  






Beta T. value Sig. of T 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
(Constant)  24.193 .000   
Number of committees  .250 3.745 .000 .873 1.145 
Board size -.005 -.074 .941 .873 1.145 




Organisational characteristics of an NGO 
 
This section is to answer the following research question: 
What is the relationship between organisational characteristics and NGO’s accountability? And 





 1 2 3 4 5 
LSE 1.000     
LETR .368** 1.000    
NGO Age -.057 .000 1.000   
Annual income -.060 -.030 .222** 1.000  
NGO affiliated within an umbrella group .092 .080 .038 -.154* 1.000 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 













Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .115a .013 .000 3.87552 
a. Predictors: (Constant), NGO affiliated within an umbrella group, NGO Age, Annual income 




Beta T. value Sig. of T. 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
(Constant)  21.066 .000   
The NGO Age -.052 -.771 .441 .945 1.058 
Total Income £000' -.035 -.507 .613 .924 1.082 
NGO affiliated within an umbrella group .088 1.319 .188 .971 1.030 















Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .082a .007 -.006 5.21175 
a. Predictors: (Constant), NGO affiliated within an umbrella group, NGO Age, Annual income  







Beta T. value Sig. of T 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
(Constant)  30.910 .000   
The NGO Age .000 .007 .994 .945 1.058 
Total Income £000' -.018 -.270 .788 .924 1.082 
NGO affiliated within an umbrella 
group 
.077 1.155 .249 .971 1.030 





Regression analysis part two 











Combinedmodel 34.5372 7.50772 242 
the existence of transparency policy .8785 .32732 247 
the existence of engagement policy .7755 .41810 245 
total number transparency guidelines Q17 3.0528 2.27884 246 
Stakeholder engagement guidelines Q22 22.2305 7.22058 243 






Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .721a .520 .510 5.25746 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Board adheres to a code of standards, total number 
transparency guidelines Q17, the existence of engagement policy, Stakeholder 
engagement guidelines Q22, the existence of transparency policy 




Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 7003.458 5 1400.692 50.675 .000a 
Residual 6467.976 234 27.641   
Total 13471.434 239    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Board adheres to a code of standards, total number transparency guidelines Q17, 
the existence of engagement policy, Stakeholder engagement guidelines Q22, the existence of transparency 
policy 








the existence of 
transparency 
policy 















Combinedmodel 1.000 .178 .383 .412 .682 .148 
the existence of transparency policy .178 1.000 .545 .369 .253 .230 
the existence of engagement policy .383 .545 1.000 .352 .337 .163 
total number transparency guidelines Q17 .412 .369 .352 1.000 .392 .093 
Stakeholder engagement guidelines Q22 .682 .253 .337 .392 1.000 .184 
Board adheres to a code of standards .148 .230 .163 .093 .184 1.000 
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
Combinedmodel . .003 .000 .000 .000 .011 
the existence of transparency policy .003 . .000 .000 .000 .000 
the existence of engagement policy .000 .000 . .000 .000 .005 
total number transparency guidelines Q17 .000 .000 .000 . .000 .072 
stakeholder engagement guidelines Q22 .000 .000 .000 .000 . .002 
Board adheres to a code of standards .011 .000 .005 .072 .002 . 
N Combinedmodel 242 242 240 241 241 242 
the existence of transparency policy 242 247 245 246 243 247 
the existence of engagement policy 240 245 245 244 241 245 
total number transparency guidelines Q17 241 246 244 246 242 246 
Stakeholder engagement guidelines Q22 241 243 241 242 243 243 















Interval for B Correlations 
Collinearity 
Statistics 






order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 18.769 1.708  10.991 .000 15.405 22.133      
the existence of transparency policy -3.401 1.290 -.148 -2.636 .009 -5.943 -.859 .178 -.170 -.119 .648 1.542 
the existence of engagement policy 3.702 1.009 .206 3.671 .000 1.715 5.689 .383 .233 .166 .650 1.537 
T  number of  transparency guidelines  .542 .172 .165 3.160 .002 .204 .881 .412 .202 .143 .756 1.323 
Stakeholder engagement guidelines  .603 .053 .580 11.360 .000 .499 .708 .682 .596 .515 .787 1.271 
Board adheres to a code of standards .868 1.532 .027 .567 .572 -2.150 3.886 .148 .037 .026 .928 1.077 




Model Dimension Eigenvalue Condition Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) 
the existence of 
transparency 
policy 









Board adheres to a 
code of standards 
1 1 5.428 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 
2 .265 4.523 .01 .00 .00 .80 .00 .02 
3 .154 5.930 .02 .02 .66 .08 .03 .03 
4 .074 8.563 .00 .51 .15 .01 .42 .01 
5 .052 10.221 .02 .44 .18 .09 .44 .29 
6 .026 14.361 .94 .02 .01 .01 .11 .64 







Case Number Std. Residual Combinedmodel Predicted Value Residual 
28 3.082 40.00 23.7987 16.20134 
60 -3.504 14.00 32.4234 -18.42344 
138 -3.485 10.00 28.3226 -18.32263 
159 -3.946 20.00 40.7466 -20.74661 




 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 19.8556 41.8315 34.6128 5.32590 240 
Std. Predicted Value -2.712 1.347 .014 .984 240 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.397 1.804 .752 .319 240 
Adjusted Predicted Value 19.4029 41.8643 34.6806 5.30270 238 
Residual -20.74661 16.20134 -.06054 5.19376 238 
Std. Residual -3.946 3.082 -.012 .988 238 
Stud. Residual -3.966 3.166 -.012 1.002 238 
Deleted Residual -20.95601 17.10361 -.06717 5.34569 238 
Stud. Deleted Residual -4.098 3.229 -.014 1.011 238 
Mahal. Distance .370 27.155 4.772 5.217 240 
Cook's Distance .000 .099 .005 .012 238 
Centered Leverage Value .002 .114 .020 .022 240 


















 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Combinedmodel 34.5372 7.50772 242 
Board involvement in 
managerial activities scale 
13.7004 4.33342 237 
strategic modle7items 
without advocacy and fund 
raising 




Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .168a .028 .020 7.43333 
a. Predictors: (Constant), strategic modle7items without advocacy and 
fund raising, Board involvement in managerial activities scale 




Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 367.236 2 183.618 3.323 .038a 
Residual 12653.271 229 55.254   
Total 13020.507 231    
a. Predictors: (Constant), strategic modle7items without advocacy and fund raising, Board 
involvement in managerial activities scale 









model 5 items 
strategic model 




Combinedmodel 1.000 .140 .148 
Board involvement in managerial 
activities scale 
.140 1.000 .480 
strategic modle7items without advocacy 
and fund raising 
.148 .480 1.000 
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
Combinedmodel . .016 .011 
Board involvement in managerial 
activities scale 
.016 . .000 
strategic modle7items without advocacy 
and fund raising 
.011 .000 . 
N Combinedmodel 242 232 236 
Board involvement in managerial 
activities scale 
232 237 235 
strategic modle7items without advocacy 
and fund raising 













95% Confidence Interval for B Correlations 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 28.116 2.718  10.346 .000 22.761 33.471      
Managerial model 5 items .155 .129 .090 1.207 .229 -.098 .409 .140 .080 .079 .769 1.300 
Strategic model 7 items  .155 .109 .105 1.418 .158 -.060 .370 .148 .093 .092 .769 1.300 











1 1 2.934 1.000 .00 .01 .00 
2 .050 7.629 .18 .90 .04 
3 .015 13.808 .82 .09 .96 







Case Number Std. Residual 
Combinedmode
l Predicted Value Residual 
138 -3.460 10.00 35.7183 -25.71828 
192 -3.117 11.00 34.1664 -23.16644 
203 -3.325 11.00 35.7176 -24.71759 




 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 29.9777 37.4251 34.5360 1.26292 235 
Residual -25.71828 11.85147 .30389 7.10957 230 
Std. Predicted Value -3.616 2.290 -.001 1.002 235 
Std. Residual -3.460 1.594 .041 .956 230 

















 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Combinedmodel 34.5372 7.50772 242 
Number of Board Members 9.43 3.937 249 
Total number of 
committees boards have 
Q13 




Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .237a .056 .048 7.32349 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total number of committees boards have 
Q13, Number of Board Members 







Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 763.034 2 381.517 7.113 .001a 
Residual 12764.766 238 53.633   
Total 13527.799 240    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total number of committees boards have Q13, Number of Board 
Members 














Pearson Correlation Combinedmodel 1.000 .075 .237 
Number of Board Members .075 1.000 .356 
Total number of committees 
boards have Q13 
.237 .356 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Combinedmodel . .123 .000 
Number of Board Members .123 . .000 
Total number of committees 
boards have Q13 
.000 .000 . 
N Combinedmodel 242 241 242 
Number of Board Members 241 249 248 
Total number of committees 
boards have Q13 














95% Confidence Interval for B Correlations 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 31.974 1.273  25.112 .000 29.466 34.482      
Number of Board Members -.021 .129 -.011 -.163 .870 -.274 .232 .075 -.011 -.010 .873 1.145 
Total number of committees 
boards have Q13 
1.348 .377 .241 3.579 .000 .606 2.090 .237 .226 .225 .873 1.145 
a. Dependent Variable: Combinedmodel            
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Condition Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) 
Number of Board 
Members 
Total number of committees 
boards have Q13 
1 1 2.739 1.000 .02 .02 .03 
2 .185 3.851 .14 .09 .96 
3 .076 5.984 .84 .89 .01 
a. Dependent Variable: Combinedmodel    
 
Casewise Diagnosticsa 
Case Number Std. Residual Combinedmodel Predicted Value Residual 
203 -3.037 11.00 33.2381 -22.23814 
247 -3.346 10.00 34.5023 -24.50232 
a. Dependent Variable: Combinedmodel   
 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 31.6800 39.8950 34.5322 1.78485 248 
Residual -24.50233 12.15203 -.05756 7.30333 241 
Std. Predicted Value -1.602 3.005 -.003 1.001 248 
Std. Residual -3.346 1.659 -.008 .997 241 



















 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Combinedmodel 34.5372 7.50772 242 
The NGO Age 26.50 15.531 249 
Total Income £000' 1777666.63 2581176.569 239 
NGO affiliated within an 
umbrella group 




Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .106a .011 -.002 7.51457 
a. Predictors: (Constant), NGO affiliated within an umbrella group, The NGO Age, Total Income £000' 




Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 145.724 3 48.575 .860 .462a 
Residual 12818.417 227 56.469   
Total 12964.141 230    
a. Predictors: (Constant), NGO affiliated within an umbrella group, The NGO Age, Total Income £000' 












Pearson Correlation Combinedmodel 1.000 -.033 -.057 .093 
The NGO Age -.033 1.000 .222 .038 
Total Income £000' -.057 .222 1.000 -.154 
NGO affiliated within an 
umbrella group 
.093 .038 -.154 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Combinedmodel . .303 .196 .075 
The NGO Age .303 . .000 .276 
Total Income £000' .196 .000 . .009 
NGO affiliated within an 
umbrella group 
.075 .276 .009 . 
N Combinedmodel 242 241 231 242 
The NGO Age 241 249 238 249 
Total Income £000' 231 238 239 239 
NGO affiliated within an 
umbrella group 












95% Confidence Interval for B Correlations 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 34.556 1.070  32.306 .000 32.448 36.664      
The NGO Age -.014 .033 -.028 -.420 .675 -.078 .051 -.033 -.028 -.028 .945 1.058 
Total Income £000' .000 .000 -.037 -.535 .593 .000 .000 -.057 -.035 -.035 .924 1.082 
NGO affiliated within 
an umbrella group 
1.354 1.026 .088 1.319 .188 -.668 3.376 .093 .087 .087 .971 1.030 




Model Dimension Eigenvalue Condition Index 
Variance Proportions 






1 1 2.769 1.000 .02 .03 .04 .04 
2 .744 1.929 .00 .00 .44 .37 
3 .356 2.790 .08 .17 .52 .53 
4 .131 4.593 .90 .80 .00 .06 




Case Number Std. Residual Combinedmodel Predicted Value Residual 
138 -3.250 10.00 34.4199 -24.41991 
192 -3.047 11.00 33.8938 -22.89375 
203 -3.088 11.00 34.2055 -23.20547 
247 -3.377 10.00 35.3772 -25.37724 







 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 32.5307 35.8116 34.5353 .79749 238 
Residual -25.37724 11.03730 .08236 7.39224 230 
Std. Predicted Value -2.521 1.601 -.002 1.002 238 
Std. Residual -3.377 1.469 .011 .984 230 
a. Dependent Variable: Combinedmodel    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
